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Abstract
This study examines the reasons for the Saudi media mdustry's dependence on imported
foreign productions In a departure from traditional dependency theory, which
emphasises the role of external factors m the context of the world system, this study
explains the state of dependency and underdevelopment m a more locally grounded
analysis which evaluates the role of Saudi media policies and regulatory functions in
perpetuatmg this dependency status Two methodologies were applied firstly, content
analyses of a two-week penod of Saudi television programming on Channel 1 were
earned out to examine the quantity and quality of both local and imported television
fare m terms of genre and format Secondly, mterviews were conducted with Saudi
media officials, media pohcy makers, and mdependent local producers to ascertain, from
their perspective, what exactly constrains the Saudi media industry and limits its
potential, and why the Saudi media is dependent on imported television fare The results
of the content analyses and interviews showed that political, professional and economic
constraints handicap STy's performance This has led to output which is considered to
be irrelevant to the needs and mterests of the Saudi viewing population It has also led
to an mcrease m imported foreign programming and DBS populanty, thus creating a
cause of concern among culturahsts and Islamists who object to content which, they
argue, conflicts with the basic prmciples of the Islamic faith Recommendations are
proposed to Saudi media policy makers m order to counteract the foreign competition
and enhance mdigenous, self-reliant development
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1. Introduction
Television has gamed a pre-emment position as a cultural medium of global and national
sigmficance It is considered to outrank both print media and radio in terms of scope and
populanty, and possibly in terms of public prestige and credibility (McQuail, 1994) It
is a medium that has the capacity to be a major source of mformation and entertaInment
for viewers, both young and old, and has a potential power which, if wisely channelled,
can be of immense benefit to a society In Saudi Arabia, where there are no other public
entertainment institutions, for example, theatres and cmemas, Saudis perceive television
to be the principal source of domestic entertainment and information According to Al-
Oofy (1990), 82% of Saudis watch television for two to three hours a day
2. Statement of the Problem
The Saudi Arabian broadcastmg media industry is heavily dependent on imported
foreign television programmes The causes of this dependency and its perpetuation can
be assigned to a combination of both external and internal factors, and are also based
in Saudi media policy and practice, all of which have led to a suppressed and
constramed national media production mdustry in the country and an increased reliance
on imports However, the impact of imported foreign programming has been particularly
significant in Saudi Arabia because many Islamists and moralists cannot reconcile foreign
media content with their umque cultural and traditional values they believe that it
contradicts and undermines Islamic doctrine and Saudi national and cultural identity A
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large segment of the viewing population has therefore given foreign programming a
hostile reception On the other hand, a substantial proportion of Saudi Arabians have
grown disillusioned with the poor quality of Saudi television (STy) output, the causes
of which are discussed and analysed m chapters Vll-LX, and have demonstrated a
growing preference for imported programming, thus creatmg a sizeable market
These conflicting interests are represented and defended to varying degrees by segments
of the population referred to in this thesis as Islaniists and culturahsts, and who
persomfy what Nordenstreng and Vans (1973) term 'the nonhomogeneity of the national
state' Islamists can be defined as orators who lean heavily on Islamic teachings and
advocate their full implementation m Muslim societies Most of their rhetonc, however,
is often perceived as radical and zealous For example, Islamists will blame external as
opposed to mternal variables and conditions, as well as parties such as Ziomsts for
conspiring to undermine the Islamic faith Moreover, Islamists, who are by and large
distant from political power but retain a degree of influence on the populace, consider
secularism and its advocates as enemies Culturahsts, on the other hand, compnse the
camp who defend local Arab culture and believe m its potential as a umfymg factor
among Arab states They do not necessarily incorporate Islamic doctnne m their rhetonc,
but do share the Islaimsts' fears of outside intrusion on Arab and Muslim culture In
general, the culturahsts tend to adopt a less hostile and more moderate approach
This author believes in Islam and its workable and applicable teachings which advocate
free-will and call for dialogue This author does not share the Islamists' opinion that
Muslims and the Islamic world are the subjects of conspiratonal plots organised and
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orchestrated by the 'outside world' Moreover, this author believes that internal variables
may hnnt the potential of Saudi Arabia to compete m the international market, as
demonstrated by the current performance of the media industry, and may thus contribute
to a reliance on foreign imports and the subsequent influence of non-Saudi culture At
the same time, the author does not agree with culturahsts in their overemphasis on Arab
nationalism and their treatment of it as an ideology per se This author advocates reform
not only in regard to media policy but on all fronts in Saudi society, and calls for change
without destabthsmg Saudi Arabia's national and cultural identity
The concepts of national and cultural identity are problematic to define and subject to
sociological debate across the world Schlesmger (1991 173) defines the former as a
particular kind of collective identity and distinguishes it from nationalism For cultural
identity, various definitions have been proposed (Schlesmger, 1991 139-150) It can be
perceived as 'the amalgam of elements which distinguish communities (of whatever size)
one from another' (Pragnell, 1985, cited in Schlesmger, 1991 142) Aside from Pasha's
(1993) analysis of Muslim cultural theory of political ideology and mass media, relatively
little has been written about cultural identity in the Arab world In the case of Saudi
Arabia, it can be seen as encompassmg the common sense of Islamic identity and the
defence and preservation of specific historical, religious and cultural qualities, norms and
prmciples which shape and guide modern Saudi society In relation to the management
of audio-visual space, Schlesmger (1991 150) contends that there is a widespread belief
that 'the excessive importation of foreign cultural products, in this mstance television
programmes, can damage or even destroy identities'
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This chapter outlines the vanous problems of dependency on imports and how it
contnbutes to the suppression of local production and the perpetuation of the problem
It then examines the reasons behind the reactions of Islaniists, moralists and culturahsts
to imported media fare, and m particular to direct broadcastmg satellite services
2.1. The Origin of the Problem
A number of political, economic, and social circumstances in Saudi Arabia have
contnbuted to the current preponderance of foreign television programmes In the past,
to evade Egyptian media influence, which was considered to be a radical influence in
Nasir' s era in the 1 960s, the Saudi Arabian government allowed a substantial influx of
Anglo-Amencan media Dr Kildare, Perry Mason, The Virginian, and The Fugitive were
shown on Saudi television screens almost every mght (Tunstall, 1977) However, a heavy
diet of foreign, Arabic and Western programmes in the late 1960s and 1970s could be
disregarded smce television was still in its infancy, and many of the production facthties
and the skilled Saudi technical staff were not available at that time
Smce 1975, the Saudi government has engaged in massive development plans to establish
and modermse the infrastructure of all services, mcludmg the telecommunications sector
Modem, state-of-the-art media facilities were set in place m 1982, and many cntics felt
that dependency on imported media fare should not be continued, especially when Saudi
technical and artistic personnel became available Smce the 1980s, however, Saudi
television - and the second channel in particular as it broadcasts m English - has
exhibited a high proportion of imported fictional television productions dominated
chiefly by Anglo-Amencan programmes, as well as Arabic entertainment fare Such
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programmes are regular fixtures on the Saudi television programme schedule
2.2. Reliance on Imports
In Saudi Arabia, television broadcasting is based on general pnnciples of public service
broadcastmg, that is, to transmit programmes that inform, educate and entertain By
looking into the Saudi development plans which started m 1970 and Saudi media
activities, one realises that despite the prominent position of the media m the
development plans, such prominence has not yet been translated mto a programming
policy The systematic, heavy reliance on imported television programmes has, m fact,
adversely affected indigenous national media operations while continuous dependency
has contributed to the delay or the abandonment of any possible growth of local media
production operations
Smce its beginnings, Saudi television has been used primarily as an entertainment and
government propaganda medium and its potential, especially for national development,
is considered unfulfilled Little attention is given to mformational and educational
aspects of programming content, while the considerable emphasis placed on
entertainment ultimately serves as a depohticismg agent In his study of Saudi television,
Douglas Boyd (1982) observes that
'The programming on Saudi Arabian television is essentially entertainment
oriented Little attempt was made to provide viewers with programmes of
an educational nature, for various reasons the lack of production
personnel and facilities, the absence of a programming philosophy by
those who were responsible for progranmimg, and the ease with which
outside entertainment programming could be purchased '(Boyd, 1982 120)
In the past few years, the inauguration of regional satellite systems such as ARABSAT
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and, more recently, the Egyptian Nilesat, as well as the adoption of advanced satellite
broadcastmg technologies, such as 'digital compression' m the 1990s, have resulted m a
proliferation of channels and an unsatiated demand for television programmes to fill air
time However, technological achievement has not been accompanied by an mcrease m
the volume of professional television production and a substantial part of this demand
is satisfied by imported programmes Broadcasters utthsmg this new technology have
been pressunsed mto filling the ever-mcreasmg air time with low-quality production,
compromismg their continuous promises to provide their audiences with high-quality
programming ' DBS Networks, such as Orbit and Showtime, each comprise numerous
channels and can be subscribed to reasonably cheaply These have become dumpmg
grounds for American entertainment produced m the l970s and 1980s, which were
endlessly re-run on American networks until they became obsolete
Anglo-Amencan prograrnmrng dominates the Saudi media market because it is
conveniently available, fanuhar and an mexpensive well-spun product at an affordable
price The greater expenence and resources of the American and British television
production mdustnes give their programmes a technical superiority which audiences
come to demand for all material, mcludmg domestic production Other reasons for the
persuasiveness of Anglo-American programmes include the high technical quality of the
programmes, the simplicity of the story and the reliance on action, suspense, and on
familiar celebrities These combme to make for their universal appeal (Katz and Wedell,
1978) Thomas Guback and Tapio Vans (1982) believe that
'American films abroad have cultivated patterns of public taste for
decades, and this undoubtedly has facilitated the distribution of American
television material ' (Guback and Vans, 1982 31)
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Hollywood conglomerate production giants have played a key role m exerting American
influence in Saudi Arabia, as Mankekar (1978) observes
'The MPEA (Motion Picture Export Association) accounts for 80 percent
of the total US foreign sales of television programmes in West Asia, and
Saudi Arabia is a special centre of Amencan influence, where there are
two television services one government-controlled, financed and
constructed with the assistance of NBC, and the other by Aramco, an
American Oil Consortium' (Mankekar, 1978 72)
In addition to Anglo-American productions, Arabic shows have begun to flood the STV
schedule as Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon are now considered to be the major exporters of
television series, plays and feature films to neighbouring Arab countries Because Saudi
Arabia has become an important market for these productions, much of the imported
Arab entertainment fare is made with the requirements of the Saudi system in mind and
with a degree of special religious and political consideration (Boyd, 1982) These latter
production centres were hailed as a means to counterbalance the Western media flow,
but by adopting the Western model they convey Western values and views that are
believed to conflict with those of a Muslim world Consequently, Saudi Arabian
productions are still noticeable by their absence from the schedules, despite recent
developments in the international and Arab arenas, and Saudi television is still
dependent on imported foreign entertainment fare Issues such as freedom of expression
and independence from government censorship and control over media facthties, which
are prerequisites to an active production industry, tend to be ignored In Saudi Arabia,
the local production system is weak and handicapped by exactly these types of obstacles
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2.3. Views on Saudi Television Output and Performance
2.3.1. Mass Communication Policy: The Media Scholars' Perspective.
Broadcast media suffered from the absence of a clear and precise information and
communication policy until 1982, when the Supreme Council of Mass Communication
actually formulated one The articulated objectives of the Saudi media are that they
should be utthsed as a tool to facilitate development plans and to preserve local Saudi
culture Saudi media scholars and cultural critics argue that Saudi television performance
is not consistent with, and deviates from the declared Saudi communication and
mformation policy, especially m relation to cultural aspects of media performance The
prolonged and continuous dependency on foreign-produced television programmes is at
the centre of this debate (see Tash, 1995, Ashobaili, 1992, Yamani, 1995, Awis and
Madkoor, 1990) The following views on two programme genres, children's programmes
and entertainment, illustrate the current argument
In connection with children's programmes, an article from the policy document outhnes
how the media should cater for young viewers
'The Saudi Mass Communication Policy affirms the relationship between
today's child and tomorrow's environment Thus, attention will be given
to the guidance, educational and recreational programmes for children
The programmes will be based on educational and scientific principles,
and directed [sic] by highly speciahsed personnel' (Article IX of Saudi
Mass Communication Policy, Ministry of Information, 1982 See Appendix
B)
Saudi media scholars contend that this should be translated mto action and that
children's programmes should be written and produced with the needs of Saudi children
in mind Ideally, programmes would draw on the Islamic heritage and introduce it
visually into the language of television, they would convey more knowledge about the
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country and its history, and would prepare youngsters to participate in building Saudi's
future
In the sphere of entertainment, guidelines for certain elements of STy programming are
also prescnbed under the stated Saudi Mass Communication Policy Article ifi of the
Mass Communication Policy (1982) reads
'All the information media seek to serve society by consolidating its
precious Islamic values, firmly fixing its honoured Arabic traditions,
keeping its gracious inhented customs and standing m opposition to
everything that spoils its purity and harmony' (Mass Communication
Policy, 1982. See Appendix B)
Again, Saudi media scholars and culturalists believe that the prmciples of this article
must be translated m decision-making processes about the entertainment content of
Saudi television, which, they argue, should be geared towards performing an educational
function and a role in the dissemination of traditional and Islamic values They maintain
that STy should be exploited in the development plans and used as a tool to promote
cultural identity (Alhanthi, 1983, Bin Salamah, 19972)
Article VIII in the Saudi Mass Communication Policy states
'Saudi mass commumcation will give the family its due attention, bemg the
essential unit in the society [ ] Mass Communication Policy, 1982 See
Appendix B)
A number of Saudi media researchers believe that a commitment to family life, as
clearly articulated in this article should be reflected positively m STV entertainment
output Their opinion of SlY's current performance is rooted in their perception that
STy
 has failed to fulfil the role assigned to it by the policy, with adverse consequences
(Ashobaih, l997)
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Accordmg to official media policy, the Saudi media are expected to reflect the culture
and circumstances of their target audience The Saudi media, comparable to media
anywhere, have the potential to showcase and inform Saudi society in a manner
consistent with its cultural and religious values a potential which can be more fully
realised if the media produce their own content It can be argued that a young country
like Saudi Arabia which lacks sufficient techmcal expertise and know-how cannot
produce high quality programmes the programmes that television viewers are used to
everywhere It is perhaps premature to prejudge Saudi television before it has had the
chance to prove itself The talent coupled with the 'reasonable' expertise that are readily
available now are untapped resources which will continue as such as long as importation
of media products at relatively low pnces continues to flood the market Production
quality, however, is only one indicator of programme quality The populanty of a
programme is often denved from its mdigenous ideas, the personahties mvolved, and
from its local cultural flavour Thus, if audience appreciation is taken as another
indicator, locally produced programmes meet the quahtative expectations of their
audiences and are usually popular
2.3.2. The Problem from the Islamic Perspective
Culturalists and conservatives alike within Saudi society have had a significant influence
on the shaping of domestic media output smce the emergence of this industry The
objections of religious scholars - known as Ulama - to some Saudi television programme
content is well-documented There are, in extremis, some instances where Ulama have
even made personal appeals to the King, voicing their concerns over specific
programmes during weekly meetings Cnticismg this new technology and its 'corrupt
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mfluence' on local culture has became the focus of much Islamic discourse in both
written form and m audio-taped lectures, especially during Jummah orations (Friday
sermons), and this influence is pervasive in almost every corner of the state
Commanding a highly-respected status within Saudi's social structure, the Ulama
contmue to be a shapmg influence on the Saudi media It is important to note here,
however, that religious scholars and conservatives have never directly intervened m
editorial policy decisions of the media, their concerns are restricted to broadcasts
depicting 'liberal' scenes on the television The following section documents certain areas
of the Islamic agenda
Imported Arab Serials
Among non-Arab populations there exists the mistaken assumption that all Arabs belong
to the same culture However, there are vast differences in terms of the degree of faith
in Islam and the social values held by each country Saudi society, unlike more Western-
influenced Arab societies, is struggling to abide by and hve according to the teachings
of Islam, especially regarding such issues as gender roles, relations between opposite
sexes and family values Under scrutiny, most countries' media products exported to
Saudi Arabia cannot satisfy the social and moral criteria established by Islamic doctrine,
and this is particularly evident in imported Arab serials which have in their content
issues regarding family values or the status of women m society Although many of these
imported Arab productions are designed for the Saudi market and are less 'liberal' than
their DBS counterparts, the majority inevitably depict values, ideas and lifestyles which,
Islamists believe, conflict with Islamic principles and are irrelevant to Saudi culture
Foreign media products in general usually convey messages inconsistent with Saudi
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Islamic values, as the next section explams
Sexual Imagery
A critical issue is the encouragement of sexual activity and underlymg sexual themes
Relationships between the sexes have always been a focus of reproach and consternation
when portrayed in drama series, as Islamic laws state that immorality and immodesty
constitute the sm of adultery or zina
'And come not near zma (unlawful sexual mteraction) Verily it is a great
and bad sin and an evil way '(Quran, 17 32)
If a Muslim indulges in the prehmmaiy build-up to zina, then there is the risk that s/he
may succumb to it The prehmrnary actions themselves must therefore be avoided at all
cost Prevention of zina (adultery) mvolves blocking the ways or means that can or may
lead to it Islam prevents the spread of zina among followers by strongly advocating
agamst free-mixmg between opposite sexes, unrestricted social mteraction between men
and women is considered a precursor to zina Contrary to Islamic doctrine, many
television entertainment shows, serials and plays - to which young Saudi viewers are
exposed - depict the free mixing and dating of the opposite sexes in their plots as the
norm and as acceptable behaviour, this is one of the grounds of Islamic objections
Dress Code
Muslim scholars and culturahsts also object to the way in which the strict Islamic dress
code is flouted in television content Ths apphes to an Egyptian show analysed m
chapter VI -Aihub Wa Attoofan ('Love and the Flood') - and to many current television
programmes In Islamic rulmg, clothes should be loose and should cover the area
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between the navel and the knees for men, while for women the Quran says
'0 Prophet, tell thy wives and daughters, and the behevmg women that
they should cast their outer garments over their persons (when out of
doors) That is most convement that they should be known as such, and
not be molested ' (Quran, 33 59)
This is aimed at preventing the provocation of desires and at directing such natural
desires into 'legitimate' channels of fulfilment as opposed to letting them find 'forbidden'
means of expression In the Quran (Surah Al-Ahzab, Verse 59), Allah orders the
believing women to wear a Jilbab, which is defined in the commentanes on the Quran
as a cloak that covers a woman's body from the top of her head to her feet (see Ibn
Kathier and Aijalalem commentaries) and is worn when a woman is m the company of
males to whom she is not immediately related Females in Saudi Arabia are trained,
both at home and in school, to abide by these teachings regarding their appearance.
However, Islamists maintain that these same women and children, as television viewers,
are continuously exposed to contradictory televised messages
Marriage and Family Values
In Islamic terms, there are three main objectives of marriage firstly, to propagate the
human race, and secondly, as the Quran says, to preserve a social sense of morahty and
chastity
'Among His signs is that He has created spouses for you from among
yourselves, so that you may console yourselves with them He has planted
affection and mercy between you, in that there are signs for people who
reflect '(30 21)
'Live a protected life m mamage, not indulging m illicit affairs nor having
secret lovers ' (4 25)
The final objective is to provide mental peace and nurture love and affection The
Islamists' concerns over the content of imported programming partly relate to messages
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which, they allege, contradict these teachmgs For example, in an Egyptian series, Aihub
Wa Attoofan, descnbed in chapter VI, mamage is depicted as a practical step in the life
of an aristocratic 'bad guy' in order to improve his trade and to forge the right social
connections in the meantime, in most Egyptian-made dramas the postponement of
marriage is depicted as acceptable provided the couple can see each other on a regular
basis It is feared that this will encourage the type of socialisation which may lead to
unlawful sexual relationships, as mentioned above In Egyptian society, with its
population of more than 60 imlhon, one of the obstacles to marriage is the search for
accommodation 'a flat or a room on the roof or m the basement' is a common phrase
However, it is an alien concept to Saudi Arabian society which enjoys higher living
standards and housing facthties, and in which mamage at a young age has always been
encouraged by Muslim scholars In contrast, in most of the imported foreign-produced
shows, marrying at a young age is always portrayed as a great mistake but this concept
is contrary not only to the Islamic teachmgs, but also to the strategic orientation of an
underpopulated country such as Saudi Arabia
Children's Programmes: the Islamic Perspective
The prophet Mohammed said 'Every child is born on the fitrah, then his parents Judaise
him or Christiamse him or make him a Magus' (related by Al-Bukhan) The word fitrah
refers to the innate character, but here it means the acknowledgement of the existence
of Allah In Islamic doctrine, the young child is naturally inclined to goodness, a belief
in and love of truth and a hatred of falsehood It is important to give the child the
correct information, answer his questions and satisfy his curiosity and it is the parents'
responsibthty to ensure that the child has these nghts Parents are responsible for the
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protection of their children's minds, hearts, and souls from the seduction and glamour
of evil, as illustrated by the following
'Every one of you is a protector and a guardian of his immediate charge
and is responsible for the actions of those people who are committed to
his charge A man is steward m respect to the family members of his
house, a woman is steward m respect to her husband's house and his
children' (Sahih Al-Bukhan, 1996)
According to Manal Khreishi (1998) commenting on children's television programmes,
in general, the vast majonty of television programmes flout Islamic principles Among
the most senous violations are those related to tawhid or monotheism and the tawhzd
of Ruboobiyah or the 'Umty of Lordship' (meaning that Allah has no partners with him
in his Lordship over all the worlds) Tins is often seen as violated m children's
programmes with super heroes, for example, Power Rangers, Superman, etc, the former
of which is a long running show on SlY Channel 2, while the Disney film Hercules is
a clear example of Shirk or polytheism (Khreishi, 1998 20) Because children as viewers
have been ignored by Arabic drama senes makers, they are exposed to a different set
of values through these imported messages 6 and are, in general, not fully aware of the
manner in which such ideas in these programmes conflict with Islamic teaching
However, given the lack of speciahsed wnters and the policies adopted by SlY
regarding the pnces allocated to children's shows (see chapters Vil-IX), among other
reasons, there is a continuing reliance on and preference by youngsters for Western and
imported matenal To counteract this there have been efforts by the Arab Council for
Childhood and Development to encourage cartoomsts and artists in the Arab world to
create an Arabic cartoon character to replace, m the minds of Arab children, those
imported from Hollywood (see Appendix F, cartoon No 8) The ACCD has laid down
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the conditions and requirements for this character and allocated a £20,000 award for the
winning design
2.4. Objections to Direct Broadcast Sateffite (DBS) Content
2.4.1. The Religious and Moral Perspective
While the concern for the preservation of cultural identity is not a new phenomenon, it
has been given new impetus by manifestations of global media, such as DBS As a
transnational television service it has triggered Islamists' concerns regardmg this new
'invasion' as they call it, and DBS 'liberal' programming has met with fierce opposition
from the Islamic elite and cultural cntics who consider much of the content to be
inconsistent with the prevailing Islamic beliefs and values system The Islamists' concerns
focus on perceptions that such broadcasts contam both covert and overt mducements to
rebel against Islamic culture and family values and, they claim, the content exposes
women to a loose and liberal morality and to emancipatory propaganda Some observers
and analysts of DBS content have concluded that it operates under a 'sex sells' banner
and thrives on sexual taboos in the receivmg societies
'Islam lays great emphasis on modesty, so much so that the Prophet
Mohammad said "Modesty is a part of Iman (faith)". But television's
emphasis on illicit, depraved and bestial immorality is the very negation
of the Islamic concept of modesty and shame ' (Shalur, 1997 9)
What Islamists and moralists consider to be obscene and prurient matenals are amply
found in many DBS programmes Over sixty per cent of viewers believe that among the
negative effects of DBS programmes is the encouragement of immorality and indecency,
while 98 % believe that the sexual content, in particular, provokes a sexual desire in
them (Alabid and Mali, 1995) It is maintained by these viewers that DBS content often
contains sexual themes mamfest in both dress and scnpt, and revealing shots, especially
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of female participants, such as smgers, dancers and even presenters (see Appendix F,
cartoon No 4) However, the perceived popularity of such programmes encourages their
contmued transmission
'There is a method to television's permissive madness Sex sells [ j as
the networks and production companies discover that they were titillating
more viewers than they outraged, they have gradually mcreased the sales
potential of their products by permittmg more and more taboos to be
broken m ever more explicit fashion '
DBS drama and serial output is not subject to Saudi censorship procedures and this may
increase its appeal One-time taboo topics, such as incest and sadomasochism, are now
dealt with in televised senes from Latin American countries, such as Brazil, Argentina
and Mexico Dubbed mto Arabic, they are beamed to viewers in Saudi Arabia and other
Muslim countries for just $1 ,000 an hour These imported Latin American soaps, such
as Casandra, Nano, Guadalupe, Maiya, and others, have become a fixed genre on most
DBS channels but they attract cnticism for their exphcit sexual themes and for being
vehicles for alien values which directly contrast with Islamic precepts (Tash, 1995,
Adaihj, 1995) '° It is worthy of note that Islaimsts' criticisms have seldom been directed
at the role of SlY in contnbutmg to the demand for such DBS content
Songs and Music
Apart from the 'All Music' channels such as ART 5, MTV and VU!, music and song
programmes are one of the mainstays of Arab DBS channels, such as ESC, DSC, MBC
and Orbit 2 (see Appendix A) The songs are usually accompanied by dancers or
'models' featured on what are known as 'video clips' Islamists believe that these dancers
violate the Islamic dress code by appearing m revealing costumes, they object to the
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'lasciviousness' of the performances, and the attention given to these performers in
general According to Mustafa and Syrafi (1995)
'The concentration on singers' and actresses' news by the media is a
contnbution to the spreadmg of evil in Arab and Muslim societies The
emphasis on lund news of actresses provokes the lustful thoughts in the
hearts and minds of the younger generation, which would drive them to
imitate these celebrities and fall astray '(Mustafa and Syrafi, 1995 202)
Overall, Islamists worry that if such things are tolerated it will lead to more
desensitisation and indifference towards matters of decency and chastity (see Tash, 1995,
Alamir, 1993) They are also concerned about the lack of an independent regulatory
authority, especially smce ARABSAT took the position of not mterfermg unless the
content is a clear-cut case of pornographic matenal ' On the other hand, Islaimsts who
have voiced their concerns over the 'penis' of some DBS content have in turn been
criticised by secular circles as being obstructivists - technological Luddites, who would
try to stop the wheels of history from turning
2.4.2. General Criticism of DBS Content
DBS content is cnticised and rejected for various reasons apart from the religious and
moral reasons described above Ramzey (1997) and Wahbi (1996) believe it is
disassociated from Muslim and Arab societies and fails to meet the specific needs of
these viewers and has margmahsed certam segments of the population in their drama
representations Women, for example, have been portrayed in many Egyptian dramas
as objects of pleasure and as irrational and dependent mdividuals (Rainzey, 1997)
Religious groups have been depicted as backward and violent fanatics in a number of
films such as Alerhabi ('The Terronst'), Almaseir ('The Destiny'), Almuhajer ('The
Immigrant') and Alerhab Waalkbab ('Terronsm and Kebab') and in Western films based
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on similar themes such as The Siege, Under Siege, Executive Decision and True Lies
Some media scholars believe that this type of production reinforces the
misunderstandings and stereotypical ideas about Islam Rural populations have always
been lampooned as examples of gulhbthty and naivety, particularly m the majonty of
Egyptian drama senes (Wahbi, 1996) In general, many Arab broadcasters stand accused
of conspiring against their own cultures and divertmg Muslims away from the faith, as
well as bemg merely 'bridges' for values which conflict with Islamic culture 12
One of the main criticisms of DBS content is directed at its 'secular tendencies' Apart
from the few 'question and answer' religious programmes, religion on almost all DBS
channels has been reduced to compulsory ntuals of a few minutes of recitations from
the Quran at the start of transmission and at close-down Islamic values hold that life
and human interaction should be subject to religious doctrine (Alqaradawi, 1973, 1974),
and it is argued that a more secular approach will eventually emasculate the people's
faith and religious beliefs (Kajak, 1987, Tash, 1995)
From a secular standpoint DBS is seen by culturahsts and media scholars as capitahsmg
on the conservatism of the national media in vanous Middle Eastern countries, mcludmg
Saudi Arabia From this point of view, DBS is seen as part of a urn-directional
information and cultural product flow from the West to Saudi Arabia, upon which Arab
broadcasters remain dependent 13 A balanced reciprocal flow, culturahsts believe, would
reduce or eliminate the misunderstandings and stereotypical ideas between the two
cultures by means of more factual media programmes which recognise each other's nghts
and deal with each other on a more equal footing 14 Apart from the few political
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discussion programmes mvolvmg politicians and policy-makers from Western countnes,
mainly the UK and the US, such as MBC's Agenda, and Nile TV's Monday and Cross
Nations, there are no other programmes dealing with this issue At the other extreme,
some Arab broadcasters, such as the Libyans, are now adoptmg a hostile and radical
anti-Western and anti-Amencan discourse through selective programming Between such
a radical, extremist approach and dependency on fictional Western-made matenals, there
is not yet a moderate and realistic 'third way'
On the other hand, Basyum (1996) believes that 'DBS presented a civilisation chiillenge
and Arabs are up to the challenge because of their confidence m their civihsation' '
Other wnters support this view and assert that the fears of determimsts and culturahsts
of what has been called a 'cultural mvasion' are Just a myth, and that Muslim and Arab
culture is not m such a weak and vulnerable position that it could be annihilated by
other cultures 16 DBS is therefore a contentious issue, not only among the elite corps
of the mdigenous media, but amongst the public m general However, for a broad
section of the public it presents a vanety of programmes of both Arab and Western
ongm that have been produced without the impediment of local constraints winch
weaken and reduce the appeal of local production (Boyd, 1994)
3. Context of the Study
This study comes at a time of many senous political and social developments m Saudi
Arabia and m the region as a whole, and at a time when Islamic revivahst movements
are sweepmg across most of the Islamic world In addition, the recent pohtical turmoil
in the Gulf region has two major implications for this study First, conflict in this corner
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of the globe has awakened long-dormant, anti-Western and, more particularly, anti-
Amencan feelings These sentiments have been openly expressed by Islamists and
nationalists on numerous occasions on some of the recently mtroduced DBS news
channels, such as Aljazirah Second, the political and inihtaiy mstabthty of the region has
had unavoidable repercussions for the already troubled economies of all states m its
proximity - and that necessarily includes Saudi Arabia Moreover, attempts to impose
a peace settlement as a solution to the Palestinian question are considered by many
Islannsts as both unjust and unfair, and certam nfts within the Islamic and Arab world
have been widened as a consequence of the confrontation between the Iraqi regime and
the AmericanlBntish allied forces These factors have made the development of local
media industnes m the region an even more crucial issue
4. Objectives of the Study
The objectives of the present study are thus, first, to mvestigate and explain the
implications for Saudi culture of foreign-produced television programmes This entails
the documentation and discussion of the culturahsts' and Islaniists' concerns over
programme content, an examination of the perceived conflict between a number of DBS
Arabic and non-Arabic channels with Saudi culture, and an analysis of the nature and
perceived implications of this conflict Other questions addressed mclude the following
Do perceived threats to local Saudi culture stem from the national television service
which cames an element of pre-censored, imported, conservative programmes ? Or do
they emanate from the less-censored commercial DBS channels ? Or is a subtle balance
involved? Islaimsts, after all, have voiced their concerns over both, though they have
reserved their harshest views for the DBS channels Can the concerns of Islamists and
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their culturalist counterparts be justified? Why do they regard cross-border matenals as
posing a real threat to the prevailing local culture? This study also aims to contnbute to
an understanding of the role of local media and indigenous production in resisting and
mimmismg the impact of what Islamists and culturalists perceive to be undesirable
intrusions by foreign broadcasters It is hoped that this study contributes to contemporary
knowledge and understanding of the believed effects of imported media programming
on local culture in general, as well as contnbutmg to research on the specifics of Saudi
Arabia in this field It is anticipated that, in the final analysis, it may present practical
suggestions and recommendations for Saudi television and local production companies
to amve at a workable compromise
A second objective is to explam Saudi dependence on the importation of foreign
television This involves qualitative and quantitative analyses of Saudi television and a
comparison with DBS offermgs to highlight the shortcomings and attractions of each
This is discussed in relation to the demand for foreign imports by a high proportion of
foreign workers in Saudi Arabia, a general desire for a more global perspective in news
reportage, and the key political, economic and professional factors which constrain local
production and limit the potential of the Saudi media industry The latter requires an
exploration into the role of local pnvate production companies in at least niinimismg the
reliance on foreign-made television programmes, screened by both Saudi television and
DBS channels, by contnbutmg to the development of indigenous talent and production
Thirdly, the study will aim to make conclusions and recommendations about the future
development of Saudi broadcasting policy Smce the problematic strong association of
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the Saudi government with media operations is a major factor in shaping their
orgamsational structure, output and performance, this study exanimes the thorny
relationship between the government and media institutions, especially the pohcy issues
and the appropriation of the television medium by the Ministry of Information By
evaluating the Saudi national television service's offerings in the light of the stated Saudi
government communications and information policy, this study aims to propose an
alternative relationship m the interests of the country as a whole and m the mterests of
media system as well
Finally, the research aims to contribute to academic thinking on cultural imperialism and
cultural dependency and to investigate the internal factors which stimulate a preference
for foreign imports and which peipetuate this dependency These factors tend to be
overlooked in dependency research relating to Saudi Arabia While cultural dependency
and imperialism theory is part of the tradition in communication studies, it is often
inadequate as it focuses on external factors within the global system In the present case,
although relevant, it downplays the role of the Saudi government and internal forces in
maintaining a dependency status and fails to examine the role of the relationship
between internal and external factors in the dependency equation.
5. The Focus of the Analysis
Eschewing the shortcomings of some previous investigations into dependency theory and
global communication flow, it is this author's intention to subject the Saudi broadcast
media's policies and programming strategies to a searching, thematic analysis of
programme content to identify their elements, values, and the messages they seek to
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convey (see Vans, 1984) It should be noted here that this study is not particularly
concerned with the effects of a specific programme type or genre on a sample of viewers
but discusses the possible or assumed influences of foreign television matenals on local
culture m general It should also be clanfied that the scope of this study, for obvious
reasons, is confined to an mvestigation of the degree of dependency on foreign television
programmes While other media products are not completely ignored, they are not the
mam focus
The majonty of programmes aired by both DBS channels and Saudi television mainly
compnse senes, senals, songs, plays and films, and are generally classified under the
genre of entertainment It is this sphere of broadcastmg with which most culturahsts are
generally preoccupied and engaged and therefore provide the focus of this study's
analysis Nevertheless, other genres, such as news and current affairs and their content
will not be ignored as a consequence of this focus It is assumed m this study that the
majonty of Saudi television programmes are designed as entertainment, that mvariably
some imported entertainment has an mextncable ideological element; that ideas and
values may be conveyed and promoted if packaged to appeal to a thirst for
entertainment, and that it is therefore useful to analyse the content of Saudi television
broadcasts
It is hoped that the content analysis and discussion of Saudi television programming
policies, as well as the mvestlgatlon of the state of the pnvate production market, will
provide a better understanding of the mtemal factors affectmg the development of
television m Saudi Arabia, and will generate mtngumg questions and raise awareness of
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issues which need to be addressed by - and discussed with - government policy-makers
It is also hoped that such an analysis will assist m the identification of the most
important problems and, according to the fmdmgs of this study, suggestions and
recommendations will be formulated to help the Saudi broadcast media, particularly
television, to fulfil certain expectations and the promise mvested in them to take a more
influential and more senous part m the intellectual lives of the Saudi people
25
Notes and References
1 'Digital Compression and TV Channel Prohferation', Asharq Alawsat, issue 6245,
3 11996
2 Bm Salamali, (1997), Saudi Arabian representative for UNESCO Personal interview
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
3 Ashobaih, A S (1997), Member of Consultative Council, Member of Supreme Council
for Mass Media, former General Director of Saudi television Personal interview.
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
4 Sumayyah Bmt Joan, (1998), 'The nghts of children' Aljumuah Magazine, Vol 9 issue
11 March l998,pp9-14
5 Khreishi, M (1998), Television and Islamic prmciples Aljumuah Magazine, Vol 10
issue 4 August 1998, p 20
6 'Children's Programming on Arab Television,' Asharq Alawsat, issue 6864, 13 9.1996
7 Ibid
8 'What has happened to entertainment9,' Awake, 22 5 1997 pp 4-6
9 Yasm, M (1998), 'Mexican Soap Invasion', Gulf TV Magazine, 15 3 1996 Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia Gulfvision pp 55-67
10 Alwazier, I (1997), Broadcaster and producer Personal interview Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia
11 Shoter, 0 (1998), Director of marketmg and external relations, Arab Satellite
Commumcations Organisation (ARABSAT) Personal interview Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
12 Mohammad, A H (1997), 'Media from Westermsation to Islamic Authentication',
Albayan, issue 109, Jan-Feb, 1997. pp 41-47, Abdulmalik, A. (1997), 'Mass media and
Popular Culture', Gulf TV Magazine, Vol 15(4) March, 1997 Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Gulfvision
13. Abdullali, K M (1998), 'Arab DBS Seduction or persuasion 7 ', Alkhaleej. 5 8 1998
14 Annbhan, F (1998), 'The danger of globahsation for the Muslim world', The Muslim
World 27th July - 2nd August, 1998, Abdullah, K M (1998), 'Arab DBS Seduction or
persuasion'', Alkhaleej 5 8 1998
15 Basyuni, A (1996), 'The reality of Arab DBS', Gulf TV Magazine, Vol 15, No 1
June, 1996 Riyadh, Saudi Arabia Gulfvision pp 66-69
26
16 Aljasir, A S (1997), Deputy Minister for Information Affairs, Member of the
Supreme Council for Mass Media Personal interview Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Ashobaili,
A S (1997), Member of Consultative Council, Member of Supreme Council for Mass
Media, former General Director of Saudi television Personal interview Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia
27
CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW
1. Introduction
Issues surrounding the development of global communication have been dominated by
the rapid expansion of the mass media m the latter part of the 20th century
Technological progress has significantly enhanced numerous channels of communication
in terms of capacity and prohferation, and there have been global movements for
democratisation as well as changes in the execution of diplomacy and international
politics These technological, socioeconomic and political forces have led to pivotal
transformations in the mass media, and especially m broadcasting and television
(Tehraman, 1982) Information is more easily accessible and communication is facthtated
across the world, which has become, as Marshall McLuhan termed it, 'a global village'
Commenting on tins, McPhail (1989) stated
'Television without borders has the potential to unite the world m
McLuhan's 'global village' where truth, cooperation and goodwill are the
order of the day '(McPhail, 1989 51)
2. Global Information Flow
Historically, notions of international information and communication flow have been
sigmficantly modified and re-evaluated among scholars, particularly m the aftermath of
the Cold War, and major transformations m the spheres of global politics, economics and
culture have led to radical reviews of previous communication and development
theories Following the struggle for supremacy among superpowers, autonomous
developing nations are now included m the dominance equation Many of these countries
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perceive themselves, or are considered as subdued by Western control over international
economic systems and as victims of cultural invasions and electronic colomahsm
(Yamam, 1995, Aijabery, 1997,' Tash, 1995)
Ideally, communication is a continual exchange between reciprocally responsive partners
However, advances in mass media technology have resulted in a flow of Western media
content to developmg countries, a flow which has been shown to be one-way, from a few
mdustnahsed nations to the rest of the globe (Ayish, 1992, Reeves, 1993) Vans (1984)
stated that m the 1980s, imported programmes accounted for more than 50% of total
programming in 39 developing nations, with the USA as the main exporter In general,
the USA has been a key player m the flow of media products on both commercial and
official levels This is evident in the role of the United States Information Agency
(USIA)
'The USIA tries to influence public attitudes in other nations in support
of Amencan foreign policy objectives One of its methods is to make itself
as useful as possible to the media in a host country To the extent wanted
by the host country, USIA provides it with goods and services, [.. } from
sound-effects record libranes to advice on how to solve technical and
orgamsational broadcasting problems [ ] to assistance m conducting
seminars on mass commumcation '2
International television flow has been debated from three perspectives One is that
television's impact is immense and pervasive, requiring immediate formulation of
national media policies to cope with advancmg influences A second perspective holds
that there is a lack of empirical data, thus preventing the assessment of the degree and
nature of television's impact l'his scarcity of research makes it difficult for policy
makers to make informed decisions A third perspective puts the blame on national
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commumcation policies in recipient countries and recogmses the imbalance m the flow
of television programming It contends that with time the process will correct itself
(Mowlana, 1986)
The first empincal study to document the world wide flows of television programmmg
was camed out by Kaarle Nordenstreng and Taplo Vans for UNESCO, and published
m 1974 Nordenstreng and Vans identified two predominant trends in global television
programming one-way flow from big exporters to the rest of the world, and the
predominance of entertainment programming The leading producers and distributors
were the USA, the UK, France and Germany (Nordenstreng, 1974, see also Vans, 1984)
The study drew attention to global television traffic and acted as a springboard for more
studies m this area
According to numerous UNESCO studies of television programme traffic, there are two
trends which can be identified in the mternational flow first, there is one-way traffic
from a few large exporting countries to the rest of the world, second, this flow is
dominated by entertainment material As for the distribution of television news matenal,
one study has found that it is also dominated by three world-wide agencies the British
Visenews, the half-Bntish, half-American UPI-]N, and the American CBS-Newsfilm
services (UNESCO, 1973, 1988)
Recent progress in research into the development of international communication and
information flow can be attributed to a number of factors vast technological
improvement affecting the quality, quantity and nature of the flow, mcreased awareness
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of the lack of equihbnuin in information flow and its imphcations internationally,
nationally and for the rndividual, more participants rnvolved m communication and
mformation transfer, creatrng a political, social and economic Impact rn trade, marketrng,
education and culture, more rn-depth research into global advertisrng as well as
corporate and pubhc opinion, and finally, the issues surroundmg the New International
Economic Order (NIEO) and the New World Information and Communication Order
(NWICO) (Mowlana, 1986)
Mowlana (1986) defmes global rnformation flow as
'[ I the movement of messages across national boundaries between and
among two or more national and cultural systems that should rnclude both
national and international dimensions' (Mowlana, 1986 44)
It is when a nation or cultural system has equal access to this movement and is able to
participate that political, economic and cultural dependency is reduced There is,
therefore, an underlying notion of reciprocity essential to the communication process
Reciprocity rn the information and communication flow is determined not only by the
direction of flow, but also by volume and content These, m turn, are dictated by
technological, political, economic, cultural and legal factors which determine the quality
and extent of the reciprocal relationship
3. New Global Order
Major upheavals across the globe in the latter quarter of the 20th century have created
an impetus for rndividuals and nations to embark on a quest for new ideologies in
political, economic and cultural spheres, and to review previous communication and
development theories In this chmate, the search for a new cultural order and the
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environment m which tins is bemg formulated are fundamental considerations Recent
events m the Middle East, and the Umted States' mvolvement and mtervention m this
region m particular have illuminated the demand for 'a new information ecology with
culture at its centre' (Mowlana, 1993) Mowlana postulates that
'[ ] any discussion of a new world order must take mto account the
broader ecological/communication context as well as the diversities of
global culture' (Mowlana, 1993 10)
Questions are raised as to whether a new world order and a new informationlculture
ecology will best serve the mterests of the mdividual and global society, and whether
they will effectively reduce or mcrease the dependence of developmg countries
3.1. The New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) Debate
Almakaty (1995) documents the development of the New World Information and
Communication Order m the 1 970s, that matenahsed not only from the desire of Less
Developed Countries (LDCs) for equal rights in the international communication and
information flow, but also from the LDCs' recogmtion of their rights to self-
determination of domestic commumcation pohcies (Almakaty, 1995) In aspinng to
greater autonomy m information, economic, cultural and pohtical systems, the LDCs
required a formal international pohcy to restructure international information systems,
media and communication Nordenstreng (1984) views the process as an action against
imperialist policies which determine the nature of the flow, and a way to gain
mdependence from imperialist powers The LDCs aspired to a reciprocal international
communication flow winch would faithfully represent their mterests in an unbiased
manner
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This initiative by the LDCs to restructure mternational communications systems, and
thus empower their own while disempowermg that of the colomahsts, effectively called
for government control of the media It met with strong opposition from Western
governments and media organisations The US government, in common with others,
feared that the NWICO would result m a government monopoly and control of the mass
media, countenng journahstic precepts of free flow of information and a free press,
while generally conflictmg with Western principles regarding journahsm and free market
systems (Meyer, 1988)
A fundamental question is posed by Almakaty (1995) who asks 'Who owns and
commands the dissemination of information and for what goal and ambition? ' Mowlana
(1993) stresses that it is not the techmcal and instrumental issues at stake here, but
moral and ethical systems and human mteraction, and it is these that will determine the
effects of any developments m global orders This debate surrounding ownership of and
autonomy within the dissemination of information is gaining a new perspective as the
globalisation of media technology, such as the Internet and DBS, increases
3.2. An Islamic Global Order
Whether or not the emergmg global mformation commumty can help or hinder the use
of information m Islamic society is revealed by a comparison of the elements that
constitute the Information Society Paradigm - the dommant model of the US and other
countries - with those of a paradigm specific to the Islamic community (Mowlana, 1993)
Charactenstics of the Information Society paradigm are superseculansm based on the
nation-state system, globahsm, synergetic economy, and the provision by individuals of
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the knowledge and expertise that this society demands (Masuda, 1981 cited m Mowlana,
1993) However, as Mowlana (1993) argues, these pnnciples are irreconcilable with four
mam areas of the Islamic Commumty Paradigm the world view of tawhzd - the unity of
God, human beings and universe, and the brotherhood of mankind, the sociology of
knowledge, the mtegrations of personahty, and the meaning of society and the state
The first of these, tawhzd, determines the boundaries and direction of information flow,
and not vice-versa While other paradigms may promise spiritual growth contingent on
intellectual growth, Islam is already founded on these pnnciples Moreover, the Islamic
Commumty Paradigm is seen as comprehensive and definitive, and cannot accommodate
conflicting prmciples from other paradigms
The second notion is that of the sociology of knowledge If it is accepted that there can
be no exclusive ownership by mdustnahsed societies of information and knowledge, they
should not be regarded as unique and mdividual entities, but as being at the core of
technological and society development processes umversally However, as Western
innovations and models of development have been embraced and adopted by the Islamic
countnes, the latter have become subservient under the dominating systems of the West,
and subject processes of 'disintegration and disunity' (Mowlana, 1993)
The third area is what Mowlana (1993 16) calls 'the integration of personality'. Partly
underlymg the clash between the Information Society Paradigm and the Islamic
Community Paradigm is the fact that while the former is based on seculansm, the latter
is underhned by 'a rehgiopohtical, socioeconomic and cultural system based on an
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elaborate legal code and junsprudence' (1993 16) At the centre of the system are the
Ulama, the religious scholars who guide the community mjunsprudence, law, economics,
culture and religion Secular paradigms are therefore mapphcable to a society where
rehgion and societal mstitutions are mseparable and are viewed as an integrative whole
Finally, the Islamic concept of the community - the Ummah - is that it is universal and
not subject to limitations, whether geographical, temtonal, linguistic, racial or
nationalistic It is a world-wide society that cuts across attempts at demarcation and
which is bound as a distmctive and unique social order by its commitment to Islam a
total life system bounded only by itself With its emphasis on unity, any other paradigm
based on a concept of a nation-state, such as the current global political system, is
mcompatible This polarisation has ramifications for information/cultural relations as it
is culture-based What has occurred is that the Islamic rulers have failed to resist the
current dominance of Western paradigms, brmgmg with them the global policies of
frontiensm and resultmg in the fragmentation of Islarmc society and an Ulama divided
by geographical boundanes At the forefront of this conflict is a new order based on
information and commumcation technology and its effects on the unity or disunity of
Islamic society To sum up, what is required is a new perspective of the climate within
which a new global information and communication order that is reconcilable with
Islamic pnnciples can grow and encourage a balanced, reciprocal global mformation
flow
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4. Communication for Development: Theories and Paradigms
Although commumcation scholars differ widely regarding the role of mass media m
developmg countries, they do agree that the mass media are important tools for nation
building (Schramm, 1964, Rogers, 1983) Most studies which consider mass
communication as a force for social awareness and national development conclude that
the media are fundamental to rapid, successful, planned development, while Dwight W
Allen and Philip Chnstensen (1973) share the opinion that mass commumcation is not
merely an auxiliary element of development, but a fundamental source
Many authors who are concerned with the role of communication and culture m the
development process set two paradigms next to or m opposition to each other
modermsation and growth versus dependency and underdevelopment While the
modermsation paradigm can be considered the oldest and most rooted m Western
thought, the dependency theory has its ongm m Latm America However, over the last
few years a new vision, termed the 'multiplicity paradigm', has emerged Unlike earlier
models, it focuses on many elements which had been previously overlooked or neglected,
as discussed later m this chapter
4.1. The Modernisation Paradigm
Development is a long established and powerful Western idea founded in early
nineteenth century philosophical writmgs The central element of this perspective is the
metaphor of growth and the identification of growth with the Western idea of progress
According to this paradigm, development is conceived as organic, immanent, direct,
cumulative, irreversible, and goal-oriented (Lerner, 1958, Schranim, 1964)
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The modermsation paradigm considers underdevelopment m terms of perceptible,
quantitative differences between rich and poor countries Development implies,
according to this view, bndgmg the gaps between traditional and modem sectors by
means of imitation processes, and between the so-called retarded and advanced to the
advantage of the latter The developmg countries must gradually meet the 'qualities' of
the industnalised countries
'Despite geographic, historical, and cultural heterogeneity, the countries m
this group have one outstanding characteristic m common they are
without exception transitional societies m which the process of social,
economic, and political modermsation has proceeded far enough to
profoundly disturb or even completely shatter traditional customs and
mstitutions without, however, proceeding far enough to set them on the
path of contmuous and effective development ' (Adelman et a!, 1967 44)
According to the modermsation paradigm, development is a spontaneous process that
every society passes through Although vanous 'non-economic' factors, such as attitude
change, level of education, and mass media, were mtroduced, the economic root has
remamed the essence of this paradigm (Tehraman, 1979)
4.1.1. Other Approaches
Everett Rogers arguably mtroduced the diffusion theory m the context of development
Modermsation, according to Rogers, is a process of diffusion whereby mdividuals move
from a traditional way of life to a more complex, more techmcally developed and more
rapidly changmg way of life Rogers stressed the systematic adoption and diffusion
processes of cultural innovations and contended that the role of the mass media is
concentrated on the adoption stage of the process (Rogers, 1962 99)
Apart from the diffusion model, one can distmguish between three more approaches
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which are psycho-sociological, mstitutional and technological mterpretatlons of
communication and modermsation (Servaes, 1989) The psycho-sociological or
behaviounstic perspective on communication and modermsation is concerned with
mdividual values and attitude change Central to the view of Daniel Lerner (1958), one
of the advocates of the communication for modermsation paradigm, is the concept of
'empathy', that is, the capacity to see oneself m the other's situation, which is an
mdispensable skill for people movmg out of traditional settmgs 'High empathic is the
predominant personal style only m modern society, which is distmctively mdustrial,
urban, literate and participant' (Lerner, 1958 50) Mobility stimulates urbanisation, which
mcreases literacy and consequently also economic and political participation The
modern mdividual, m this context, relies on the mass media for world news, and prefers
national and mternational news rather than sports, religious or local news
Building on Lerner, Wilbur Schranim took a closer look at this connection between mass
communication and modermsmg practices and mstitutions In Schranim's view, the
modern communication media supplement and complement as 'mobility multipliers' the
oral channel of a traditional society He contends that '[ ] a developmg country should
give special attention to combining mass media with mterpersonal communication ' He
also argues that mass media perform at least three functions for change and
modermsation, they are 'watchdogs', 'policy-makers', and 'teachers' (Schrrnim, 1964 263)
Another technologically deterministic approach to modermsation sees technology as a
value-free and politically neutral asset that can be used m every social and histoncal
context Four different pomts of view within this perspective can be distmgmshed A first
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shares the conviction that the development and application of technology can resolve all
the varied problems of mankind The second view holds that technology is the source
of all that goes wrong m societies A third vanant sees technology as the driving force
in development The fourth regards technology as an inexorable force in development,
an irresistible as well as an overwhelnimg force As Marshall McLuhan puts it 'Any
technology gradually creates a totally new human environment' (McLuhan, 1964 m)
4.1.2. A Critical Assessment of the Modernisation Paradigm
The most important point of criticism of the modermsation paradigm is that, empirically,
the areas of study are primarily specific, quantitatively measurable, short-term, and
individual effects that are generahsed m a questionable manner (Schranim & Ruggels,
1967) Moreover, this approach starts from basic positivistic and behaviounstic positions
which presuppose a hnear, rational sequence of events, planned m advance and with
criteria of rationality determined externally The process of communication through mass
media is compared to the communication process in face-to-face activity, with a
beginning and an end This concept, which is directly derived from the mechanistic
mformation theory, is difficult to transfer to processes of human mteraction where the
context encompasses transmission as an integrated and substantial part of the overall
process (Merni, 1974) In most Sender-Receiver type models the social context m which
communication takes place is absent, and little attention is given to sociological and
contextual factors except for commercial and ideological reasons The media motivate
individuals to aspire to mobthty and higher standards of living in programmes and
editorial material (Servaes, 1989)
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4.2. Cultural Imperialism and Dependency Theory
The static and histoncal manner of studymg commumcation processes leads to the
supposition of a stable social system where social harmony and integration prevail and
where class struggles or social conflicts are non-existent (Servaes, 1989) From within this
broad, cntical framework, the specific model of 'cultural impenahsm' argued that, far
from aiding developmg nations, the international flows of technology transfer and media
hardware, coupled with the software flows of cultural products, actually reinforce
dependency and prevent true development (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1991)
Much of the research and literature relating to cultural impenahsm and dependency
theory predates the end of the Cold War and is therefore of limited relevance as it
assumes a global ideological conflict which no longer exists Nevertheless, the following
overview reveals the pomt of departure for the multiplicity paradigm and the need for
an analysis which is more focused on the specific dynamics of Saudi Arabian culture and
society and its media industry
Cultural dependency and impenahsm analysis is predicated on the mterrelatedness of
economic (mcluding technological) structural relations, and ideological-cultural relations,
between advanced capitalist or industrial societies and those of most of Afnca, Asia and
Latin America (Golding, 1977) These theories have their roots m Lenin's classic
formulation of impenahsm as the highest stage of capitalism in which monopolists seek
profitable investment abroad as a way of overcoming stagnation at home With the
break-up of the colomal empires after World War II, and with the emergence of the
Umted States as the dominant capitalist power, capitalism entered a neo-colomal or neo-
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imperialist phase (Reeves, 1993) Accordmg to neo-imperialism, transnational
corporations of the advanced capitalist economies are exertmg ideological-cultural
mfluence in order to maintain control for the ideological subversion or mcorporatlon of
indigenous ruling classes The neo-impenahst position attempts to locate ideological-
cultural relations and mass media m a dynamic international political settmg On the one
hand, the underdevelopment or dependence of much of the world is essential for the
development of the advanced capitalist world Following this, political and ideological-
cultural relations both flow from and ensure that the primary economic relationship
between the dependent and advanced parties is maintained
One of the central postulates of the imperialism/dependency model is that local cultural
identity is subverted and destroyed so that the values of the dominant metropolitan
economics and their transnational corporations can be adopted, or even imposed
(Hamelink, 1983) It is also postulated that the social and economic pohcies m the
dependent society are conditioned and constrained by the metropolitan capitalist centres
(Reeves, 1993) People in dependent societies see their societies mcreasmgly through
modes of perception and categonsation substantially controlled by metropolitan capitalist
interests, even to the extent of adoptmg and mternahsing the consumption patterns and
values characteristic of the advanced capitalist societies which encourage them
In accordance with this, Herbert Schiller (1976) perceived cultural impenalism as
[ ] the sum of the processes by which a society is brought into the
modern world system and how its dominating stratum is attracted,
pressured, forced, and sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions to
correspond to, or even promote, the values and structures of the
dominating centre of the system '(Schiller, 1976 9)
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Lee's and Boyd-Barrett's position, although mspired by Lenm's classic formulation of
impenahsm and subsequent Marxist revisions, is m fact distmct from them Political and
ideological-cultural relations are viewed as a means of ensunng the mamtenance of an
economic relationship of exploitation This is the reason behind the importance of the
media m both metropolitan capitalist countnes and penpheral capitahst ones (Tunstall,
1977)
4.2.1. Media Imperialism
The main focus of the media impenahsm thesis is on the relationship between ownership
and control of the media and the power structure m society, the ideological sigmfication
of meamng m media messages and its effects m reproducmg the class system (Curran
et a!, 1977) Straubhaar (1991) explams that media impenahsm is the use of the mass
media as ideological and economic tools of the capitalist world to dominate the
economies and cultures of developmg countnes The mass media, with their typical,
standardised programming, are the product of and shaped by the highly developed
productive forces and cultural practices of advanced capitalist societies (Reeves, 1993)
Tunstall (1977) identifies the adverse effects of media nnpenahsm as follows
'Authentic, traditional and local culture m many parts of the world is bemg
battered out of existence by mdiscnnimate dumpmg of large quantities of
shck commercial and media products, mainly from the Umted States'
(Tunstall, 1977 57)
Boyd-Barrett (1977) similarly defmes it as
'[ ]the process whereby the ownership, structure, distribution or content
of the media m any one country are smgly or together subject to
substantial pressure from the media mterests of any other countiy or
countries without proportionate reciprocation of nifluence by the country
so affected' (Boyd-Barrett, 1977 117)
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Accordmg to Boyd-Barrett, media impenalism is either the product of deliberate
commercial or political influence or else disseminated unmtentionally in a much more
general process of political, social or economic influence This influence is absorbed and
adopted by many of the dependent societies, which have also been forced to adopt the
vehicles or the means of communication established in the advanced dominating
countnes Poor economic conditions have prevented recipient, helpless countnes from
indigenous development, thus high costs of local programmes have encouraged the
importation of foreign ones The Umted States, as a pioneering mdustnal power, has
been the major provider of technical equipment and expertise for developing countnes,
NBC International, for example, provided technical and operational assistance to Saudi
Arabia to establish its television service in 1965 in a package of assistance which also
included training schemes and programxnmg for a number of years In the 1 970s the
French SECAM system was adopted by the Saudi Ministry of Information, despite its
infenor technical quality and the availability of much better colour systems
The media impenahsm thesis gave media content and market perpetration considerable
attention and they were looked at as ideological vehicles, expressing positions m conflict
with those of recipient societies Lee (1980) wntes
'Television impenahsm is charactensed by first, television programme
exportation to foreign countries, second, foreign ownership and control of
media outlets, third, the transfer of the metropolitan broadcastmg norms
and institutionahsation of media commercialism at the expense of public
interest, and fourth, the invasion of capitahstic world views and an
infringement upon the indigenous way of hfe m the recipient nations'
(Lee, 1980 75)
Different factors have contributed to such heavy dependency by developing countries
on foreign assistance and media products, which go hand in hand Some of these could
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be attributed to the mternal economic and underdevelopment circumstances the
developmg countnes expenence In descnbmg the state of dependency rather than
justifying it, many media scholars believe that the real source, the real shaper of
developmg communication systems and the messages they produce is the West Most
developing countries, mcluding Saudi Arabia, for a vanety of reasons which will be
discussed m chapters Vil-IX, lack sufficient technological expertise and the tramed
human resources that are required to mstitute domestic communication systems which
would reflect their history, needs, concerns, values, and culture, so they must rely on the
transfer of Western communication technology and software These are far cheaper to
obtam than to have produced by domestic counterparts (McPhail, 1981) In a review m
chapter V of the histoncal circumstances behind the mstallation of Saudi Arabia's
television system, we fmd a number of examples which illustrate McPhail's argument
4.2.2. Cultural Penetration
Many media scholars believe that cultural dependency and the advancement of new
commumcation technology have mvited and facilitated the penetration of local culture
by Western media products Moreover, it is claimed that this penetration m general has
had a negative influence on a number of these cultures (Tash, 1995) Through media
penetration the dommant Western media technologies have disrupted many countnes'
cultural sovereignty and jeopardised their national cultural secunty (Balgasis, 1992) This
cultural penetration is, accordmg to Aljabery (1997)
[ ] a status where the dominant political, economic, and cultural
countnes, take over the helpless Third World cultural institutions The
most visible aspect of such domination is the cultural one Utihsmg
modem technology, Western cultural patterns and values penetrate most
of the Third World commumcation systems '
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McPhail (1981) explams how such penetration has been sugar-coated and presented as
a solution to some of the economic problems faced by developmg countries
[ ] (it) tended to foster a colomal-type dependence on the West, to
aggravate an unbalanced distribution of benefits by concentratmg new
commumcation power m the hands of the rulmg ehte, and to create
tensions and frustration m less developed countnes by promotmg
mappropnate and maccessible Western ideals and further expand the
economic gap between the West and the least developed countnes'
(McPhail, 1981 79)
Herbert Schiller (1976) expressed his concern for local cultures He observed
[ ]the cultural mtegrity of weak societies whose national, regional, local,
or tribal heritage are beginning to be menaced with extmction by the
expansion of modern electromc commumcations, television m particular,
emanatmg from a few power centres m the mdustnahsed world [ ]
(Schiller, 1976 63)
In Saudi Arabia, the Westermsed media model and the alien content of most of the
television programming are evident, and are the focus of concerns among cultural critics,
Islaimsts and media scholars over the influence and displacement effects of such
programme contents on Saudi cultural identity, as documented m chapter I However,
rather than advocatmg cultural sohtude and isolation, benefits of this penetration could
be derived from cultural reciprocity and the free, 'balanced' flow of mformation as
defmed by numerous UNESCO declarations (IJNESCO, 1973)
4.2.3. The Dependency Paradigm
Usmg cultural dependency and imperiahsm theory as a sprmgboard, the dependency
paradigm developed m a Latm Amencan context As a result of the general mtellectual
revolution that took place m the mid 1960s, the Eurocentnc look of the modermsation
paradigm on development was challenged by Latm American social scientists and the
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theory of 'dependencia' was born (Servaes, 1989) The dependentistas were primarily
concerned with the effects of dependency m penpheral countnes, but imphcit m their
analysis was the idea that development and underdevelopment must be understood m
the context of the world system Paul Baran, an American considered to be the father
of 'dependency theory', was one of the first to articulate the thesis that development and
underdevelopment are mterrelated processes, that is, they are two sides of the same
corn In Baran's view, the production of socio-economic and political structures at the
periphery is followed by contmued imperialist dependence, and this is in accordance with
the mterests of the centre powers (Cardoso & Faletto, 1969, Sunkel & Paz, 1970)
According to this theory, this is the main cause of the chrome backwardness of
developing countries, smce the mmimum interest of Western monopoly capitahsm was
to prevent, or at least to slow down and to control the economic development of
underdeveloped countries All dependentistas agree with the basic idea exemplified m
the following defimtion by Dos Santos (1970)
'Dependence is a conditioning situation m which the economies of one
group of countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of
others A relationship of interdependence between two or more economies
or between such economies and the world trading system becomes a
dependent relationship when some countries can expand through self-
nnpulsion while others, berng in a dependent position, can only expand as
a reflection of the expansion of the dominant countries, which may have
positive or negative effects on their case The basic situation of
dependence causes these countries to be both backward and exploited
Dominant countries are endowed with technological, commercial, capital
and socio-political predominance over dependent countries [ ] and can
therefore exploit them, and extract part of the locally produced surplus
Dependence, then, is based upon an rnternational division of labour which
allows rndustnal development to take place in some countnes while
restnctrng it in others, whose growth is conditioned by and subjected to
the power centres of the world '(Dos Santos, 1970 231) (see also Chilcote
and Edeistem, 1974, Portes, 1976, Cardoso, 1977, and Valensuela and
Valensuela, 1979)
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An important aspect of the dependency analysis is its emphasis on the role of extra-
national forces and factors that create and support the maintenance of
underdevelopment m certain countnes According to dependency theory, the most
important hindrances to development are not the shortage of capital or management, as
the modermsation theonsts contend, but are rooted m the present international system
The obstacles are both internal and external This means that development in the centre
determines and maintains the underdevelopment in the penphery To remove these
external obstacles, dependentistas argue, each penpheral country should dissociate itself
from the world market and opt for a seif-rehant development strategy To make this
happen, most scholars advocate that a more or less revolutionary political transformation
will be necessary (Tunstall, 1977, Schiller, 1973, 1976) The dependency paradigm, in
general, places an emphasis on external factors and regional contradictions, a
polansation between development and underdevelopment, a subjectivistic or voluntanstic
interpretation of history, and a primarily econonncally-onented analytical method It
contends that the maintenance of subordinate dependency of developing countries on
developed ones has become mcreasmgly essential to improve or at least maintain the
current hvmg standards
Dependency theory is of some relevance to Saudi Arabia's relations with Western
powers, and especially with the USA Since the 1930s, the presence of major oil
compames, such as Standard Oil of California and later ARAMCO, m the Eastern
region of Saudi Arabia guaranteed a steady supply of cheap oil to the USA, a supply
which lasted for decades It was only m the late 1 970s that Saudi Arabia started to gain
some control over oil sales and the subsequent revenue was used in the 1980s to fmance
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its development plans Similar relations still exist, especially in the form of arms deals
and are mamfest m partnerships with Western muitmational corporations which have
been awarded major contracts worth billions of dollars to execute Saudi development
plans, often with mfluential local partners Many of these transnational corporations
have a firm foothold in Saudi Arabia through partnership deals with local busmesses
who, in most cases, act as facthtators, promoters and sales agents for giant corporations
ranging from fast food chains to major defence contractors These transactions are tied
to advertismg and the extension of consumensm of products which interest middle
classes, and help deepen the penetration of the dependent societies (Sauvant, 1979)
4.2.4. A Critical Assessment of the Dependency Paradigm
Many scholars, including dependentistas themselves, cnticise the dependency paradigm
for a variety of reasons Jan Servaes (1989) cnticises it on the grounds that there is a
lack of analyses of internal class and state variables within the penphery It is therefore
impossible to develop explanatory models without looking at the development of the
global framework of power relations as a whole in connection with the television
industry Moreover, analyses of the dependency situation in Saudi Arabia have so far
failed to examine the internal forces at work which effectively constrain local television
production of quahty and result m increased cultural dependency on imported media
fare Secondly, argues Servaes, narrowly focused or static approaches are often unable
to explain and account for changes in underdeveloped economies over time These static
views largely ignore the historical manifestations of imperialism and are in danger of
becoming merely empty and highly abstract formulae Thirdly, he believes, it has a naive
view of production forms which locates the force of capitalist development and
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underdevelopment m the transfer of the economic surplus from the penphery to the
centre, and therefore fails to differentiate capitahst from feudal or other pre-capitahst
modes of controlling the direct producer and appropnatmg the surplus
An over-emphasis on external vanables as the cause of underdevelopment and
dependency tends to focus on the metropohs and mtemational capital (the so-called
existmg international division of labour), as they are 'blamed' for poverty, stagnation,
and backwardness, instead of on local class formation Such views tend to overlook the
local socio-pohtical factors and dynamics which constram development m general, and
the media m particular These local factors and the ways m which they encourage
dependency will be dealt with m the course of this study
In general, most dependentistas take for granted that, together with the high volume of
Western media messages and products, a conservative and capitalistic ideology and a
consumption culture is transmitted and established simultaneously In this sense, they
challenge the point of departure of the modernists and, in particular, those of the
diffusion theonsts who assume that the media play an important role in processes of
social change For this reason, the dependency theory can, with its stress on external
explanatory factors, be considered the antithesis of the endogenously-onented
modermsation paradigm However, the difference is mimmal in regard to the content
of development, as both mainly use economic vanables
4.3. The Multiplicity Paradigm
In contrast with the more economic and politically onented views of the modermsation
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and dependency paradigms, the central idea of the multiphcity paradigm is that there is
no universal development model Development is an mtegrally multidimensional and
dialectical process that can differ from society to society This implies that the
development problem is a relative one and that no mdividual nation can contend that
it is 'developed' m every respect This does not mean, however, that it is not possible to
defme the general principles and pnonties on which a development strategy can be
based Jan Servaes (1989) cited six cntena, and this author believes that they are
particularly pertinent in the case of Saudi Arabia Servaes' principles can be summarised
as follows
• Basic needs bemg geared to meetmg human, material and non-matenal, needs It
begms with the satisfaction of the basic needs of those, dominated and exploited, who
constitute the majority of the world's mhabitants, and ensures at the same time the
humamsation of all human bemgs by the satisfaction of their needs for expression,
creativity, equality and conviviality and to understand and master their own destiny This
cntenon gives rise to issues of equality and freedom of expression and the notion that
the media should be the voice of the people
• Endogeny stemming from the heart of each society, which defines m sovereignty its
values and the vision of its future Since development is not a linear process, there could
be no universal model, and only the plurality of development patterns can answer to the
specificity of each situation
• Self reliance implying that each society relies pnmanly on its own strength and
resources m terms of its members' energies and its natural and cultural environment
Self-reliance acquires its full meaning only if rooted at the local level of each
community The overwhelming dependency tendencies which have been encouraged and
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sustamed by the Saudi government plans have cast Saudis as passive recipients of
development projects executed by millions of imported foreign expatnates - a situation
not without its problems for Saudi social life
• Ecology utihsmg rationally resources of the biosphere m full awareness of the
potential of local ecosystems, as well as the global and outer limits imposed on present
and future generations It imphes the equitable access to resources by all as well as
careful, socially relevant technologies
• Participative democracy as the true form of democracy Not merely government of
the people and for the people, but also, and more fundamentally by the people at all
levels of society
• Structural changes to be required, more often than not, in social relations, m
economic activities and m their spatial distnbution, as well as m the power structure, and
in decision-making by all those affected by it, from the rural or urban community to the
world as a whole
What is new m the multiplicity development discussion is the 'eco-system approach'
which differs at almost every point from the modermsation paradigm From the
ecological perspective, a country must not compare itself with other, more 'developed'
examples for its development policy, but must proceed from its own ecology and culture
In the case of Saudi Arabia, development could be attained without resorting to
compromising Islamic values These values are, in fact, a safeguard for a balanced
development incorporating equality and Justice two of the main principles of Islam Also
important is the notion of self-reliance which is multi-dimensional and open to many
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mterpretations In this context self-reliance is used as the counterpart to dependency, as
a sovereign and autocentnc strategy for development on the basis of a commumty's own
capabilities and needs, and the capacity of autonomous goal-settmg and decision making
The political, social, cultural and communicative aspects of the strategy should be
emphasised, and local, national, regional and mtermediate levels should be combined
and distmguished to acquire a strategy based on tins pnnciple of self-reliance The social
reforms necessary for the movement from dependency to self-sufficient development
raise the problems of participation, decentrahsation and autonomy In this context, the
idea of selective participation has been launched, a participation that is based on
equality and sovereignty As Michael Green (1991) puts it
'Media develop and are developed by changing publics and needs, and in
this conception media should be looked upon as cultural forms m winch
groups, communities, and societies articulate their diversity ' (Green,
1991 28)
Contrary to the more economically and politically onented views of the modermsation
and the world system approaches to dependency, the central idea m a 'new' multiplicity
paradigm is that there is no universal path to development Development must be
conceived as an integral, multidimensional and dialectic process which can differ from
one country to another In other words, every nation must define development for itself
and seek its own strategies (Servaes, 1989) At the same time, this also implies that the
problem of development is a relative one Thus, development should be defined as needs
onented, indigenous, self-reliant, ecologically sound and based on participatory
democracy and structural transformation (Servaes, 1989)
This study contends that the multiplicity paradigm can provide a useful backdrop for the
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current utilisation of broadcast media in Saudi Arabia By acknowledgmg that
development is a multidimensional process which is umque in nature to each society, the
multiplicity paradigm, m a more applicable and eclectic rationale, accommodates some
of the specifics of Saudi Arabian society and its need to harness the media to help
preserve the country's individual profile throughout the development process This
author believes that Islamic teachings which advocate free-will and dialogue can be
drawn on to direct and vandate changes on all fronts in Saudi society that are necessary
to increase its self-reliance In promoting self-reliance, factors such as social awareness,
national responsibthty, motivation, and mobthsation of the people become the
fundamentals of genuine development, and they are what has been missmg in Saudi
development Mass media, utthsed wisely, can help to solve problems such as these
(Alhanthi, 1983) The Saudi media have themselves been part of the problem because
of their rehance on imported programmes and the manner in which they avoid
addressing pressmg issues of importance to the Saudi people
The above review of development theones and paradigms highhghts that the emerging
multiplicity paradigm may best help explain some of the economic, political, and social
development problems in Saudi Arabia However, what is essentially required is a more
Saudi-centred analysis Models which are based in post Cold War theones rely on now
obsolete concepts of an imperiahst struggle between superpowers and tend to ignore
internal and local factors, such as the role of government departments, which create
current situations of dependency These models, therefore, can be regarded as outdated
or even irrelevant Paradigm shifts from dependency and media impenahsm theones in
the 1 970s did m fact establish recogmtion of the role of internal factors in the
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dependency equation (Nordenstreng and Sculler, 1979 Preface) However, there has
been no rn-depth analysis of the relationship between dependency and national or local
factors from an Islamic perspective with specific reference to the performance of the
Saudi media, and of television m particular Purely secular paradigms fail to
acknowledge the specifics of an Islamic society and the nature of the religious and
cultural forces and their roles in development processes Paradigms rooted m political
or economic theory do not have a broad enough perspective and are often static
Importantly, most theones fail to take into account internal factors and local constramts
on development which create the situation of media dependency in Saudi Arabia
This author believes that there is a dual existence of both external and internal factors
that are inter-related and create such dependency, as argued by Nordenstreng and
Schiller (1979) Realistically, however, rnternal impeding factors should be the focus of
analysis and the subject of change An increase in pressure on policy makers and
decision-making bodies to implement such change would, m turn, help to alleviate some
of the external variables, as well as provide the necessary support for more balanced
relations with others
5. Electronic Media in the Arab World
While the previous section demonstrates the abundance of general research and theones
relating to cultural dependency and the media, little research has been carned out on
the effects of electromc media in the Arab world, and even less m Saudi Arabia Boyd
(1982) comments on this point as follows
'Arab television broadcasters get little or no formal scientific feedback
from the audience It is not the practice of these broadcasters to undertake
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either studies providmg information about programme preferences or
research explonng the uses of television among viewers Most reliable
data came from surveys coimmssioned by manufacturers wantmg
information about consumers' brand preferences ' (Boyd, 1982 47)
Extant research is generally qualitative, includes a number of audience studies and is
focused on the development and effects of broadcastmg systems and video cassette
recorders The first to pioneer research into Saudi Arabian broadcasting systems were
Shobaili (1971) and Boyd (1970, 1972), who estabhshed the development of these
systems in their political, social and cultural background Further research has been
conducted by Saudi graduates and by international researchers, m addition to studies
conducted by radio broadcasting compames such as the Voice of America (VOA), Radio
Monte Carlo Middle East (RMCME), and the British Broadcasting Coiporation (BBC),
which have tried to measure and assess listenership in the region
5.1. The Development of Electronic Media
This section is concerned with prior research into the development of electromc media,
its apphcation and impact, as well as audience research in Saudi Arabia In addition, it
examines previous research into international and transnational broadcasting media in
the Arab world Fmally it looks at other studies dealing with the penetration, application
and ramifications of DBS m the Arab world, with particular reference to Saudi Arabia
As mentioned, the earliest research into the evolution and growth of the Saudi Arabian
television system was camed out by Shobaih (1971) The study was then developed to
include radio and television, the press and Aramco television, the first company to
broadcast m Saudi Arabia While he mainly concentrated on the nifrastructure of the
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media's orgamsatlon, adnumstration, programming and technology, he related these to
contemporaneous issues, such as the cultural and societal factors which affected
progranimmg features and the role of the government in the development of the media
In 1982, Najai conducted the first study of young Saudi audiences m Riyadh The
purpose of his research was to discover the cogmtive and affective effects of watching
television on youngsters, and to ascertain the reasons for their viewing In analysing the
results from 300 males and 300 females, Najai concluded that males watched television
for more hours than females, and did so mostly out of a desire to understand and learn
A 1983 study by Aiharithi mto the effectiveness of Saudi broadcasting had sigmficant
results His study of the Saudi media content and functions concluded that the mass
media were not expeditmg national development nor raising social awareness for a
number of distinct reasons a lack of professional expertise, a lack of indigenous
manpower, overuse of imported productions, government domination, and the absence
of a formal coherent policy This ineffectiveness was intensified by the political,
economic and rehgious climate at that time, as well as the social issues which impeded
the potential of the media As a result of this study, Al-Hanthi was able to propose
sigmficant recommendations for broadcasting purposes Some of the deficiencies that
relate to the Saudi broadcast media will be revisited m the course of this study to
examine whether they still exist, and whether the new DBS challenges have had any
impact on Saudi television performance
Shailth (1989) compiled a study of the effects of imported programming on Saudi
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television by analysmg programme content and mtervlewmg Saudi television officials
His results showed that imported programming accounted for 26% more broadcastmg
than local productions (63 % against 37%) The main source of the English-language
productions was the USA, while the main source of Arab programmes was Egypt His
study also revealed that these programmes were imported because of their quality
Importantly, a significant finding was that the imported productions contained scenes and
messages which were mconsistent with the traditional and cultural standards of Saudi
society Such inconsistencies, this study will show, are still present and have mtensified
with the prohferation of DBS channels
In 1990, A1-Oofy earned out research mto the usage, status and effects of VCR on other
forms of media and the impact on Islamic consciousness The methods adopted for
research purposes were primarily quantitative and qualitative analyses His findings
demonstrated that in areas where people had more access to the media, there was a
tendency to record more televised productions and watch fewer rented videos Female
viewing was higher than male, while the under 20s proved to be the main users of VCR
equipment Many of the people mterviewed, however, claimed to have altered their
VCR viewing habits The subjects mterviewed also revealed that watching videos had
either mcreased their knowledge of the world and other cultures, or discouraged them
from reading In conclusion, A1-Oofy recommended that the broadcasting system in
Saudi Arabia be de-centralised, that trammg provision for technical and artistic
personnel be vastly improved, that censorship be reduced, transmission of Saudi
television should be increased, and that there should be more co-operation between
Saudi television and members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) A1-Oofy
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postulated that ownership and use of both VCR and satellite dishes would be affected
by the new Islamic awareness m Saudi Arabia
Hudson and Swmdel (1988) used a content analysis approach to analyse Saudi television
Channel 2 news programmes durmg May, 1992 The results of their research showed that
23 9 % of all the time allocated to news bulletms was actually spent on news about the
Saudi royal family, and 63 3 % of the stones were borrowed from other news
broadcastmg sources The limitation of their study lay m the fact that it was confmed to
Channel 2 output, it lacked details regarding the application of their methodology, and
the penod studied was not justified
Zamakshan (1994) mvestigated the attitudes of Saudi Arabian parents towards television
and examined their concerns regarding the possible adverse effects of television on their
children Through group discussions and surveying a sample of 672 Saudi parents m
various cities, his fmdmgs concluded that parents showed some concern about the impact
of foreign culture on their traditional life
Almakaty (1995) provided a descnptive study of the technical, legal and cultural aspects
of Direct Broadcastmg Satellite m the Arab world, and specifically in Saudi Arabia The
reason for his focus on that country, he contended, was its unique status m the Islamic
world and the cultural ideology of its people The establishment of DBS has led to
intense debate pubhcised through the mass media and through interpersonal
commumcation smce the l980s In his study he mvestigated the socio-cultural perceptions
of DBS among a sample audience of male Saudis Three types of people were identified
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type 1 were moderate protectiomsts, type 2 were high protectiomsts, and type 3, cautious
adaptors Type 1 Saudis beheved that DBS may present a threat to Saudi society as well
as to the Saudi broadcast media Type 2 people strongly believed that DBS represents
a critical cultural threat Type 3s, however, saw no senous cultural threat from DBS and
regarded it as helpmg to promote more mtemational mteraction and understandmg
Habib (1997) camed out a study of the news service m Saudi Arabia and contrasted it
with those of a number of DBS broadcasters He focused on the treatment of news
regarding five major events which occurred at the time of the study The events are the
Arab-Israeli peace settlement, the Bosma-Herzogovma conflict, mcidents m Yemen, the
problems m Algena, and fmally the Iran cnsis The results showed that Saudi television
news neglected some of those mcidents which were covered by all the DBS services In
this study, Habib concluded that the mtroduction of DBS has not encouraged Saudi
television to improve its traditional news programmes and there is a great deal of scope
for improvement
5.2. Penetration and Utilisation of Transnational Broadcasting
Transnational media have a major mfluence on ideas and opinions, on values and life-
styles and therefore on change, for better or worse, in different societies (MacBnde et
a!, 1980) Thomas McPhail (1981), refernng to the cultural effects of transnational
media, calls it 'electromc colomahsm' He describes it as
'The dependency relationship established by importation of communication
hardware, foreign-produced software, along with engineers, technicians,
and related information protocols, that vicanously establish a set of
foreign norms, values, and expectations which, m varying degrees, may
alter the domestic cultures and sociahsation processes ' (McPhail, 1981 20,
Citing Read, 1976, and Tunstall, 1977)
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The typical content of transnational media channels will have been chosen with a view
to international transmission, even if it was ongmally designed primanly for a domestic
market This will usually imply a downgrading of cultural specificity in themes and
settmgs and a preference for formats and genres which are thought to be more universal
Because of the mfluence of the Umted States on audio-visual and music production,
transnational content is sometimes considered as culturally North Amencan in character
The general direction of effect is assumed to be towards displacing the ongmal culture
of receiving countries andlor causing them to imitate the mternational model (McQuail,
1994) The transnational media corporations are exerting considerable influence through
programme sales, technology, professional models, marketmg patterns and the direction
and volume of the flow of entertainment material
'Privately-owned orgamsations m the commumcation field wield a power
m setting patterns, forming attitudes and motivating behaviour This power
is exercised in various ways
(a) ownership of media and other communication means, or investment
m telecommunication channels,
(b) production of software and distribution of various kinds of programmes and
contents,
(c) advertising and marketing,
(d) various indirect ways of mfluencmg the production of messages '(MacBride
eta!, 1980 118)
The populanty of regional and international media among Saudi audiences has been
mvestigated in a number of surveys Radio audience research carned out m 1972 by the
Umted States Information Agency (USIA) mdicated that 70% of Saudis hstened to
Radio Cairo a minimum of once a week, 53 % to the Voice of the Arabs, 73 % to the
BBC, and 62% to Radio Kuwait 54 6% of Saudis tuned m to foreign broadcasts Radio
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Monte Carlo Middle East (RMCME) news proved popular among Saudis, which is
attnbuted to the fact that during the 1973 Arab-Israel war it presented pro-Arab news
(Boyd, 1982)
In analysing the importance of radio broadcastmg to the Arab world, Acord (1979 388)
concluded that 'Radio is an invaluable tool to break up hardened ground' He also
looked at the issue of Mushm-Chnstian relations and highlighted the potential of radio
for pre-evangehsm He observed that cautious and responsive productions sensitive to
Muslim requirements could do much to improve association between the two religions
Boyd (1983) named Trans World Radio (TWR), Far East Broadcasting Association
(FEBA), Radio ELWA, Vatican Radio, and Station WYFR as five Christian broadcasters
transmitting in Arabic In total their output amounts to 51 hours a week. In 1989, the
International Broadcasting Association ([BA), and High Adventures (HA) jomed their
ranks (Warren, 1990)
During the Iran-Iraq war, Boyd and Asi (1991) surveyed a sample of 2,000 male and
female undergraduates attending various umversities in Saudi Arabia. The purpose of
the survey was to investigate hstemng habits among transnational radio audiences during
this time The results showed that both the BBC and RMCMIE were rated highly, the
former by men over 20 and the latter by women under 25, while older students
expressed a preference for VOA Much of RMCMIE programming is music-based with
frequent advertising of thy-to-day consumer goods and news summaries, while the BBC
and VOA are more mformation and news directed Radio listenership in the Arab world
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is one of the areas which calls for more updated research m the light of the new DBS
phenomenon, and in particular the channels devoted to news and documentanes such
as Aijazirali and ANN
5.3. DBS - Its Social and Cultural Impact
One recent form of commumcation technology which has provoked controversy and
debate in the mtemational arena is the Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) service which,
during the last few years, has been a vehicle for television signals carrying a diversity of
programming, mainly Anglo-Amencan, to many parts of the world DBS is a powerful
and versatile system that transmits a signal directly to an inexpensive receiver, thus many
developing nations fear that this technology has resulted in the unwanted and
unregulated reception of foreign prograimning and, they believe, poses senous threats
to indigenous culture and national sovereignty These perceived threats fall into the
categones of propaganda, commercial domination and cultural intrusion
Since their establishment by the Soviets m 1957, and the USA in 1958, commumcation
satellites have become the most effective means of enhancing global radio and
television, and have also been used as political propaganda weapons in the struggle
between the superpowers Despite the cost of this technological warfare and the issues
raised by world public opinion, projects are still designed for the purpose of global
domination through cultural invasion via satellite commumcation (Yamam, 1984)
Yamani (1984), in describing this phenomenon of electromc colomsation, identified DBS
as a means of dominating popular thought and highlighted the prospect of cultural
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dependency for developing countnes faced with this technological onslaught He warned
[ ] those who own advanced commumcation technology are those who
have the power of cultural invasion and who are capable of launchmg the
most dangerous impenahst attack m the current age '(Yamam, 1984 32)
A1-Makhlafi (1986) also exammed DBS networks and satellite commumcations and their
functions as weapons for cultural impenahsm and dependency In analysing the notion
of information flow and dependency, he pomted out that ARABSAT (the Arab Satellite
organisation) could be used as a mouthpiece to champion the Muslim cause
In Labeb's (1990) study, which dealt with the technical aspects of direct television
broadcasting, he identified four groups of direct broadcast satellites for communications
or services, for direct broadcasting, for direct television broadcasting, and Middle East
satellite communication He examined the Arab states' allegation that DBS transmission
of foreign programming can have an adverse effect on Arab cultural and social identity
and traditional values and concluded that research confirmed this to be true The
pnncipal concern therefore is the protection of these elements of Arab societies
Maniir (1993) analysed the social effects of DBS and mass media, and their conceptual
and technical developments In exanunmg the impact of DBS from a number of
perspectives, social, economic, political, health, ideological, cultural and secunty, he
concluded that it poses a much greater cultural threat to Arab societies than other forms
of mass media
Yamam (1984), Labeb (1990) and Al-Makhlafi (1986) have produced studies loaded with
rhetonc descnbmg the inimment danger of the so-called 'cultural invasion', but they fail
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to focus on the weaknesses inherent m official Arab media which contribute to the
popularity and appeal of transnational media Such failmgs and the misuse of national
media systems m Arab countries tend to be ignored in these studies
Bait-Almal (1993), m his study of DBS use and socio-cultural perspectives, surveyed 201
regular users of direct television satellite, hvmg m Riyadh He categonsed his subjects
mto three groups according to their standpomts the first group comprised those who
believed DBS fostered mteraction and understanding between cultures and nations, the
second group regarded DBS as an impenahst weapon for cultural mvasion and for
mcreasmg consumerism of Western products m developmg nations, the third group of
people perceived the detrimental effects of DBS, but did not give weight to them They
were convmced that with some adaptation, the challenges posed would be surmounted
as m the case of radio, television, and VCRs Among those surveyed, the Middle East
Broadcastmg Centre (MBC), the Egyptian Satelhte Channel (ESC) and Dubai Satellite
Channel (DSC) were the most watched, chiefly because the broadcasts were m Arabic,
and the subjects tended to watch news and cultural programmes as opposed to
entertainment The popularity of DBS channels is reflected m the defection of many
national television channel viewers to DBS networks
Marghalam (1997), applymg a 'uses and gratifications' method, mvestigated the
gratification sought from the adoption of DBS by 495 Saudi Arabians resident m Riyadh
In this study, Marghalam found that 72% of the respondents owned and/or had regular
access to satellite dishes In addition, satellite dish owners spent more hours watching
satellite channels than watching the local government channels The Saudi television
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Channel 1 ranked tenth in mean number of hours viewed weekly Marghalam also
demonstrated that there are a number of factors dictatmg the adoption of satellite
dishes These include the heavy government control over television programnimg
content, the limited programming on the two government-run channels, and the lack of
alternative forms of entertamment m Saudi Arabia He also found that the motives
underpinning avoidance of DBS adoption include religious beliefs, sex and violence
content, and Western commercialisation
5.4. The Islamic Media
As descnbed, since the commencement of broadcastmg services and the subsequent
adoption of DBS in the Arab world there have been a number of studies concerning this
phenomenon (see Alaniir, 1993, Bait-Almal, 1993, Ashal, 1994, Alabid and Mali, 1995,
Ayish, 1994) These studies have dealt with the effects and viewership of DBS in a
number of Arab countries There are also, however, a growing number of cultural
Islaimsts' wntmgs regarding what is bemg called the 'Islamic media' or 'Melam Ahslami'
Based on religious discourse, the constant feature among these wntmgs is the call for
media systems, broadcasters and practitioners to observe their responsibthties, as dictated
by Islam, in their programme ideas and subject matter and content of entertainment
They believe these should reflect the Islamic identity of their societies (see Ashanqeeti,
l99lb, 1994, 1996, Sun, 1991, Mohammad, 1983, Kaheel, 1985, Tash, 1995, Anikabi,
1992) Most of these wrthngs draw upon Islamic values and principles which they see as
a remedy for the dependency on un-Islamic imported media products and reliance on
an authentic Islamic message that should be directed at all humamty (Ashanqeeti, 1994,
Mohammad, l997)
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6. Conclusion
This chapter has descnbed much of the research that has been carned out m this field
What is apparent is that the vanous cultural and dependency theones have
acknowledged the role of mternal or local class and state conditions which effectively
constram local production and create a preference for foreign media imports, but this
tradition needs to be extended to cover the specific situation of Saudi Arabia Many
studies fail to adequately consider the umque charactenstics of Saudi Arabia m terms
of its religious and cultural hentage What is therefore required is an extension of
traditional and simphstic impenalism and dependency theones and the formulation of
a model that is appropnate and apphcable to media dependency m Saudi Arabia, a
model which considers the shortcomings of the Saudi media as a causal factor m the
dependency equation
While previous research has not qualitatively analysed local and foreign media content
in sufficient depth, this study attempts to do Just that at a time when a new generation
of television services is bombarding Saudi viewers These services undoubtedly have an
impact on Saudi television, on viewing patterns and on viewers' preferences Saudi
Arabia is a clear example of a situation where local constraints on production, as
descnbed in chapters Vil-IX, have resulted in a preference for imported programmes
of higher technological and artistic quality, and with more stimulating content Previous
studies, as descnbed, have generally acknowledged that shortcomings and constraints
exist and some researchers, such as Marghalam (1997), have attempted to diagnose the
problem However, their scope is confined to limited cross-sectional analyses which fail
to encompass a broader perspective There is a lack of research mto the constraints and
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shortcomings of Saudi television within the macro picture of media interaction with local
culture, and a need for further research within communication for development theones
Previous studies, bemg mostly descnptive, have not engaged m cntical thinkmg and
therefore have not apportioned any responsibthty for these shortcomings In the absence
of pnvate sector television compames m Saudi Arabia, ST y falls within the domain of
the government, but its role as sole controller of Saudi television and the ways m which
it impedes Saudi media development and potential effectiveness have not been
examined Fmally, previous research has not assessed the quality of the programming
produced as a result of these limitations, nor the quality of the programming offered by
foreign broadcasters which, as demonstrated, is perceived as more appealing, but
perpetuates Saudi Arabia's dependency on foreign cultural products
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CHAPTER ifi
METHODOLOGY
1. Data Collection Techniques
This study attempts to identify and discuss the impediments to the development of local
television production m Saudi Arabia which effectively mcrease its dependency on
foreign programming It also aims to analyse local and foreign programme content to
determine the nature of the preference for foreign media products In conducting the
research required for this mvestigation, a combination of methodologies is applied They
mclude content analysis of Saudi television schedules, mterviews with policy-makers and
television producers, and a survey of the visual production market It also conducts an
overview of DBS programme offerings and considers the implications of DBS policies
In order to obtain the relevant data, the author embarked on two field trips to Saudi
Arabia, the first from February to Apnl, 1997, the second durmg the same months of
1998 During these tnps, three main cities m Saudi Arabia were visited for the purpose
of carrying out interviews Riyadh - the capital, Jeddah and Danimam In the course of
the first trip, this author seized the opportumty to attend the 5th Annual Gulf Television
Production Festival held in Manama, Balirain, between the 17th and 20th of March,
1997 In addition, in order to explore the local, 'independent' television production
market, a survey was conducted among 20 private production companies operating in
Saudi Arabia, in the anticipation that such a survey would provide this study with useful
data regarding the practicality and the mechanisms of the local production market
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1.1. Sampling
To conduct this quantitative and qualitative research, the subjects of analysis, that is,
television programmes and key informants in the Saudi media facilities and in the local
video production market were purposefully sampled on the basis of what Lecompte and
Preissle (1993 69) call 'cntenon-based selection' The samples were extracted during the
penod from 1St March, 1997 to 14th March, 1997 These sampling procedures enabled
this author to deliberately select particular persons and units of analysis to provide
essential information that could not be obtained from other sources
2. Content Analysis
In agreement with Deacon et a! (1999 115-7), this author acknowledges that the view of
content analysis as providing a completely value-free insight into the study of content
is highly questionable However, bearing in mind that content analysis is not well-suited
to studying rn-depth questions about textual and discursive forms and their meanings
(Deacon et a!, 1999), this author applied this method to produce a more expansive
picture and to draw inferences from Saudi television output in order to provide a
general analysis
This data has been organised into themes and issues as a way of categonsrng the
analysis This includes issues such as the proliferation of DBS and its presumed impact
on national television services and local production mdustry, the rules and regulations
applied by the Ministry of Information relating to the production process of visual
matenals in Saudi Arabia, and how these rules may affect the progress of visual
production This study also shows the range of themes that are present in news and
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entertainment shows and highlights the shortcomings of Saudi television output
The techniques of content analysis employed here are designed to identify the carners
of meaning in both fictional and non-fictional texts In analysing news programmes,
newsworthiness and news value were identified and inferred through the ranking of news
stones and a calculation of the comparative time devoted to each story In fictional
presentations, dramatic shows were looked at with regard to the storyline, the subject
matter of episodes, the language used and the attire of the performers An additional
guidance for content analysis of DBS and ST y
 is to identify in the programme content
whether or not they contain any 'objectionable' elements, for example, scenes, messages,
and ideas that are considered incompatible with Islamic precepts Such 'objectionable'
items are, m fact, identifiable and frequently singled out as such m most of the Islamists'
writings STy
 programmes in particular were looked at in terms of their conformity and
consistency with the Saudi Communication and Information Policy, which was
formulated by the Supreme Council for Mass Communication m 1982 (see Appendix B)
2.1. Quantitative Analysis
In evaluating the extent of dependency on foreign imported television production by
Saudi television, and in calculating the ratio of domestic to imported material, there is
an initial application of quantitative analysis In a two-week television schedule where
no special programming has been incorporated, shows are classified into two broad
categories, imported versus local There is a further, more specific classification
according to the country of ongm or the source of imported programmes, and
programme genre entertainment and non-entertainment The former includes
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programmes such as music, sports, plays, dramatic senes, and senals, children's
programmes, and comedy The latter encompasses, news and news magazines, talk
shows, current affairs, and religious programmes
The researcher has ensured that the sample weeks reflects normal weeks of
progranimmg where there are no special events taking place, such as a soccer
tournament, or religious ntuals which are usually covered by the medium extensively
through a special programming schedule In order to identify and realise the competitive
television environment the Saudi television operates m, a panoramic picture of television
programme offermgs in the sample is presented by providing a descnption of the
programme content of the major satellite television channels They are the Middle East
Broadcasting Centre (MBC), Arab Radio and Television (ART), Dubai Television, the
Egyptian Satellite Channel (ESC), and the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation
International (LBCI) The analysed sample of satellite channel programmes was
collected during May 1998, and over a subsequent penod (see chapter V and Appendix
A) It was therefore not himted to the same two-week penod as the SlY sample The
analysis emphasises programme content, the financial aspects and apparent programming
policy
Saudi television programmes on channel 1 are considered m terms of whether they are
imported or home-grown, whether the programmes are designated as entertainment or
are ostensibly senous, and which audiences they intentionally target Imported shows are
classified by country of ongm as well as by language and, once such categonsation has
been effected, calculations follow where possible and sigmficant
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2.2. Qualitative Analysis
At the conclusion of the aforementioned quantitative analysis of schedule content, a
qualitative appraisal follows which addresses variables such as programme theme,
character, gender, relationships, sexual mtngue and use of language The prevailing
charactenstics of the televised content are evaluated for the quality of production and
tts potential appeal and value to Saudi audiences, juxtaposed with an mvestigation into
iltemative offenngs
In order to identify the subject matter of Saudi television programmes, imported and
local, and to study the programmes' philosophies and assumptions, and to identify their
textual features, values and messages they mean to convey, mitial empirical
documentation precedes an analysis of a sample of Saudi television programmes m two
time slots early afternoon hours, and pnme-time The former is traditionally dominated
by shows targeted at children, while the latter consists of peak viewing hours which are
usually directed at adult viewers Pnme-time viewing commences with the main news
bulletin at 9 30 and continues until close-down, an hour or two past midmght A
representative sample of these programmes on video tapes is documented in this study
The generated data is used as a basis for assessmg these programmes' conformity with
the Saudi media policy At this point it should be emphasised that while the media policy
can be regarded as the minimum standard for a better media, its limitations, such as its
mflexibthty, must also be acknowledged
The data is also used to assess the programmes' possible positive, negative or neutral
'interactions' with localities of Saudi culture and Saudi society A different set of cntena
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is applied m assessing these possible effects or 'interactions' The first of these examines
the Islamic point of view regarding the role of the media and their potential as a tool
for heightening peopl& s awareness of different social issues in an Islamic country Islam
is always looked upon as the base of Saudi government legitimacy, and the Islamic point
of view cannot be ignored, either by the government or by any sound scholastic analysis
After all, this Islamic thinking and the opposition to any form of cultural dependency
can be traced back to the early days of broadcast media operations in Saudi Arabia The
Islamic pomt of view functions as a framework m which the identified values and ideas
of imported television fare are measured
In explaining the Islamic point of view, the author has opted to draw extensively on his
knowledge and mterpretatlons of the Islamic hentage, both the Quran and Sunnali and
their commentanes, as observed by prominent Muslim junsts and scholars It should be
noted that Islam is not Just a faith but an entire social system It provides a set of values
and laws that govern all personal, social, economic and political conduct
In the fictional matenal, the study looks at key story lines relating to moral and ethical
values and at the structure of plots and dramatic action, appearance and attire of actors
and actresses, as well as relations between the characters
For analytical reasons, imported and local television shows are exanimed under the
following cntena
• Programme message the focus of the mam theme and the ideas and values that it
tries to impart
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• The frequency of the television programme's airing daily, weekly, etc, over what
penod of time months, weeks, etc, for how long the programme is running, and
whether it is a new production or a rerun
• The depicted role or the characters that actors and actresses try to portray, for
example, the 'hero' or 'herome' and their mteractive relationship
Programmes are analysed thematically in terms of their values, ideologies, images, and
ideas that could be mferred or identified A grouping method is apphed to accommodate
these representations To explore whether these collective representations are m
harmony or in conflict with local culture, those mferred from the sample, are assessed
and gauged according to their local counterparts Samovar and Porter (1985) defined
'culture' as
'[ ] the deposit of knowledge, expenences, beliefs and values, attitudes,
meaning hierarchies, religion, tlmmg, notes, spatial relations, concepts of
umverse, and matenal objects and possessions acquired by a large group
of people in the course of generation through mchvidual and group
stnvmg '(Samovar and Porter, 1985 19)
Culture has necessarily been broadly defined for the purposes of this study as
incorporating people's ways and patterns of living which encompass verbal utterances,
gestures, ceremomal behaviours, values and belief systems References to 'non-local
culture' or 'alien culture' allude to non-Saudi contnbutions, both Arab and non-Arab, to
television content
Following this, a discussion about the prevailing culture and dominant value system m
Saudi Arabia and their similanties to, or deviations from the imported ones is presented
Since Islam is the prevailing religion, its doctrines and teachings are utihsed as a
framework or gauging instrument
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Another cnterion, besides the Islamic perspective, is the cumulative development
literature of scholars who have devoted considerable attention to mvestlgate how media
should be utthsed m different settmgs around the world Special attention is given to the
Saudi media scholars' literature pertammg to media usage
The cumulative views about commumcation for development and cultural dependency
are considered in the assessment and the evaluation of broadcast media purposes and
use, and serve as explanatory tools to assist in understanding the history of cultural
dependency Although the media impenahsm thesis is consulted, this study eschews some
of the shortcomings of previous studies, for example the lack of mvestigation mto the
local class and state roles in impeding local production, and the lack of detailed
qualitative analysis of local and foreign programming, both of which could provide a
comparative framework from which to assess the preference for foreign imports By
providing results of investigation into local constramts and qualitative analysis of
programming, this study also exceeds the mere crude statistics and quantitative
descnption of the phenomena of dependency and impenahsm in the television
programming sphere
3. Interviews
Interviews with media officials, policy-makers, the owners and executives of pnvate
production companies and independent producers were administered pnmarily in the
second half of this investigation The mdependent producers were selected for their
unique abthty to be miormative because of their mvolvement m the problem that this
author is attempting to mvestigate They are considered as key players in the local
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television production scene and are therefore in a position to provide this study with the
mformation required to answer some of the research questions Their wiThngness to do
so must be acknowledged To avoid the element of partiality in selectmg mterviewees,
a key factor m the selection process was the relevance of the interview and the
representation of the pomt of view of the informants
3.1. Difficulties in Soliciting and Obtaining Information
The current climate in Saudi Arabia is not conducive to obtaining information for
research purposes The country has substantial expenence of cultural and demographic
isolation, and as a consequence its peoples are essentially protectlomst - disciplined to
subordinate their individual and personal needs and opinions to those of their families,
clans, tnbes and communities (Najai, 1982) It must therefore be recognised from the
outset that compared to research activities in other countnes, a study such as this is
limited by the social, political and religious circumstances of Saudi Arabia, thus
conducting media research in Saudi Arabia is a difficult undertaking Public officials,
respondents and citizens are usually reluctant to reveal information or voice their
pimons Najai (1982) refers to this too
'Saudi Arabia has expenenced an extensive penod of isolation and self-
contained discipline which generally predisposed the individual to
subordinate his (sic) needs and opinion to the collective interests of
family, tnbe and the commumty at large '(Najai, 1982 10)
Alkheraiji (1990) descnbes his own expenence as a challenging exercise in patience and
often accompanied by disappomtment and frustration The nature of this present study,
the accessibility of media facthties and the availability of media officials has constituted
a distmctive challenge For example, although this author was 'armed' with a letter from
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the Director of King Abudlaziz Umversity addressed to the Deputy Minister of
Information, requesting co-operation from and access to intended interviewees, the letter
was treated as yet another paper petition to be passed along the bureaucratic chain for
a number of days Numerous attempts by this author to gam a positive response from
the Deputy Minister proved unsuccessful Thus, in order to gain access to Saudi
television facthties and to Ministry of Information officials for interview, this author has
had to rely on a chain of personal connections with former colleagues and acquaintances
who actually work there Their role was to facthtate entry to the premises and to
introduce the mformants Such efforts were vital m gaming trust, and breaking down the
barners which may prohibit government officials from disclosmg or revealing
information Since interviewing as a method has the capacity to range over multiple
perspectives on a single topic, all mterviews in this study are used as heuristic tools
Information gathered m one interview has led to new perspectives and new questions
in later interviews In the mtervlewmg process, leads have been followed m order to
expand on questions and to acquire as precise and as detailed a response as possible
Commumcation policies and media regulations are important factors m shaping media
operations, therefore, the issue of communication and mformation policy deserves
attention In this study, this author has chosen to investigate commumcation and
information policy with the supreme authonty responsible for planning and formulating
media policies in Saudi Arabia, and has therefore conducted a number of an open,
unstructured interviews with members of the Supreme Council of Mass Commumcation
The outcome of these interviews is the object of textual mterpretation and provides vital
data m evaluating the SCMC's authonties, responsibilities and performance It is also
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beneficial in identifymg this body's current agenda and pnonties m terms of policies and
plans for local media productions and their future in a fast changing media world
The availabthty of the necessary data to understand better the issues surrounding
communication pohcy and independent and rn-house Saudi television production
activities and operations dictates the number of interviews and the number of
informants
3.2. Interviewees, Topics and Conditions
A total of 46 interviews were conducted as follows
• Interviews with members of the Supreme Council of Mass Communication
• Interviews with managers, heads of vanous departments in Saudi TV and top officials
m the Ministry of Information
• Interviews with rndependent producers who own local production firms
All of the interviews with media officials were conducted in Saudi Arabia within the
confines of their offices or adjacent venues, such as meeting rooms, unless it was their
express wish to meet at a remote location Anticipatmg interruptions, many of the
mterviewees requested that incoming calls be diverted for the duration of the interview,
which lasted approximately an hour Since the majonty of independent producers
operate their companies on a part-time basis and mostly at evening time, these particular
interviews were conducted at company headquarters during these hours after
arrangements had been made over the phone Interviews with members of the Supreme
Council for Mass Communication, who are responsible for the formulation of media
policy, were conducted in various venues These members, with the exception of the
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Secretary General, who works full-time, are engaged in their own permanent jobs in
widespread locations For mstance, one member works for the Ministry of Information,
another works as a general director of a pubhshmg firm and another is employed as a
lecturer at King Saud Umversity Each member was contacted and a suitable meeting
place was discussed and agreed upon
All of these interviews were audio-taped and transcnbed m note-form at the same time
unless the mterviewee expressed his objection to the use of a tape recorder, as four did
Other interviewees made gestures during the course of interview to stop the recording
m order to reveal sensitive information which they did not wish to be taped Taping
resumed after that At the end of each interview the transcnption was presented to the
interviewees for approval It was anticipated that some Saudi television officials and/or
local production company representatives would decline an invitation to be interviewed,
whilst others would opt to proceed under the blanket of anonymity Mindful of the
sensitivity of such issues and the possible repercussions of a breach of trust, this author
has categoncally honoured any agreement to ensure the perpetual confidentiality in such
circumstances and has assiduously avoided attnbutmg comments or specific information
which would implicate, embarrass, or otherwise compromise contributors
Topics discussed in the course of these mterviews mcluded the following
• The existing broadcast media's orgamsational structure (facthties, equipment, and
staff)
• Plans for the future of media in the light of the latest development m communication
technologies, (technical, coverage, new services, new programming policies, for example)
• Local television production status and the possible ways to develop it, for example
through subsidisation and finance, revision of the rules and regulations affecting
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television production, jomt ventures, and how it could be fostered and protected from
the competition of foreign programmes
In 1995, Dr Fouad Alfarsy was appomted as the new Information Minister A few
months later he gave his directions to the Ministry officials to form an ad hoc committee
to mvestigate the status of Saudi television The committee consisted of senior Ministry
officials, mcludmg deputy ministers for broadcastmg affairs and semor directors and
producers, m addition to heads of some Saudi television departments Members of this
committee were interviewed m order to acquaint the author with their responsibilities
and their agenda In mterviews with media officials, issues to be addressed mcluded
• Human resource development
• The accessibthty of media mstitutions to wnters and mtellectuals
• The broadening of contnbutorship to foster new talent
• The lack of audience research
• The Mimstiy of Information rules and regulations pertaining to the local pnvate video
mdustry and whether it is adequate to foster local mdependent production
• The assumed shortcomings of the Saudi media m addressmg and debatmg local issues
which mterest their audiences
Fmally, there is a lamentable dearth of studies concerning the influence and effects of
transnational media - mcludmg imported television programmes - on television
audiences To support the research objectives, the author conducted as much as is
practicable of the programme of informal supportive mterviews with fellow researchers,
academics and media practitioners Such informal contacts provide the study with
additional and unforeseen insights mto the topics under mvestigation
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3.3. Survey of Television Production Entities
During a visit to the Ministry of Information in July, 1996, this author was able to obtain
a list of major licensed television production firms operatmg in Saudi Arabia The list
comprises more than 80 names and mailing addresses Some of these firms are well-
known established production companies with a reputation in the television market m
Saudi Arabia and abroad In this author's view, these compames could be a viable source
of information about the status of the local production market, the factors and the forces
shapmg local production operations and its prospectus
To obtain clear relevant answers, the author conducted a total of twenty interviews with
independent producers to investigate their role and the perceived hindrances for the
development of local production from their own perspective A further twenty-six
interviews were carried out with top officials from SlY mcluding the Deputy Minister
and other heads of departments within STy
 Finally, agents, representatives and
operators from TV networks m Saudi Arabia, such as First Net, Showtime, and Orbit TV
Network, were interviewed
The interview questionnaire deals with the local television production market, its current
situation, its future and any obstacles it faces Subjects were asked to identify from their
own perspective what they viewed as obstacles hindering the development of the local
production market, and the ranges of co-operation between subjects and the Ministry of
Information Smce the aim was to explore the respondents' opinions regarding local
production market economics, respondents were encouraged to include any comments
or ideas they wished to add This data has been collected, interpreted and analysed
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The local production companies nominated as subjects for research are, potentially,
entirely capable of weaning Saudi television from its dependency on foreign programme-
makers Yet, to date, their capabilities have not been fully utthsed and have remained
unexploited There is, clearly, an investigative challenge to discover precisely how the
Ministry of Information mstructs such companies, how the laws are framed and how they
are interpreted and aclmimstered Lastly, as well as investigating the gamut of deterrents
to free trade in Saudi broadcastmg, the author addresses the dearth of mducements such
as subsidies which are a spur to mvestment and creativity in more hospitable media
environments
The msights gleaned from the data collection and analyses and the outcome of the
mtervlews has facilitated the formulation of follow-on questions relatmg to the rules and
regulations of the Ministry of Information, and the addressmg of those issues which
emerge as being worthy of discussion with media officials
4. Research Questions
Research questions addressed m the methodologies descnbed above include
•	 Quantitatively, to what extent is Saudi television Channel 1 dependent on
imported television programmes?
How is that evident from the ratio of local to foreign-made matenals?
•	 What are the roles of Saudi television's rn-house production and pnvate video
production facilities?
How effective are these two mechanisms in mimmismg dependence on foreign
media products?
What are the obstacles, if any, to eradicatmg this phenomenon?
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•	 How do the censorship methods apphed by Saudi authorities affect the selection
and broadcast of television programmes?
• How justifiable are the concerns of culturalists and Islaimsts over the DBS
channel contents which, presumably, are perceived as posmg threats to Saudi
culture?
In addition, the main questions this study investigates are
•	 Qualitatively, what, in broad terms, are the collective values represented by these
shows, and how might they intrude on indigenous culture?
• How effective is the censorship of Saudi television, by its selection and editing
of foreign-made programmes, in enforcing conformity with values compatible with
Islamic ideology?
•	 What are the obstacles and hindrances to the development of rn-house and
independent local productions?
The following chapter provides an historical, cultural and societal context for these
questions in a detailed description of Saudi Arabia, past and present In defining the
elements which constitute Saudi Arabia's national identity it is possible to identify the
societal components, such as institutions and values affected by the forces of
modermsation, the advancement of media technology and, for reasons outlined
previously, the importation of foreign media products
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CHAPTER IV
SAUDI ARABIAN SOCIETY, CULTURE AND MODERNITY
1. Introduction
In order to assess the impact of modermsation, brmgmg with it the mception of
television, on Saudi Arabian society, and to gain a deeper insight mto the concerns over
imported programming, it is important to consider the ongins and culture of a people
deeply rooted m traditional and religious beliefs and the societal values based on these
This will provide the reader with an essential frame of reference leading to a better
understanding of the issues raised m this study
There is often a great deal of emphasis placed on the power struggle between the forces
of tradition and those of modernity In this mstance, tradition can be defmed as
adherence to and defence of the basic pnnciples of the Islamic faith, culture and values,
while modernity is perceived as rapid economic growth and the execution of
development programmes (Alfarsy, 1990) Modermty implies imported Western
technology and with it, imported Western values, which can be perceived as a threat to
the traditional foundations of the Kingdom It is apparent, however, that m Saudi Arabia
the two forces of tradition and modermty interact closely On the one hand, it can be
contended that the system requires defending from negative, un-Islamic mfluences On
the other hand, it is necessary to modermse and to accept change One view is that the
Saudi system is too closed and too defensive, but it can also be argued that in an age of
global media, culture, politics and economics it is not possible for any country to totally
isolate itself What emerges, therefore, is the need for a progression and development
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that reflects and complements modern Islamic values and allows a flexible application
of Islamic doctrine
Despite the discovery of oil in the country m the late 1930s, the Kingdom did not
witness any real economic and social development until the early 1950s Since the l960s,
Saudi Arabia has been engaged in a movement to reform, develop, and modermse all
aspects of Saudi life Using its substantial oil revenues, the government's aspiration to
modermsation has led Saudi Arabia to effect great improvements in its nifrastructure
Within only a few decades, this isolated, tnbal, desert land has evolved into a modern
state (Alharithi, 1983)
In the l970s, the Saudi government employed itself in the building of the country's
rnfrastructure almost from scratch Earlier, King Abdulaziz, father of the present state,
applied the mechanisms of education and the physical orgamsation of an nifrastructure
in his development model The plans have not been challenged on Islamic or traditional
grounds and have remained the basic guidelines for an acceptable political, cultural and
societal development In these plans, the King maintained a balance between the
conservative and the most progressive views in the country (Vassthev, 1998)
The massive influx of oil revenues and the resulting effect on the Kingdom's economy
have enabled it to formulate and execute extensive programmes of rapid development
which have catapulted this society into an era of modermsation in every direction To
gain an rn-depth insight into the nature of the transformation that has taken place, it is
necessary to examine the many facets of Saudi Arabian society pnor to, during and since
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its metamorphosis, in terms of its history, politics, economic situation and religious
hentage Against this backdrop, the subsequent conflict between modermty and tradition
can be fully comprehended, as can the consequences of and social reaction to the
television broadcastmg industry
2. The Physical Setting
Compnsmg almost 80% of the Arabian peninsula, Saudi Arabia is bounded by the
Arabian Gulf, the UAE and Qatar m the east, Kuwait, Iraq and Jordan to the north,
Yemen and Oman in the south, and the Red Sea to the west (see Figure No 1)
Its geographical features include a coastal plain, Tihama, which extends from west to
east Stretching mto the northwest region of the country is the Najd Plateau East of this
is the Nafud Desert, encompassmg 57,000 km sq A stnp of desert, known as Dahna,
connects the Nafud Desert with the Rub Al-Khah (the Empty Quarter), the largest sandy
desert m the world, covering an area of 650,000 km sq The Dalma also separates the
Najd Plateau from the eastern provmce The latter is a flat area which slopes gently into
the Arabian Gulf (Khattab, 1982) The geographical diversity of the Kingdom and the
relative sparseness of its population underlines the potential role of the media for
national commumcation and in promotmg the people's involvement m national
development
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Figure No 1. Saudi Arabia and Surrounding Countries.
Source: Vassffiev, A. (1998), The History of Saudi Arabia. London: Saqi Books.
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3. Population
According to the census of 1974, the total population was measured at 7,012,642, of
which 5,128,6s5were classified as settled and 1,883,987 as nomadic A census m 1992
estimated a total population of 16,929,294,wlule an estimate made m 1994 measured it
at 17 8 million Roughly 38% of the population are aged between 20 and 44 (Khattab,
1982) In 1975 the population consisted of the Bedouins, who represented 10%, the rural
population at 47%, and the urban population at 43 % (Census Department, 1976) A
senes of Five- Year Development plans, described later m this chapter, created a shift
m this distnbution Records from 1980 show 42% hvmg m urban areas, 12% m towns
and the rest m rural areas The latest study, of 1985, estimates the urban population at
72% The fact that a large proportion of the population consists of people under the age
of forty-five has sigmficant implications for the future of Saudi society m relation to the
process of modermsation and the mfluence of the media on the relations between the
old and new generations, the work ethic, and on the traditions and values of Saudi
society These will be discussed m detail further on m this chapter
4. Historical Background
Pnor to the seventh century A D ,the Arabian Peninsula was populated by a nomadic,
polytheistic people, divided by numerous nval tribal factions. It was not until the 4th
century that the peninsula's position along the major trade routes from west to east led
to the building of towns such as Makkah and Madmah In the 7th century A D came the
pivotal change with the mtroduction of Islam to the region Despite diverse tnbal
factions and disparate influences, Islam was to prove a umfying force and Makkah
became a major cultural centre for the Islamic world In the 16th century the peninsula
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came under the control of the Ottoman Empire, whose domination of the region
continued up to the First World War (Vassthev, 1998) Meanwhile, one family, who had
been acquiring resources and gaining leverage, had started to effect changes on the
social and political structure of the region Ths family, which can be traced back to the
15th Century, were called the House of Al-Saud
4.1. The History of the House of Al-Saud
The mid-i 8th century was a time of religious cleansing led by Mohammad Ibn
Abduiwahab, an Islamic leader and revivalist In 1744, a meeting took place between this
leader and Amir Mohanimad Ibn Saud, m which the latter agreed to join forces and
work for the Islamic revivalist cause Pnor to this, the population of the peninsula had
begun to indulge m superstitious and esotenc practices while the mosques stood
unfrequented and ruined (Stoddard, 1967) The aim of these two leaders was to
reconcile these people with the authentic Islamic faith Mohammad bm Abduiwahab was
not content merely to preach Islam, but was determined, with the help and support of
Amir Mohanimad Ibn Saud, to build a society where Islam m its undiluted punty would
be embodied as a practical scheme of hfe
Ruling jomtly over the city of Al-Dinyah, Mohammad Ibn Abduiwahab and Mohammad
Ibn Saud took the titles of Sheikh and Imam, respectively According to Rentz (1980),
the two collaborated closely, forming a strong partnership which led to the conquest and
capture of Najd The House of Al-Saud was then faced with the archetypal problem of
expansiomsm - consolidating its rule, a problem which was to lead to years of turmoil
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Mohammad Ibn Saud's work was continued by his son, Abdulaziz Ibn Mohammad, who
managed to capture Riyadh in 1773 and then to conquer the rest of Najd (Alfarsy, 1990)
until finally extending his authority over most of the peninsula Confrontation ensued
with the Ottomans, who still retained control over Makkah and Madinah in the west In
1818, during a power struggle over the region, Al-Dinyah fell under siege By the
following year, the Al-Saud family members had been captured and the House of Al-
Saud was forced to surrender control temporarily (Hopwood, 1972)
In 1824 Turki lbn Abdullah, an Al-Saud family member, recaptured Riyadh, where he
ruled until his assassination in 1834 when he was succeeded by his son Faisal, who
retained power until his expulsion to Cairo m 1838 by the Ottomans In 1843, Faisal
escaped from Egypt to begin his second reign of the peninsula Despite recovering much
of the land that had previously belonged to his family, Makkah and Madmah still eluded
his control His rule, lasting until his death m 1865, and the subsequent years were times
of grave internal dissension within the family However, power struggles with the House
of Al-Rashid forced the ruling member of the Al-Saud, Abdulrahman Ibn Saud, and his
son, Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, into temporary exile m Kuwait m 1897 (Vassthev, 1998)
By the beginning of the 1900s the major powers in the region, including the Al-Sauds,
the Ottomans, the Hashnnates and the Al-Rashids, were again staking their claims
Inevitably, this conflict of interests was to lead to more friction and mternal warfare
4.2. The Unification of Saudi Arabia
In 1902, Abdulaziz Ibn Saud managed to oust the Rashid fanuly from Riyadh and spent
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the next ten years consolidating his rule over the region and unifying the people of the
Najd This was no small feat, to do this he had to totally annihilate the control of the
Al-Rashid family as well as the Turkish army in these regions (Shobaili, 1971) The
demise of the Ottoman power during the First World War removed it from the equation
Eight years later, defeatmg the last of the Rashids, Ibn Saud extended his temtory north
to the border with Iraq and Transjordan He then sent his son Faisal southwards to
control the region of the Asir, between the Hijaz and Yemen Finally, Ibn Saud turned
to the region m the West and by 1925 he had assumed complete rule of this area too,
including Makkah and Madmah The following year he was proclaimed King of the Najd
and Sultan of the Hijaz In 1932 total consolidation of Saudi Arabia was announced in
a Royal Order which began as follows
'With reliance on God and on the basis of the telegrams sent from all our
subjects m the Kingdom f the Hijaz and of Najd and its Dependencies,
and yielding to the desire of public opinion in our land, and wishing to
unite the parts of the Arab Kingdom, we have ordered the following
Article 1 The name of the Kingdom of the Hijaz and of Najd and its
Dependencies shall be changed to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and our
title from now on shall be King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ' (Rentz,
1980 30)
Unlike other Arab nations which bore the brunt of Western imperialism, Saudi Arabia
thus escaped the mjunous effects of occupation by a Western power Moreover, Ibn
Saud had succeeded m umtmg together four regions previously torn apart by rampant
disorgamsation and diverse tribal customs, traditions and mterests
It was dunng these years that Saudi-Western relations were formed (Alkheraiji, 1994)
'Saudi-British relations from 1915 through till 1950 were mainly concerned
with the fulfilment of boundary agreements concluded between them,
while Saudi-American relations remained purely commercial This can be
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largely attnbuted to Amenca's policy of isolation and non-mvolvement m
World affairs at that time ' (Alfarsy, 1980 35)
Abdulaziz contmued to build on his relations with the west until his death in 1953 It was
durmg his reign that a group of Californian geologists realised that the whole peninsula
was floatmg on oil With the discovery of oil in Eastern Saudi Arabia by an American
company in 1938, the economic transformation of Saudi Arabia and the process of
modemisation was about to begin
Following his death, Ibn Saud was succeeded by his sons, Saud, Faisal, Khand and Fand
Saud abdicated in 1964 in favour of Faisal who had had considerable control over
foreign and economic policy during Saud's reign After Faisal's assassination by his
nephew in 1975, Khand assumed control and on his death m 1982, Fand became King
5. The Constitution
In a position with few parallels m the modern world, Saudi Arabia has no formal,
written constitution
'Saudi Arabian culture, civihsation and socio-pohtical orgamsatlon are
cotermmous with Islam Only when this is understood can the essence of
the Saudi policy and the pervasive intensity of the unbroken Islamic
continuum be appreciated ' (Alfarsy, 1986 9)
Religion, therefore, is the very core of the Saudi Government's existence Smce the
formation of the Kingdom in 1932, the Quran has been accepted by the Saudis as the
fundamental constitutional document This became established in the eyes of the world
in 1992, when King Fand issued three royal decrees instituting a Basic Law which
defined the systems of government and set up a Consultative Council (Majhs Al-Shura)
In a further move to create a political mfrastructure, King Fand also announced the
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creation of a provmcial consultative council and defined the government structure, the
means of succession of future rulers and domestic and foreign policy In the same
document, he formally declared that Saudi Arabia is an Arab and Islamic Kingdom, with
its own language Arabic, its own religion Islam, and its own constitution the Quran
and the teachmgs of the Prophet Mohammad These works embody not only the
constitution but the main tenets of the Islamic Shanali Islam therefore defmes the
government's ideological basis
6. Government Structure
6.1. The King
As an absolute monarch with centrahsed power, the King is Head of State, Pnme
Mimster, Commander-rn-chief of the security and imhtary force, and Imam - leader of
the Muslims His power is lnmted only by the Shanali and the norms of the society he
reigns over
6.2. The Ulama
The Ulama are the political core and religious backbone of the Saudi government When
it is considered that the formation of Saudi Arabia began in the fifteenth century with
a politicallreligious liaison, it becomes clear that religious leaders are central to the
political system Consisting of a non-hierarchical group of religious men and with a long
history rn the socio-political and legal systems of the country, it is chiefly responsible for
the judicial system With the power rnvested in them they may issue a Fatwa, and any
legal judgement which is passed is issued by this body, whose authority is endorsed rn
the Quran '0 true believer, obey God and obey the prophet and those who are in
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authonty among you' (3 59) According to Alfarsy (1990), the Ulama's role m Saudi
society also includes the implementation of the principles of Shariah, provision of
religious junsprudence, guidance and education, the spreading of the Islamic message
outside Saudi Arabia and supervision of the mosques
'The Ulama can be defined as a religious and conservative group,
traditionally conceived of by the government as the guardian of the Islam
orthodoxy in governmental political decisions '(Najai, 1982 34)
While the country's leaders advocate obedience to the Ulama, the Ulama upholds
allegiance to them in return This alliance has ensured political and social stabthty during
times of cnsis, such as the Gulf War when the Ulama issued a Fatwa which gave the
King power to appeal for foreign military assistance, with the support of the Ulama he
was able to maintain a consensus
6.3. The Council of Ministers
Headed by the King, the Council of Ministers is the highest authonty m the country it
is through this body that the King's power is discharged Under King Abdulaziz, the
administration of the country was divided into two geographical regions Central and
East, and the Western Provmce To govern the Western Province, the King created two
bodies, the Consultative Council and the Council of Deputies The latter, however, was
replaced m 1953 by the Council of Ministers This new body then underwent a senes of
modifications over the years to fmally amve at its present state Currently compnsmg
twenty-eight members, the Council is appointed by the King and has responsibihty in
both legislative and executive affairs Although the council strictly adheres to a principle
of majority rule in its voting procedures, the King, m his capacity as Prime Minister, has
the power of veto, which can be exercised within thirty days of any decision At present,
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the Council is headed by King Fand while Crown Pnnce Abdullah acts as First Deputy
Prime Minister, and Prince Sultan is the Second Deputy Prime Minister
6.4. The Consultative Council (Majils Al-Shura)
The Consultative Council, in its original state, was established by King Abdulaztz, but
was suspended some years later In 1993, developmg historical circumstances and the
need for a degree of political participation necessitated the re-establishment of the
Council in a new form In July, 1997, King Fand declared an merease from sixty
members to ninety members plus chairman They include retired semor officers from the
armed forces, digmtaries, retired semor civil servants, academics, adniimstrators,
journalists and writers, two members of the Shia nunonty, religious conservatives and
religious progressives These members are chosen by the King for their wisdom,
speciahsed knowledge and expertise m issues important to Saudi Arabia In the belief
that a Western-style democracy was mappropnate for the Saudi people, King Falid
stated
'The free vote system is not suitable to our country because the Kingdom
is the symbol of Islam and the two holy mosques Democracy is suitable
to the West but not the whole world '(Alkheraiji, 1994 73)
The Shura serves as an advisory body to the King on various issues related to domestic
and foreign policy and cames out an mspectorate function with government agencies
and departments According to Saudi law, new members will be added every four years
with half the previous members remaining
6.5. The Judicial System
In 1927, a Royal Decree effected the union of the judicial system m Saudi Arabia Smce
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then, despite legislation m 1952, there has been little change to the basic system The law
of Islam (Sharzah) is the law of the land and is adniimstered by the courts The pnmary
concern of these courts is family mhentance and property Then there is a commercial
court the Committee for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes In addition, there are
speciahsed courts, each with its own individual area One deals with labour and
employment matters, there is the Negotiable Instruments Committee, which is concerned
with fmancial matters, and the Board of Gnevances, which handles cases mvolvmg the
government and its agencies, and foreign court judgements
6.6. Regional Government
In 1993, thirteen provmces were designated, each governed by an Aniir with mmistenal
rank As stipulated in the Basic Law of 1992, each provmce has a consultative council,
the Majlis Almantiqa, which meets quarterly In addition, Saudi Arabia is divided into
five administrative regions with each one governed by a Governor or a Prince This
demarcation was necessitated by the modermsation process to ensure that each region
is given equal attention m the development programmes Alfarsy (1990) outhnes the
objectives of the Fifth Development Plan (1990-95) for each region
'[ ] to realise a balanced development between the different regions of
the Kingdom, through 1 considermg the development centres as a basis
for regional development, according to the defined standards, 2 complete
utilisation of the services and utilities m the different regions of the
Kingdom ' (Alfarsy, 1990 51)
It is the role of the five regional governors to ensure that this matenalises m their
mdividual temtones
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7. The Economy: The Development Programmes
Until the oil revenues began to pour m, the Saudi approach to building an economic
mfrastructure was virtually non-existent Its main source of mcome was the annual Hajj
to Makkah and there was therefore no need to provide for other revenues Suddenly,
m the 1950s, the situation required a radical rethink The ways and means by which to
import, export and store crude oil needed vast improvement Seaports, airports and
refmeries had to be constructed With a massive influx of oil-based wealth, Saudi Arabia
had become more and more dependent on imports, which placed a further strain on the
transport and communications systems New mimstnes were established to deal with this,
and so a more modem economic infrastructure began to take shape (Lackner, 1978)
According to El Mallakh (1982 141)
'Ideas about planning in Saudi Arabia date back to 1958 when it was
found necessary to Inject rationality into the economy after the cnsis
which occurred in 1955-7
The economic cnsis to which he refers came about after gross over-spending on
development projects by the government led to a large borrowing requirement from the
SAMA - the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency The deficit led to inflation and a fall m
the exchange rate of the Riyal The government then ran up debts with Amencan banks
to the sum of 92 million dollars, resulting in a general lack of confidence m the
economy Businessmen withdrew their interests King Faisal, therefore, took corrective
action, persuading ARAMCO to act as guarantors, he managed to delay the debt
repayment He then cut back extra government spending, financial aid to other Arab
countnes and introduced the first national budget (Lacey, 1987, El Mallakh, 1982)
Havmg successfully stabihsed the economy, m 1958 he adopted a more proactive
98
approach and formed an economic development coimmttee which paved the way for the
first phase of economic development
The chosen model for economic development was the Five Year Plan, a concept which
had its ongms m the post World War II penod m the West In the 1970s these plans
were imitated by a number of developing countries, but the fmancial limitations of these
countries and their political mstabihty led to the plans' failure In contrast, development
programmes m Saudi Arabia were supported by oil-derived wealth, and stability
7.1. The Five-Year Development Plans
King Faisal's perception of the development of his country is revealed in his own words
'Our religion requires us to progress and advance and to bear the burden
of the highest tradition and best manners What is called progressiveness
m the world today, and what the reformers are caThng for, be it social,
human or economic progress, is all embodied m the Islamic rehgion'
(cited m Alfarsy, 1980 38)
7.1.1. The First Five-Year Plan (1970-1975)
The profound meaning of the First Five-Year Development Plan was encapsulated by
King Faisal when he asserted
'Like it or not, we must join the modem world and fmd an honourable
place in it '(Gaslull, 1967, cited in Alfarsy, 1980 118)
Thus, in 1970, the government formulated the first of a senes of Five-Year Plans
spanning a total of twenty years at the cost of $800 million and fmanced entirely by oil
revenues The primary objective was to build and improve the country's infrastructure,
encompassing agriculture, industry, energy, labour, transport, commerce, mining, defence,
education, and national secunty, among other aspects of the society This first plan was
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also aimed at cultural and rehgious conservation, improving living standards, and
maintaining economic and social stability, and focused on increasing the productive
capacity of the economy (El Mallakh, 1982) These aims were achieved m part by
increasmg the growth of Gross Domestic Product and developmg human resources
7.1.2. The Second Five-Year Plan (1975-1980)
When this development plan was formulated, the main goal was to reduce the
dependency on oil revenues through the estabhshment of new mdustnes $142 billion
dollars was spent on economic and social development, defence, administration and
foreign aid As a result of this plan there were further developments in human resources
and non-petroleum mdustnes (Alfarsy, 1986)
7.1.3. The Third Five-Year Plan (1980-1985)
The third plan was devised in order to redress the economic balance even further Still
heavily dependent on oil revenues, the country required changes m the economy to
conserve its fuel resources and to ensure long-term economic stability m this particular
export The idea was that the potentially steady supply of revenues would then finance
current and future development projects One such project was the development of the
petrochemical, pharmaceutical and other heavy industries and the exploitation of their
potential in foreign markets Under the control of the Saudi Arabian Basic Industnes
Corporation (SABIC) these industries advanced dramatically during this penod
Attention was also given to agncultural progress The Saudi people were encouraged to
participate in the progress of their country on both national and regional levels by a
greater focus on social welfare lower income groups were taken into consideration too
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with improvements in social services (Alfarsy, 1990)
7.1.4. The Fourth Five-Year Plan (1985-1990)
This plan was to devised to build on aspects of the previous one Firstly, there was a
focus on making economic use of the country's resources and developing viable
alternatives Secondly, more attention was given to production m various industries at
local and secondary levels, there was also a drive to ensure that foreign contracts were
awarded to local compames Next, a plan formulated to reduce the number of unskilled
foreign workers was put into effect Fmally, the development plan was targeted at the
pnvate sector to encourage it to invest in economic development (Alfarsy, 1990)
7.1.5. The Fifth Five-Year Plan (1990-1995)
The objectives of this plan were somewhat different from earlier development drives
At the centre of attention was the need to bridge the gap between tradition and
modernity so that while the principles of the Shanah were still advocated, the people
were encouraged to receive training, cultural awareness and information This m turn
would support earlier plans to promote the human resource element of the society and
mamtain a qualified and expenenced indigenous workforce
7.1.6. The Current Five-Year Plan (1995-2000)
Ths plan contmues the emphasis on developing the private sector and aims at the
mcreased growth and mdigemsation of the workforce Saudi Arabia has gradually been
forced to depend more and more on foreign manpower in order to implement earlier
plans and to provide the necessary skills and expertise required to resource its expanding
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mdustnes However, this is not without negative consequences for the economy and the
society Affecting the economy, foreign workers often require foreign imports,
undermnung the policy to reduce dependency in this area In an attempt to reduce
Western influence the government has adopted a shifting policy to establish links with
other competing firms m developmg countnes rather than the West (Lackner, 1978)
Many of these new workers are politically neutral and are not looking for residency
Meanwhile, the development of the indigenous workforce is an on-gomg issue Other
areas being dealt with are Saudi Arabia's defence capacity, balanced economic
development and the protection of the environment
Media facilities and commumcation network infrastructure were the targets for
ambitious development plans but what has been missing is the use of the media as a
platform to encourage Saudis to participate m the development of their country, and as
tools for raising awareness In addition, the media have not been harnessed to catalyse
support and backing for government policies and actions
8. Education
The educational system is free and provides not only education but also books and a
health service The standard practice is for a child to be enrolled first at pnmary school
for six years, followed by three years at intermediate school and then three more at high
school before progressing to university or college There are two types of high school
one offering arts and science subjects, the other, vocational training Girls are educated
separately from boys In 1995, there were 815,000pupils enrolled at intermediate school,
447,000 at high school and 9,578 enrolled for vocational training In addition, there are
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4,550 pupils attending one of more than thirty special schools for children with special
educational needs As far as further education is concerned, in 1996 it was estimated that
there were 2,343 adult education centres and seven universities These institutes are
attended by over 90,1207 students Fmally, the adult literacy rate is Just under 62%
(Statesman's Yearbook, 1998-1999)
Pnor to unification m 1932, education had been concentrated in rehgious schools, either
Katatib (wntmg schools) or Halagat (seminar style schools) and lesson content revolved
purely around the Quran The process of modermsation, however, demanded a more
modern educational system which could train and empower the Saudis to participate in
the development of their society Furthermore, the government aimed at reducing levels
of illiteracy In conjunction with the Five-Year Plans, it hoped to develop scientific and
technical capabthties in the new generation, thereby training Saudi people to take over
the tasks of the foreign workforces The educational reforms which took place were
facilitated and expedited by a number of components the import of educational
technology, trammg abroad for students and teachers, positive encouragement from the
government in the form of free education, and the financial mvestment into the
construction of schools and the purchase of equipment and matenals
In order to succeed in their reforms, the government had to surmount a number of
impediments The first of these was the fact that the nomads, the indigenous population
of Saudi Arabia, are a people who are rooted in their traditions and would not succumb
readily to change The next problem was a lack of educators and trainers in Saudi
Arabia In addition, there was strong objection from the religious element to a modern,
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Western form of education, and objection from the conservative element who feared
that public education would result in discontent and unrest, and especially opposed the
estabhshment of girls' schools believmg this would divert them from their duties as wives
and mothers This opposition ignored the fact that the Quran advocates the search for
knowledge for all Muslims To resolve these issues, the government integrated the
Bedouins through projects promotmg a more sedentary way of life, set up teacher
training colleges and reformed the educational system The conservative element
conceded opposition to education contradicts the teachings of the Quran and is
therefore agamst the constitution They too began to co-operate with the government
9. Islamic Tradifion, Culture and Modernisation in Saudi Arabia
Giddens (1989) stated that the concept of culture compnses the values held by the
members of a particular society or group, the accepted norms that they follow and what
the group creates in terms of matenal products It is also consists of the ideas and habits
which are learned, shared and diffused through generations It is a collection of shared
concepts To sun ender any one of these components would amount to surrendermg a
part of the society's unique social identity
'Most developmg countnes of the world nsk the loss of their cultural
identity while modern transformation takes place Alien societal norms
and values inconsistent with these nations' hentage and cultures seem to
overwhelm indigenous values '(Alfarsy, 1986)
'Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, m 1798, dramatically introduced French
hberal thought into the Middle East This invasion posed a direct
challenge to the peoples of the Middle East and revealed the wide cultural
chasm between Europeans and Easterners' (Salem, 1973 3)
Although some Arab wnters have unlimited faith m modermsation as a mood of change
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m their backward societies, they tend to confuse it with Westermsation, which they then
import and implement in a rather mechanical fashion Ehe Salem (1973) contnbutes to
the defining of modermsation In his opinion
'Modermsation is defined as the process by which a country adopts,
transforms, or replaces its traditional institutions and patterns of life under
the influence of the new science and technology that arose during the
renaissance in Western Europe' (Salem, 1973 2)
In fact, the process of adoptmg and implanting any modern ideas or practices does not
always necessitate the compromising of local beliefs, values and culture, especially when
there are few contradictions ansmg as a result of this adoption process
The call for cultural authenticity is not necessarily the rejection of all that modernity has
to offer As Lee (1997) states
'The cry for authenticity does not usually reflect a wish to halt spread of
modernity and restore a traditional society that disappeared long ago
Rather, it wants the tiger tamed, it seeks a modermty rendered less
arbitrary, less vicious, more comprehensible, and above all, more
productive of lifestyles people would recognise as spiritually as well as
matenally satisfying '(Lee, 1997 75)
Faced with the apparent dichotomy between forces of modermsation - bnnging with
them imported Western ideology - and forces of religious principles and Islamic
tradition, the people of Saudi Arabia vary m their views and opinions Modernists claim
that the two are not irreconcilable but that the religious element and the Ulama are
perhaps too ngid and should reduce their influence The Islamists believe that religion
must be the ovemdmg factor shaping the society Sayed Ali, Head of the Islamic Affairs
Committee in the Egyptian parliament, maintained that
'Islam is not against modermsation, but when modermsation aims at
fulfilling only matenahstic needs while disregarding moral matters, it
always ends up breaking down the structure of society '(Bashir, 1991 55)
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Nevertheless, economic and global commumcation developments have made it inevitable
that the Saudi people are and will be exposed to and influenced by Western values and
ideologies The question is whether the two can be reconciled Islamist movements do
cnticise certain disagreeable aspects of modermty, but they cnticise tradition too and
attempt to fit modernity into their definition of authentic Islam 'Authentic thought
constitutes a revolt against both modermty and tradition' (Lee, 1997 75) Society is seen
as bemg under threat of saturation with matenahsm, consumensm and moderation The
danger implies indulging in a sensual matenalistic life with the relentless struggle to
maximise the pleasures and to be possessed by the need of pleasure and the industry
that perpetuates it An alternative viewpomt is presented by Mansfield (1981), who
descnbed the modermsation of the peninsula thus
'In the Arabian Peninsula, an impovenshed semi-nomadic society is being
transformed in a single generation into one that can deal with the
advanced industrial nations of the world on an equal footing Moreover,
the attempt is bemg made to carry out this monumentally difficult task
without the lQss of the people's identity or the essential values The past
of the New Arabians is important to them because of their lively
awareness of their place in the mingled strands of Arab and Islamic
history '(Mansfield, 1981 151)
To develop some insight into what exactly is being influenced or even, as conservatives
would claim, threatened, it is useful to examine some of the components, past and
present, that make up the society, the sources of its religious and cultural values, habits
and traditions, and to see what measures are bemg taken by the society and its
institutions to resolve ideological warfare, and to reconcile the forces of tradition and
modernity
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9.1 Islam
Saudi Arabia is considered by Muslims as the repository of Islam, the birthplace and the
keeper of the faith for the entire Muslim world. Under King Abudulaziz, the unification
of the peninsula tribes took place and Islam was the unifying factor which led to the
formation of one cohesive nation (Alfarsy, 1986). As stated earlier, the Quran and the
laws of Shariali provide the religious, legal and political systems of the country.
9.1.1. The Constitutional Sources
The Quran
'If we had sent down this Quran upon a mountain, you would have seen
it humbled, split asunder out of fear of Allah.' (Quran, 59:2 1)
There are two main sources of social legislation in Islam. One is the Quran, the text of
which is a record of the revelations that came to the Prophet Muhammad. Its fmal
compilation is attributed to the third Caliph Uthman, who collected and incorporated
the records in one volume soon after the Prophet's death. It contains a comprehensive
system of ideas which range across the whole of life, the worship of God, the nature of
man, and the way he should live. It also serves as a guide for the individual, the family
and the community to the way in which they should conduct their affairs. When the issue
of conflict between Islam and modernity is addressed, 'There is no value for any
judgement or exposition not based on genuine Islamic concepts and the Shariah'
(Aiqaradawi, 1995:28). The Quran says, in this respect: 'If you differ on anything among
yourselves, refer it to Allah and His Messenger, if you do believe in Allah and the Last
Day' (4:59). The Quran has been protected from changes and manipulations and kept
literally and verbatim the way it was revealed to the Prophet Mohammad. The Quran
says: 'We have, without doubt, sent down the message; and we will assuredly guard it
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[from corruption]' (15 9) However, the Quran is not a limited mstruction, there are
guiding principles open to any number of vand interpretations and many Muslim
societies aim to re-express Islamic ideology in modern terms It is this inherent quality
that has enabled Saudi society to ensure continuity of faith in the midst of change There
is a firm behef amongst many Muslims that the Quran is as capable of making its
contnbution to the advancement of man today as it was in the early centunes The
manner in which the Quran has been successfully implemented to provide an Islamic
foundation for manifestations of the modermsation process wifi be discussed m the next
sections
Islamic principles denved from the Quran define most aspects of the judicial system
The recommendations and prohibitions on business and fmancial dealings are founded
in Islamic law These include principles of taxation (zakah), social welfare, quality
control of manufactured goods, transfer of goods, economic transactions, and laws of
property succession, among many other aspects of business and property law A breach
of the law can therefore be equated with religious transgression The law thus has an
extra force witnessed in few other nations rather than opposing or hindering the new
system, Islamic law defines and remforces it
There are no contradictions between Islam and advanced technology and science The
search for knowledge is a duty in Islam and Islamic law defends the nght to be
educated This can also be interpreted as fostering, even encouraging innovation In the
Quran, innovation is not prohibited provided it is for the good of society and provided
that justice and morality prevail
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The Islamic model of economic growth implies that the basic needs of all members of
society must be provided for, there should be a system of reward for those who
contribute the most and, as development takes place, values must be preserved The
Islamic economic order is founded on pnvate ownership and free enterprise, with
safeguards against monopoly, corruption, and illegitimate trade practices, so is the Saudi
economic system
The Sunnah: The sayings and the deeds of the Prophet Mohammad
'Referring every aspect of life to Allah and to His Messenger, which
means referring them to His Book, the Quran, and to the Sunnah of the
Prophet' (Aiqaradawi, 1995 86)
The second source of social legislation is the Sunnah, the 'custom' of the Prophet his
words and his actions His personal life was recorded in detail by his compamons Each
of his sayings is known as a hadith It provides a constant and consistent guide to
prevent misinteipretation of the divine law The Quran says
'If you differ on anything among yourselves, refer it to Allah and His
Messenger, if you do believe in Allah and the Last Day '(4 59)
Without such authentication based on Shanah, there would be too many opinions
reflecting personal interests and human prejudices The Quran says
'If the truth had been m accord with their desires, truly the heavens and
the earth and all the bemgs therein would have been in confusion and
corruption'(23 71)
9.1.2. The Five Pillars of the Islamic Faith
The route towards spiritual development rests in iman or faith, Islam literally means
'submission, obedience and surrender' referring to man's submission to the will of God
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and an undertaking to live his life according to His commandments and His will Five
principles, known as the 'Pillars' which form the basis of Islam define the basic duties
of every Muslim
Shahadah - This pillar concerns the first and foremost duty, the profession of faith by
which one becomes a Muslim, which means the behevmg and pronouncing of the
Shandatin as follows
'I bear witness that there is no God but Allah and Mohammad is his
messenger
This profession in its utterance affirms that a Muslim is entering not only a spiritual
community, but also a sociopolitical community with legal and moral obligations
Shahada relates to the principle of tawhzd, the unity of God and is a form of wltnessmg
that there is no God but Allah According to tawhid, God is the Creator, Sustainer and
Master of the universe and of eveiythmg that exists in it Life and the control of life
have been given by God and it is He who decides the purpose of man's existence and
determines the Inmts of authority Shahada is not the payment of lipservice but
confirmation of belief m and commitment to these tenets
Salah - This refers to prayer to bring man m communion with God Muslims must pray
five times a day in order to mamtam and enhance their consciousness of remembrance,
fear, love, divine commands, and to prepare them for obedience to God In salah, a
Muslim reiterates these tenets and increases his spiritual and religious awareness As a
community religion, salah should be carried out not only individually but with other
members of the congregation to foster the spiritual development of the community Prior
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to the practice of Salah, wudu or 'ablution' must be performed, thus salah is prayer,
discipline and hygiene, spirituahty and practicality, knowledge and virtue
Soum (The Fast of Ramadan) - The ninth month of the Muslim calendar is the month
of fastmg From sunrise to sunset, neither food nor water may be taken It is a time of
discipline and reflection, a time when rifts are healed and families are brought together
at sunset for prayers and to break the fast During this time, each Muslim is trained
mdividually and as part of a commumty in righteousness and self restraint It serves as
a leveller in society, a time when both rich and poor experience hunger and hardship in
order to please God Rather than impose a temporary cessation to all entertainment
during this month, the broadcasting industry complements the tone of Ramadan by
mcorporatmg appropriate programmes mto their schedules during the day and,
mcreasmgly, during the evening As a consequence, evening schedules have become
saturated with entertainment shows which, in the opimon of the Islanusts, are excessive
and contain themes which are inappropriate to this month The issues surrounding the
programming schedule for Ramadan will be analysed in chapter VI At the end of
Ramadan, the yearly payment of alms or zakah is paid This is known as zakah elfitr,
an obligation on every Muslim, irrespective of age, who has sufficient means to
distribute food or the equivalent amount of money to the poor and needy at the end of
Ramadan
Zakah - In addition, there is a further almsgiving or zakah to be paid, not necessarily
during Ramadan, but annually, and this is an obligation to distnbute a certain percentage
of annual savings or capital in goods or money to the poor and needy The traditional
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percentage is 5 % on accumulated wealth and on invested capital, 5-10% on agricultural
produce, and 20% on certain mineral products The purpose is to develop in both the
mdividual an4 m the community a sense of mutual sacnfice, love, sympathy and co-
operation Although it is often described as a tax, the underlying spirit differs from
taxation altogether, the real meamng of zakah is sublimity and purification, reflecting
the perception that poverty and misery are caused, m part, by the evil in human souls
Thus, the donation that a Muslim gives, if he is inspired by a true love of God as
opposed to obligation, will help to uplift and purify his soul In recent years zakah has
played a large part in plans for an Islamic economic order and a tax system consistent
with Islamic tradition
lTajj - This last Pillar of Faith relates to the pilgrimage to Makkah - to be performed
once in a lifetime by every Muslim who possesses the physical abthty and the financial
means Every year, roughly two million people from all over the world, mcludmg
dignitaries from other Muslim states, congregate at Makkah to fulfil their duty to go on
a pilgrimage or Hajj to the holiest city The King moves from Riyadh to lead the
pilgrimage, and government headquarters are transferred here to ensure that the season
passes safely and smoothly The spirit of Hajj is one of total sacrifice, sacrifice of
personal comforts, pleasures, acquisition of wealth and personal appearance, pride
relating to social background, and so forth Hajj also signifies the brotherhood of all
Muslims as demonstrated m this huge international assembly Saudi Arabia, as host to
this poignant occasion, has an enormous responsibthty to maintain its own standards as
the flagship of Islam in this respect Every year, all Hajj activities are broadcast live and
free of charge from the holy sites via satellite systems to any country wishmg to
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rebroadcast the events Another significant outcome of the reciprocal relationship
between Islam and progress occurred m the 1980s, when the wealth from the oil
revenues enabled the government to embark on a programme of building to complete
the expansion of the Great Mosque m Makkah and the Prophet Mosque m Madinah to
admit hundreds of thousands of worshippers m their courts at one time
9.1.3. Islam as a Complete and Comprehensive Way of Life
Islam signifies a complete way of life which cannot be subdivided and cannot function
smoothly unless a Muslim lives his whole life m accordance with it The Shariah
prescnbes the code for such aspects of life and social order as economic, political and
judicial affairs, morals, habits and personal character, religious ntuals, family and social
relationships, adinimstration, rights and duties of the mclividual, and national and
mteniational relations
'In contrast to Chnstiamty, Islam is not merely private commumon with
God and individual solution in the hereafter, but is public as well as
private, social as well as mdividual, demanding that every aspect of society
be moulded m conformity with very definite and specific cultural patterns'
(Jameelah, 1967 272)
An important aspect of Islam is its umversahty, an Islamic community is multi-national,
polyglot and comprises mdividuals who are not Just Muslims, but Christians and Jews,
etc, living together under the legal and social system of Islam As a religion, Islam does
not adopt a contradictory attitude towards other God-sent rehgions God's guidance has
been disseminated through a succession of messengers and prophets who are all
acknowledged and revered by Muslims, but Islam is seen as the consummation of all
religions
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However, the main aspect of Islam m its additional meaning of 'salvation and peace' is
that it does not distmguish between the spiritual and the secular but aims to shape the
mdividual and society to estabhsh peace and contentment m the world - the Kingdom
of God on earth Anyone, if he believes in God and accepts the guidance of the
Prophets as the law of his hfe, can become a member of this community and will have
equal rights and social status regardless of race, nationahty, language or class
distinctions Islam, therefore, is a social order which transcends cultural and geographic
boundaries and bamers Those who do not accept the creed or moral code are regarded
with tolerance as sharing the common ties of humanity and are guaranteed universal
fundamental rights
Islam is an ideological society, uniquely different from those founded on race, colour or
temtory, and the Islamic way of life reflects a distinct concept of man's place m the
universe The behef is that all human beings are equal and form one brotherhood The
Quran says
'0 mankind, We have created you all of a male and a female, and have
made you races and tribes, that you may recognise one another (49 13)
In essence, everyone originates from this couple While Islam does not ignore
diversification or differences m ideas, beliefs and pnnciples, it does not accept prejudices
based on gender, colour, race, language and nationality, nor superiority founded on
these As human bemgs we are all descended from the same parentage, all men and
women are brothers and sisters and therefore equal and guaranteed the same basic
human rights The concept of equality is reflected m the Islamic desire to remove
obstacles to security, success and prosperity While there is no equality in wealth or
material possessions, and m fact, Islam believes in natural inequality, there is equality
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in opportunity to access these with effort and ability
Regarding social justice, everyone is entitled to be treated fairly, irrespective of
differences Individuals have equal rights to freedom and to live and work m peace
Islam recogmses that mdividuals are subject to limitations and may lack the necessary
means and abthties to succeed Through its moral injunctions, Islam guarantees
assistance to the weak and weary, to people who are unable to take part in economic
competition, for example, in the form of zakah, as mentioned earlier This guarantee is
a form of social insurance which safeguards members of the Islamic community from
being forced into unacceptable conditions of labour for fear of starvation, and ensures
that proper medical care is available to all In addition, there is an obligation enforced
by the Islamic state on every Muslim to deal fairly and honestly with those he conducts
usmess with, those he employs and the community as a whole
Islam also promotes individuality and individual freedom within the community to foster
the development of personality, intellect, talent However, the aim is the growth of the
community and therefore Islam does not sanction the misappropriation of wealth nor
any act performed at the expense of the good of the commumty
[slam has adopted the middle course of moderation freedom from extravagance and
extremes The individual manoeuvres himself within the accepted moral and social
framework within which he has complete freedom Virtue is seen as achieving the
balance The Quran says
'Thus we have made you a moderate nation that ye may be witness over
all nations '(2 143)
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Excess and deficiency sigmfy imbalance and are not permitted The Quran says
'Who created everything, then ordained for it a measure [ } '(25 2), and
'Keep up the balance with equity and do not make the measure deficient'
(55 9)
Idle luxury, wastefulness and arrogance are seen as floutmg principles of moderation and
are therefore not permitted, thus consumensm and matenahsm are strongly discouraged
Islam advocates freedom to earn wealth only by means through which a person offers
a genuine and useful service to the community Engaging in prayer is seen as an
opportunity for man to detach himself from material indulgence and embrace spiritual
purity At the opposite end of the moderation spectrum, asceticism and monasticism are
also prohibited as not being conducive to the unity of the Islamic community or the
practice of tawhid
The spint of moderation with regard to fastmg means that fastmg is not total abstinence
but a short penod of deprivation during which an mdividual may still pursue matenal
and physical needs while working towards spiritual growth The nght path constitutes the
enjoyment of things which are beautiful, pure and good within the limits of Shanah, an
action which is regarded as an act of piety and sigmfies faith m Allah
In issues of morahty, Islam aims to establish an ideological society with a high level of
moral awareness The family is an essential cornerstone of the Islamic social order and
many tenets of the Islamic faith are designed to protect this social unit Extra-marital
sex, zina, is forbidden and punishable, all routes to zina are obstructed, and whatever
facilitates the path to zina is eliminated For this reason, promiscuity is prohibited as is
indiscriminate contact between opposite sexes The hijab prescribes essential regulations
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which are meant to protect Muslim females from gazing males and to cover their beauty
and attractiveness, which must not be revealed to male strangers Thus, Islam advocates
proactive and reactive measures mcludmg social rules, moral persuasions and punitive
solutions, in order to preserve the moral code and protect the family from corrupt
mfluences This raises the issue of sexual themes m television programmes which, as
described in chapter I, Islannsts believe may provoke lustful thoughts, stimulate the
contemplation of illegal acts, or encourage viewers to indulge m unlawful sexual contact
Such content will be examined and discussed in the content analysis chapter
9.1.4. Entertainment: an Islamic perspective
Tune in Islam is of great importance In fact, so much importance is attributed to it that
Almighty Allah in the Quran takes an oath by time and says Wal-An - 'By the token
of time' A Muslim is not permitted to waste time, more so when the wasting of time on
an activity or pastime involves interference with or neglect of one's duties to Allah and
man (Shakir, 1997) The main purpose of creating a human race and jmns (gemes),
according to the Quran, is to worship Allah The Quran says
'I have only created jmns and men that they may serve me '(51 56)
Everyone is held accountable and responsible for his time and his wealth before Allah
Islam does not tolerate futility nor idle sport and amusement This is based on the belief
that amusement and entertainment divert one's attention from the remembrance of
Allah or Diker It also interferes with one's worship causing neglect of prayer, in general,
and the congregational prayers The Prophet Mohanimad said
'A servant of Allah will remain standing on the day of judgement until he
is questioned about his life and how he spent it, and about his knowledge
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and how he utthsed it, and about his wealth, and from where he acquired
it and in what way he spent it, and about his body as to how he used it'
(At-Tirmidhi, 1980 220)
This is one of the pnncipal concerns reiterated by Islaimsts when discussing the
entertainment aspect of television Amusement and entertainment which Islam describes
as Lahw wa Lath make a person mdolent, negligent and irresponsible The Quran says
'The life of this world is but play and amusement (Lahw wa Laib) and the
abode of the hereafter is best for those who fear Allah '(6 32)
Itis also reported m the Sunnah that
'Every sport or amusement that a Muslim occupies himself with is a
"Baatil" (baseless, null and not permissible) except three his practismg
with a bow and arrow, training a horse and playmg with his family '(Ibn
Majali 2/132, No 2267)
The Prophet also strongly condemns chess and backgammon m the following hadith
'Whosoever plays with chess and backgammon is like one who has dyed
his hand with the flesh and blood of swine '(Muslim 4/122, No 5612)
Islamic scholars, by analogy, have extended tins rule to apply to other activities in
modern times including watchmg television (Shakir, 1997)
9.2. Tribal and Family Values
Originally a nomadic culture, many Saudis are still affiliated to their tribes and identified
within them, thus tribal and family values underpm many of Saudi Arabia's traditions
The individual is responsible to the family, which is responsible to the tribe or
community, and loyalties to both tribe and family have always been steadfast Withm
these social units, children receive social education and learn about the traditions and
values of their country
Traditionally, the extended family formed an essential societal unit The larger the
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family, the more able they were to manage the land they lived on and to produce food
It therefore had an important economic function, while its political function was
concerned with the preservation of its temtory, that is, defending it from tribal attack
Fmally, the larger the family, the higher their status Urbamsation has therefore induced
a breakdown m the extended family as a societal umt and m tribal traditions The
nuclear family is much more commonplace and consequently there is less tribal or
kinship influence The more the society is urbamsed, the less bmdmg extended family
ties become Coupled with the growth of social welfare and the expanding role of
government agencies and busmesses, many family functions are now redundant, for
example, economic cooperation has decreased and there are more marriages outside the
family In addition, the adoption of new technology m the home has afforded the family
more time to spend with each other and with members of the larger family
According to tribal values, while the tribe was ruled by a Sheikh, there was a hierarchy
of respect and power according to age The youngest members of the family must show
respect to the eldest, which is consistent with Islamic ruling
'In primitive (let's say earliest) societies, the fact that as people get older
they pass through socially recogmsed statuses is usually of much greater
structural significance than m industrial societies, and, as a result, i
usually symbolically recognised' (Bilton et a!, 1987 47)
However, the new generation are assimilating a different, more Western set of values
and principles through exposure to the media, and particularly to imported television
content The resulting confusion is mevitable as they are influenced by different
persuasions This exposure to Western life has also created a cultural gap between
generations and within society and the family unit Advances m technology are regarded
as essential for development but there is widespread fear of the retrogression m
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character that often seems to accompany it While the older generations perceive some
aspects of modermsation as a possible threat to their values and traditions, the new
generation believe it is necessary to embrace it if they are to survive m a modem world
The continued influx of foreign media can thus be seen as an essential part of
perpetuatmg the development drive, but bnngs with it increased dependency
Furthermore, while traditionalists stnve to protect the culture and instil a sense of
cultural identity m the new generation, the youth feel the pressure of matenahstic
options, competition, and alternative cultural options Paradoxically, exposure to alien
cultures is necessary if Saudi society is to function m a modem world, yet to preserve
its own values, it has to draw and mamtam cultural boundaries The manner m which
the Saudi government and the Ministry of Information have approached this dichotomy,
and the tensions which have resulted, will be examined m the course of this study
With the educational reforms and the inception of the media, children are now exposed
to different and varying influences As far as formal education is concerned, the
government has had to develop their human resources through education and training
to indigemse the workiorce, but traditional work ethics prevail Traditionally, manual
labour is regarded as degrading, Saudi people generally aspire to employment m
government administration The new generation is therefore perceived as not being
sufficiently motivated or socially prepared to participate in more manual work The
influx of wealth has partly removed the desire of some Saudis to work for a hying, as
has the fact that there is an ever-present foreign workforce performing manual tasks
instead The modermsation process has been literally and metaphoncally descnbed as
'a jump from a camel's back into a Cadillac' (Philip, 1984 xiii) This passion for cars has
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motivated many Saudis to become mechanics, electncians and engineers, but they could
not perform these tasks without education and training Again, the problem emerges that
development and technological advancement require the assistance and input of foreign
expertise in the training of the indigenous workforce The consequences of this, as
previously discussed, mclude an increased dependency on the more developed nations
which impart their knowledge, the importation of foreign products, including media
content, and the subsequent dependency on imported resources in order to contmue the
development process Finally, as descnbed earlier m this study, the increased dependency
on foreign media content stimulates confficting viewpoints among the Islamists,
culturalists and modermsts, and puts pressure on the government to attempt to please
all the people all the time From the point of view of local production in Saudi Arabia,
the resulting constraints partly serve to stymie its potential This issue is examined m
more detail in chapters Vil-IX
In taking proactive measures to minimise any negative effects of the infiltration of ahen
values, the government has ensured that from the moment children start school,
traditional values and prmciples are upheld and taught, not only by the educational
institution but by society and the family too, m order to build a firm foundation The
Fourth Development Plan (1985-1990) made the household accountable for
disseminating and nurtunng the cultural, religious and social education of the children
The mosques, schools and media are expected to sustain and gmde family life m these
areas In this way, there is an ubiqmtous diffusion of Islamic laws, beliefs, tnbal concepts
and traditional values and while this does not eliminate confusion, it establishes the
norm to be followed, and the points of departure However, the success or failure of
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these mstitutions is contingent upon a number of circumstances related to management
and appropriate allocation of resources, as well as the effective use of the media
13 The Role of Women
'Due to the vast mtercultural chasm which separates West from East, the
position and treatment of women in Saudi society have been
sensationahsed by a judgemental Western press '(Parssmen, 1980 152)
The traditional place of women m Muslim society is a prominent one, and undue
restrictions are generally matters of social custom as opposed to coming from the
religion itself According to the Quran, women are equal to men but different in their
role In Saudi Arabia, the role of women is rooted in the nomadic cultural tradition that
defines many other aspects of Saudi society, and differs greatly from their role in
industrialised societies Men and women are separated physically and socially, but
women are allowed to own and inherit property and to run their own busmesses and
work, albeit with restrictions on the type of employment they undertake Economically,
both sexes are equal and receive the same salary for the same work A woman, however,
is not responsible for the financial maintenance of her family, that is her husband's job
or the responsibility of any mature male member of the family The man is also
responsible for chaperoning the female members of his family and transporting them to
their places of work or study
As with many societies, the woman's duty is to take care of the home However,
opportunities for women's employment improved with the implementation of the Fourth
Development Plan (19 85-1990), which took into account recent advancements in the
computer mdustry and made provisions for women at home to participate m mformation
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technology, allowing them to fulfil their traditional role at the same time In this way,
the possibility for women to take part m and contribute towards the development of the
country mcreased Indigemsation of the workforce has further enhanced employment
opportunities for women, but their traditional role is preserved as far as possible
Regarding education, in 1960, the government assumed responsibthty for mtroducmg a
system of public schools for girls throughout the Kingdom (Parssmen, 1980) As part of
their reluctance to adopt new ideas, conservatives opposed female education on the basis
of nomadic and tribal values After a few years, this resistance abated and the original
opponents of female education began a desperate search for public school places for
their daughters Women's education is currently given high priority by the government
in Saudi Arabia Women may attend university and there is a growing body of skilled
professional women There are also literacy programmes which have been developed to
target older women but the media have not been involved in the promotion of these
projects
Concerning religious practice, women and men have equal rights and equal duties As
described briefly in chapter I, the Quran clearly advocates modesty of dress and
behaviour for men and women
'Say to the believers that they cast down their eyes and guard their private
parts, that is purer for them God is aware of the things they work And
say to the believing women, that they cast down their eyes and guard their
private parts and reveal not their adornment save such as is outward, and
let them cast their veils over their bosoms, and not reveal their adornment
save to their husbands, or their sons, or their husband's sons, or their
brothers or their brother's sons, or their sister's sons, or their women, or
what their rights hands own, or such men as attend them, not having
sexual desire, or children who have not yet attained knowledge of
women's private parts, nor let them stamp their feet, so that heir hidden
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ornament may be known And turn all together to God, 0 you behevers,
baply so you will prosper'(26 30, 31)
'0 Prophet, say to thy wives and daughters and the believing women, that
they draw their veils close to them, so it is likelier they will be known, and
not hurt God is all-forgivmg, all-compassionate ' (33 59)
The object of wearing a veil, or hijab, is not to restrict women, but to protect them from
harm and molestation, and to maintain values of honour, good faith and chastity In
Saudi Arabia it is an upheld tradition and exists because those who wear it feel that they
are obeying Allah and it has become a part of their tradition and part of their lives,
without preventing them from making a social contnbution, for example they are still
able to work as teachers, nurses and doctors
Women substantiate their role within modern society as the guardians of family
observance, ui particular the spiritual and moral education of their children If a
woman's role is therefore to act as the protector of traditions and morals and safeguard
the moral well-being of their children, this role has gamed added sigmficance m view of
the clash and interaction between tradition and modernity The dnvmg force of
'liberation' for women has had implications for the role of women in Saudi Arabia On
the one hand, many fully accept their role m society, and therefore do not perceive
imitation of the Western idea of a woman's role as 'liberating' A number believe that
there is no need to pursue the Western concept of equality between the sexes, which
they feel means erosion of both the importance of motherhood and of loyalty to Islam,
and may contradict the perception of being female The female population find a
balanced formula for partnership which takes into account their responsibthties, their
aptitudes and their potential for contributing to the advancement of society The Quran
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supports this by saymg
'And their Lord hath accepted of them, and answered them Never will I
suffer to be lost of the work of any of you, be he male or female Ye are
members, one of another [ ] '(2 195)
If women are prevented from domg so it is due to the neglect of religious precept m
political, social and fmancial mstitutions and, above all, it is a result of bemg made
captive to tribal traditions
9.4. Ethnic and Linguistic Homogeneity
Prior to its umfication, Saudi Arabia was divided by numerous tnbes with diverse
customs and traditions Alfarsy (1990) describes how, these differences notwithstanding,
the population is homogeneous and the people share the same religion, the same
heritage, speak the same language and practise almost identical traditions That is not
to say that there have been no changes, the nomadic population has been transformed
through semi-nomadic stages and settlement and it is now estimated that the Bedoum
population is possibly less than 5% of the total as the government further encourages
urbanisation Nevertheless, there are no minority groups, no minority conflicts and a high
level of homogeneity
'In terms of ethmc and linguistic homogeneity, Saudi Arabia is ranked
112th among the nations of the world with 94% homogeneity (on an
ascending scale m which North and South Korea are ranked 135th with
100% homogeneity and Tanzania 1st with 7% homogeneity)' (Kunan,
1987 1695)
Arabic m Saudi Arabia exists m two forms classical and colloquial Classical Arabic is
the language of the Quran and the means of formal commumcation, literary expression,
poetry and oration Preservation of linguistic homogeneity is essential to maintain Saudi
Arabia's cultural and social identity
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'The nature of cultural objects can only be understood m relation to talk
It is accepted by everyone that there is a close relation between culture,
language and commumcation The relation should be understood in terms
of this basic role which talk plays in the generation and sustammg of the
meaning ' (Giddens, 1989 101)
As a country which has never been colomsed, Saudi Arabian society does not have the
vestiges of colomal rule and has not expenenced imposed radical change
'Saudi Arabia's cultural, religious, hngmstic and ethmc homogeneity is
unmatched by other systems The political system of Saudi Arabia has
emerged in about half a century without the disabilities of strong colomal
traditions' (Braibanti, in Alfarsy, 1986 foreword)
While modernity may result in the introduction of other languages, for example through
English and French broadcastmg, there is also a drive to support classical Arabic in the
media Inevitably, there has to be change, for example, a new lexis has to be
mcorporated into any language to talk about mamfestations of modermsation and
technological advancement, and new languages have to be learned m order to participate
in the global economy, but the classical language is still valued, preserved and promoted
as far as possible
The pressing problem is the fact that the country has a crucial need for foreign relations
and manpower The investment of vast amounts of wealth to modermse the country has
brought m nnlhons of skilled and unskilled workers But foreign workers bring with them
their own customs, beliefs and social norms, as well as their own language (Al-Hodaif,
1992) The government's dilemma lies in whether to allow the entry of foreign workers
essential for its development now and m the future, or whether to limit the influx and
preserve cultural homogeneity
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'It was not possible to prescnbe an exact formula for solvmg this cntical
problem But an important factor which helped to mimimse the impact of
alien social ustoms and norms was that once the purpose of each
individual or group had been accomplished, their services would be
terminated In other words, there would be a pre-designed policy for their
dispersal rather than allowing them to settle permanently m the countly
Another recommendation was the maintenance of a fixed and balanced
ratio between the inflow of foreign manpower and the total population
This would serve to control leverage against the spread of then social
norms, and thus help the Kingdom to preserve its existing way of life'
(Alfarsy, 1990 210-211)
These are simplistic solutions to a complex issue While unable to eliminate the problem
- it has to have a foreign workforce if it is gomg to achieve its objectives - m its
development plans the Saudi government has adopted a policy of stnct immigration
control and restnctions on foreign workers, and implemented educational policies to
train Saudi nationals With these measures it can go some way towards preserving ethmc
homogeneity Inevitably, there has been and will be an impact, and foreign visitors will
leave their mark, whether to the detnment or for the benefit of Saudi society, but this
is a sacrifice that has to be made if the society aspires to any of the advantages of
modermsation
10. Conclusion
Various innovative changes have been met with strong opposition from religious
elements and conservatives However, modermsation m Saudi Arabia has taken place
in carefully controlled conditions and with consensus from all sides constantly being
sought, and this has ensured a smooth and gradual transition despite the short space of
tune In this way, the Kingdom has been able to strike a balance between its religious
and cultural identity, and the desire and impetus to modermse The government has
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succeeded m drivmg the country forward while preservmg the essential religious and
cultural charactenstics which to a great extent compnse its identity
If modermsation is to take place, it implies the surrender of some traditional
charactenstics of social, political and economic mstitutions The pnce paid is the
replacement of culture, values and beliefs However, it has been demonstrated that
modernity and tradition are not entirely mseparable nor mcompatible and modem orders
can be founded on traditional ones, while they m turn may define new socio-pohtical
structures There is an opposmg argument which states that modernity based on
traditional precepts is purely cosmetic In order to function effectively, a society which
aspires to modermsation needs to retain its cultural foundations and build on them so
that the two complement each other It has to bndge the gap between tradition and the
assimilation of Western values In Saudi Arabia, the attempt to bndge this gap has been
relatively successful m certain areas of its society, as illustrated by its economic growth
which is based on an Islamic model, and the role of Islam m its systems and mstitutions
Confusion and challenges to the fundamental pnnciples of Saudi culture remam
unavoidable as lifestyles have undergone major transformations, people have become
more urbamsed, are able to exercise choice through purchasmg power and have more
time for social, cultural and leisurely pursuits Social change, or as Hedebro descnbes
it, 'Alterations m the orgamsation of a society, m its structure, or m the functions
performed by different groups and units within it', is mescapable (Hedebro, 1982 5)
Nevertheless, many elements have been preserved and even strengthened The quest
contmues for answers to social and global problems that are consonant with Islamic
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tradition, neither merely reactions to nor adaptations of Western ideology and mfluence
Throughout this, the government has mamtamed national unity and social stability, and
despite exposure to foreign influences, it has so far managed to avert certain negative
aspects, such as drug culture, gang warfare and high crime rates It has retained its
position as the host to millions of Muslims on pilgnmage by promotmg its religious and
conservative values In a unique approach, called 'maintaining tradition within change'
in the Fifth Development Plan (1990-1995 20), the Saudi government has endeavoured
to mamtam its own culture and understand others as it promotes aspects of technological
change However, new developments in telecommunications, as discussed below, have
allowed for more exposure to alien cultures and ideas, and have awakened the concerns
of the Islamists for their culture and values once again
11. Implications for Television Broadcasting
From this chapter some key points arise which have a direct bearing on the Saudi mass
media in general, and on television in particular A society which is founded on the
amalgamation of varied tnbes and dispersed factions is at risk of bemg threatened by
forces of modermsation which may accentuate diverse interests and widen any existing
nfts between religious and cultural entities m society If harnessed wisely, the media
have the potential to facthtate the unity of the nation and to showcase the country in the
mterest of national solidarity and common interest The successes and failures of Saudi
broadcasting are considered later in this study m the light of these issues
Regarding the constitution, if programme content in television offerings directly conflict
with Islamic precepts as written m the Quran and the Sunnah, it amounts not only to
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religious transgression but is representative of unconstitutional notions and therefore has
legal implications
From the perspective of economic development, a foreign workiorce m Saudi is an
essential prerequisite if skills and technology are to be exchanged and development is
to continue However, a foreign workforce bnngs with it a demand for foreign imports
mcludmg media m general and television m particular, to which the local population are
also exposed and for which they may begm to develop a preference. These workers are
then targeted by the media m their programming For example, there are some new DBS
commercial services mcluded in ART's lstNet network and they compnse imported
channels from India and the Phihppmes to satisfy the demands of the expatnate
workforces from these countnes While the Saudi government has clearly demonstrated
a strong desire to promote development and align itself with the modem world, the
content of foreign imported and DBS channel programmes has the potential to influence
and affect key elements of Saudi Arabia's religious and cultural identity One important
consequence of this content is that foreign news and current affairs programmes serve
to counter the depoliticismg effects of shows designed essentially for entertainment. in
sum, as in other areas of society, the problem posed is how to achieve a fine balance
between the conservation of tradition and the drive towards modermsation
This chapter has also discussed the importance of Saudi Arabia as a flagship for the
Muslim world For this reason there is an increased onus on the Kingdom, more than
on other Arab states, to conform to the expectations of the Muslim people and to strictly
adhere to religious protocol The implications for televised broadcasting are clear, that
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is, programme content considered by Islamists to be unsuitable or 'un-Islamic' meets with
strong opposition, particularly the content of many imported and Western items Content
mconsistent with Muslim culture is also unwelcome Thus, on the one hand the
government has to be flexible m its mterpretation and implementation of Islamic
doctrine m order to promote local media production and resist the penetration of global
media On the other hand, it is in the difficult position of havmg to reconcile radically
conflicting religious and cultural forces, which emanate from the various Arab, Muslim
and foreign factions, m its programming policy
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CHAPTER V
TIlE MEDIA IN SAUDI ARABIA
1. Introduction
This chapter examines the introduction of the media to Saudi Arabia, with a focus on
the broadcastmg industry and television as a major part of Saudi Arabia's development
process As a means of educating and informing the people, the media have a sigmficant
active role to play in the socio-economic development of Saudi Arabia In this and the
following chapters, this role will be analysed to determine whether the media have, in
fact, facthtated the modermsation process, and whether they have exacerbated the clash
of traditional and modem forces and the manner m which this has happened Whether
television was introduced to Saudi Arabia as part and parcel of new technology amvmg
from the West, or whether it has actually been successfully exploited to fulfil the aims
of the development plans and facthtated cultural self-reliance will also be considered
The following discussion describes firstly, the reasons for and the development of
broadcasting in general and of television m particular, together with an overview of
programming, government policies and an exanilnation of the social reaction to
broadcasting, with specific reference to television
2. The Introduction, Development and Expansion of Broadcasting.
2.1. The Functions of Broadcasting
This section examines the general theones which attempt to explain why media were
first introduced to the society and the functions they were perceived to serve It then
132
becomes apparent why, despite opposition, the government chose to mcorporate
broadcastmg into the Saudi way of hfe
Firstly, the mam criterion of whether it was economically affordable was satisfied Saudi
Arabia had acquired vast wealth from the oil revenues and so the estabhshment of a
broadcastmg industry was sustainable financially Secondly, it was perceived that the
foreign media were producmg propaganda which was not bemg successfully countered
in Saudi Arabia According to Shobaili (1971), the government recogmsed that it was
necessary to mtroduce television to counter the propaganda that the Saudi people were
receivmg on the radio Pohtically, if used as a government mouthpiece, television could
be a direct source of information about Saudi Arabia, information which could be
channelled throughout the country and abroad This would serve two functions it would
effect a greater sense of umty and identity and it would promote the image of Saudi
Arabia mternationally Later on it was realised that if these aspects of television could
be made compatible with Islam, it would assist Saudi Arabia in maintaining its position
as the major centre of Islam and would enable it to vie with other broadcasting
industries m the Gulf region (Al-Usmam, 1984) Thirdly, as Boyd (1972) believes, the
introduction of television was a way for the government to fulfil their commitment to
the people to supply entertainment, distribute information, and provide a source of
education, there was a high rate of illiteracy at that time and television could provide
what books could not (Shobaili, 1971) Fmally, Lasswell (1971) identifies another
function of media applicable to television the transmission of socio-cultural heritage
from one generation to another These reasons for the mtroduction of broadcasting are
reflected m the following account of its development m Saudi Arabia
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2.2. The Historical Background
During the early years of this century the populace was almost totally illiterate King
Abdulaziz recogmsed the potential of radio to reach the people throughout his vast
country, but it was not until 1949, in the face of bitter disapproval from religious leaders,
that he was able to establish the nation's first local broadcasting station, located m
Makkah In a Royal Decree to his son, Faisal, he laid down the standards to be met m
the creation of the first radio station and, to appease the irate conservatives, he
supported his decree with the insistence that readings from the Quran be regularly
broadcast
Royal Decree No. 7.3.16.3997:
From Abdulaziz Ibn Saud to our son, Faisal Peace be with you, his grace
and blessmgs Our advisors have discussed with us the matter of radio
broadcasting m Jeddah We view the followmg First a director shall be
selected to be in charge of the station and its administration work
including preparation of talks and news which are to be scrutmised,
prepared and broadcast, the work for improvmg these programs, and the
training of personnel Second, a program shall be supervised by you and
be executed after your approval Third the programs should consider
1 The dissemination of foreign news as it is, ensuring that nobody is
offended as well as avoiding libel or improper praise of anyone
2 In domestic news, facts should be presented, following our way of
broadcasting what we usually want to publish and not broadcasting when
we usually prefer silence on issues
3 Select from what can be broadcasted from the Holy Quran, religious
preaching and lectures from the history of Islam and the Arabs (Saati,
1992 35)
The final argument that seemed to stem the flow of opposition was the statement 'Can
anything be bad which transmits the Word of Allah? ' (Boyd, 1982) In this way, King
Abdulaziz also determined the benchmarks which were to form the basis of future media
regulation and policy
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While it was King Abdulaziz who set the tenor of Saudi Arabia's utilisation of the
electromc media, it was his son, King Faisal, who established the governmental
machinery that allowed these media to come of age In 1953, King Saud (1953-64),
Faisal's elder brother, issued a decree establishing the first mass media regulatory
agency, the General Directorate of Broadcastmg, Pnntmg, and Publishing In 1963, a
cabmet-level office was established to replace this agency, which became the Ministry
of Information It is this Mimstry that has supervised the considerable development of
broadcasting in Saudi Arabia in terms of facilities and coverage. Faced with stiff
competition from other Arab radio stations, Saudi broadcasting had to expand the
technology of its radio facilities and improve their quality m order to attract listeners
(Boyd, 1982)
2.2.1. The 1960s - the Introduction of Television
By 1963, society m Saudi Arabia was psychologically prepared to accept the medium of
television People were eagerly looking for a new means of recreation and entertainment
which did not conflict with the Muslim faith The population, especially women and
children, were willing to see what was going on m the world and emerge from social
isolation (Shobaih, 1971) The social, cultural and political needs of the nation justified
the mtroduction of television to Saudi Arabia In line with the basic functions of
television as described, the government believed that television could provide
mformation, news and entertainment, it could counter foreign propaganda, especially
from Egypt, it could promote umty among the Saudi people, and it could provide health
education and help tackle the literacy problem
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Although the Saudi government had launched its television project on a large scale in
1965, the Eastern provmce of the country had, in fact, expenenced this medium since
1955, when the United States Air Force Base in Dhahran established its own English
language television station, begun on June 17, 1955, for base personnel (Boyd, 1971)
Two years later, the Arabian Amencan Oil Company (Aramco) began a television
service for its 9,000 employees, also in Dhahran. The range of coverage of these two
services was therefore limited to the Eastern part of Saudi Arabia
In 1962, in a ten-point programme, Crown Prince Faisal formally established the
mtroduction of television throughout Saudi Arabia. Initially, Saudi Arabia would receive
technical assistance and training from the United States (Shobaili, 1971; Boyd, 1972) On
January 6, 1964 the Saudi government and the US government signed an agreement to
establish two one-half kilowatt stations in Jeddah and Riyadh. The agreement stipulated
that the U S government '[ .]sball assume responsibility for contracting for the training
of operatmg personnel, and for the initial operation of the stations' (Shobaili, 1971) It
also stated that the US Army Corps of Engineers would carry out those responsibilities
on behalf of the Umted States government In 1964, during a visit by the Saudi Minister
of Information, it was decided that the ongmal plan to build two stations with 0.5 kw
power each be extended to create a more powerful and efficient transmission, If the
stations' power were increased to 2 5 kw power each, they would produce a more
reliable and clearer signal. During the same visit the Radio Corporation of Amenca
(RCA) and the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) were chosen as potential
subcontractors to the Corps of Engineers There was also a provision for training
management officers to ensure proper coordination of all training requirements, both on
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the job and m the US (US Corps of Engmeers, 1968, cited m Shobaih, 1971)
After a successful tender, the contract for the construction of the interim television
facthties at Riyadh and Jeddah was awarded in July, 1964 to the American firm of Paul
Hardeman, Inc The facilities were completed in approximately one year, after which
telecastmg operations began Signal tests were first carried out in Jeddali and Riyadh on
July 17, 1965, with no more than slides, music, and occasional Mickey Mouse cartoons
Nevertheless, vast numbers of people flocked to view the American, European and
Japanese sets on display on the market area (Boyd, 1972) Because of the lack of
experienced technicians who could produce live shows, the initial stages of operation and
live telecasts were kept to a minimum However, as soon as the first two government
television stations became operational in Jeddah and Riyadh, watching television became
the great common denominator of the people m Saudi Arabia and their main leisure-
time occupation
In 1967, two years after the opemng of the Jeddah and Riyadh stations, a second
television project was completed a series of microwave relays were built to send
Jedclah station signals to transmitters m Makkah and Taif 1 In 1968, three more
television stations equipped with the latest technical facilities were built at Madmali,
Qassim and Dammam (Boyd, 1972) One of the most difficult problems that Saudi
Arabia faces, in terms of expanding television transmission, is that Saudi Arabia
encompasses a large area of about one million square miles throughout which the
population is thinly and sparsely distributed Initially, m order to expand the television
signal coverage, the Saudi government installed numerous micro-wave relay stations at
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different locations throughout the country.
2.2.2. The 1970s - the Introduction of Sateffite and Colour Transmission
In 1972, two satellite ground stations were completed in Jeddah and Riyadh and linked
to the INTELSAT system receivmg the signal from satellites in orbit over the Atlantic
Ocean and Indian Ocean regions, respectively These stations have helped meet the
telecommunication needs of the country and have been used to receive and transmit
television signals internationally 2 Additionally, Saudi Arabia has been an active
participant m the ARABSAT project - headquartered m Riyadh - m which Arab
countries participated in the costs of launchmg satellites to improve all forms of
communication among Arab states, including the distribution of broadcast signals
On September 24, 1976, Saudi television started its colour transmission in the French
SECAM-3B system, and in 1977, a new television facthty was opened m Abha city, m
the southern provmce The station is used to broadcast the national television service
and is equipped to produce local programmes
2.2.3. The 1980s - the Centralisation of Television
In 1983, television transmission was centrahsed m the capital Riyadh and a second
television channel started broadcasting m English, with daily news reports in French In
the same year, the construction of the Riyadh Central Television Complex was
completed This complex, which cost about £680 million, is the largest and most
advanced television facility m the Middle East According to a Ministry of Information
report, the complex consists of three transmission studio units with telecme, video and
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control rooms annexed to them In addition, there are three news studios, with annexes
for video, film and general administration There are also five production studios and
a film production studio, technical facilities, a film processing laboratory, and production
and exhibition theatres By and large, matenally speaking, the Saudi television system
is one of the most technologically advanced, but like any other mass medium, television
is judged by its production and output, and by its ability to attract audiences, not by its
luxurious physical facihties
The Saudi government, represented by the Ministry of Information, has evidently placed
remarkable emphasis on the foundations, the infrastructure arrangements and hardware
preparations, with little attention bemg paid to software, programming and personnel
training As Douglas Boyd remarks
'Since the setting up of the television stations and setting up the television
equipment were the dominant thoughts for Saudi officials, the content of
programs was a secondary matter' (Boyd, 1972 226)
It is this disregard of content and quality that has provoked the intense debate over
media output among the various elements of Saudi society
3. Social Reactions to the Establishment of Broadcasting Media
Despite its apparent success, there were, and still are, strong objections to the
establishment of television services Nevertheless, even hostile confrontations with the
Saudi government did not weaken the government's determination to firmly establish
and expand its television service After a number of unsuccessful attempts to persuade
the conservatives to accept the new medium, the Saudi government finally resorted to
exercismg its authonty to establish what it viewed as necessary for the nation's well-
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bemg Reassuring sceptics and concerned objectors, the late King Faisal stated
'This public service is charged with great responsibilities, smce it has
access mto every house and comes in touch with every mdividual and
every group of people What is bemg broadcast or publicized through this
service must serve our religion, our homeland and our people This service
has to present only what is beneficial to our nation and to our
countrymen, it must guide citizens to what is in their own and their
country's interest' (Saudi Arabian TV In its first decade, 1975 Preface)
However, when women began to appear on Saudi television, m 1965, there was an attack
on the television station in Riyadh King Faisal settled the issue by resolving that Islamic
prmciples and Saudi values would be respected m the future The pacifying effect was
short-lived A second incident took place, this time at the Holy Grand Mosque in
Makkah A group of armed fanatics took over the Mosque, locked the gates and used
the loudspeaker system to announce their demands pertaining to the un-Islamic content
of television programming After fifteen days, negotiations collapsed, the Mosque was
stormed by armed forces, was fmally liberated and the fanatics were captured This
mcident was a turning point for the Saudi media One of the consequences was the
reduction of women's appearance on television and restnctions placed on the roles they
performed and their attire (Beayeyz, 1989)
Al-Usmani (1984) believes that the advent of television served to expedite socio-
economic progress in the country because the society aspired to it, but that the religious
element delayed the process by taking exception to television, apart from objections to
content, as descnbed m chapter I, they believed that it could not promote the principles
of the Islamic faith The government managed to satisfy all concerned by allowing the
importation of television provided that programmes did not subvert Islamic ideology and
practice The objections and concerns were contained at the time by cautious religious
140
progranmung and the careful selection and censonng of imported television shows
However, while mcreasmg broadcasting hours, a rather relaxed censorship on television
imports was adopted by the Ministry of Information a situation which often resurrects
the concerns of the Islamists Despite attempts by the government to pacify them with
hours of religious broadcasts to demonstrate firstly, that television can support their faith
rather than undermine it, and could be apphed usefully to the benefit of Saudi society,
many still remain unconvinced These concerns awakened and resurfaced after Saudi
Arabia and the neighbounng countries became the focus of DBS services, as
documented in chapter I
Nevertheless, viewing habits reflect the general acceptance of television by the Saudi
people In the early years, radio listeners defected to the new medium, and during
broadcasting hours television quickly dominated leisure time activity (Shobaili, 1971) It
was apparent to any observer m Jeddah and Riyadh, that street traffic was very light
during telecasting hours People tned to accomplish their chores to free themselves to
watch television 'Some people used to crowd the store fronts to get a glimpse of
something which was to change their social pattern profoundly' (Boyd, 1971) In a few
months, television became a dominant medium of communication, and an important
source of leisure for the people (Shobaih, 1971) A survey m 1972 revealed that 87% of
those questioned owned television sets and 52% watched it every day (Boyd, 1993) A
survey camed out by the BBC m 1992 revealed that 88% of Saudi adults watched
television daily Even when it is taken into account that many viewers may approve only
of those programmes which are vehicles for Islamic messages and values and that, in
general, there is a large viewing population, that does not necessarily equate with total
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approval of all programme content Perceptions differ there is a large segment of the
population who do not see television as a cultural threat but believe that through
advertising it can have a detrimental effect on national development Other viewers,
however, believe it can enhance the modermsation of the country and be a positive
economic force (Almakaty et a!, 1994) Whether these perceptions are accurate or not
depends on the nature and quality of media output, SlY programming policy and the
suitability of television content for the needs of Saudi society
4. Television
4.1. The Structure of Television Affairs
Television broadcasting activities m Saudi Arabia are managed by the office of the
Assistant Deputy Minister for Television Affairs, who is appomted by and directly
responsible to the Minister of Information The former's duties compnse the control of
eleven different departments and offices, as well as the supervision of numerous
subsections within this infrastructure (Zamakshan, 1994) These departments and
subdivisions deal with the commercial, administrative, tecbmcal, production and research
aspects of television broadcasting as well as the implementation of each channel.
Inevitably, such a complex system affects the bureaucratic efficiency of the department
as a whole As described m chapter VII, attempts to reach decisions regarding scheduling
and content involve such lengthy processes that the production potential of both SlY
and local production companies is inhibited and hindered by delays and
maladministration
In addition, as Zamakshari (1994) points out, an imbalance of influences results in
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adnnmstrative considerations takmg precedence over artistic and techmcal factors Above
all, programming policy overrides any other factors The force of adnimistrative and
political slants on programming pohcy means that the decision-making process depends
on the political agenda and on the discretion of top officials as opposed to bemg based
on audience research or on artistic merit and production quality One of the mam
criteria of programming policy relates largely to censorship regulations and procedures
which, as described in chapter VII, may be arbitrarily executed Inevitably, the quality
of SW output is affected
One major area of television broadcastmg pohcy, which can arguably be regarded as
negatively affecting SW potential is that of centrahsation, which, as stated earlier,
occurred m 1983 Zamakshan (1994) mentions a number of benefits arising from this
policy He contends that initially it was economically viable to centrahse television
operations as it reduced the number of foreign and native personnel needed for
administrative and techmcal functions There are also economic advantages to the
construction of one station network as opposed to several mdividual stations in remote
areas of the country Nonetheless, it is nevertheless apparent that a focus on the centre
has diminished the importance of branch stations, which, while adequately equipped,
)ack the manpower and expertise required to allow them to function to their full
potential Such regional stations, if fully operational, would enable the various and more
remote parts of Saudi Arabia to influence the media and allow television to reflect their
regional identities and requirements At present, however, there is a distinct lack of
regional representation Moreover, the absence of a clear strategy defining regional
media operations means that branch stations he dormant and there is no competition
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between them Moreover, while healthy competition between networks and stations
encourages better quality programming and production, the absence of regional
television activity m Saudi Arabia has stymied a potentially creative impetus Fmally, the
centrahsation of television affairs serves to mtensify the concentration of government
control over media operations, and consequently over SlY scheduling and programming
4.2. Television Programming
In the early days of television, the two television stations at Riyadh and Jeddah
broadcast similar two-hour long programme schedules Programmes started at sunset
with fifteen minutes of readings from the Holy Quran and sayings of the Prophet
Mohammad, followed by readings from the daily newspaper for ten minutes The rest
of the time was divided between children's programmes, cartoons, slides, music,
documentary films, and songs When television was first introduced to Saudi Arabia
there were no theatres or performing arts institutions, and therefore no available
professional television performers, artists or producers Television schedules therefore
had to rely on imports Gradually, the programme schedule was extended, but with more
air time to fill and a dearth of home produced matenal, there was an increased reliance
on imported programmes from different sources Programmes purchased from other
neighbouring Arab countnes, programmes purchased or leased from Western countries
and a very small percentage of amateunsh local efforts still compnse the mghtly
schedule At present, the Saudi television daily schedule consists of 16 to 18 hours on
the 1St channel and 10 hours on the 2nd, most of which is imported. Egypt is the main
country from which Saudi Arabian television purchases its entertainment programmes,
with Syna and Lebanon not far behind Western programmes, on the other hand, are
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supplied primarily by American and British companies.
For a long time STV depended heavily on an unalterable programming format consisting
of cheap imports; mostly re-runs of children's animations, and adult entertainment in the
form of family sagas and love stones. Confronted with recent strong competition from
DBS broadcasters, the need has arisen for STV to produce a more appealing format in
order to draw and increase local viewership.
Like radio before it, television progranime seasons, or cycles as they are called in Saudi
Arabia, are set every three months. The regular programming in these cycles is changed
during the two holy seasons; Ramadan (the month of fasting) and Tho-Aihaja (the
month of pilgrimage), to allow for scheduling relevant and appropriate religious
programmes in place of some entertainment programmes.
Since 1985, advertising has been permitted on Channel 2 and was subsequently
introduced to Channel 1 in 1986 (Alkheraiji, 1994). Until 1999, advertisements were
broadcast in three time blocks with no programme interruptions, but since November of
that year, new policies have been proposed to allow insertions during certain
programmes. Saudi television, however, is not allowed to use the advertising revenue;
all the income generated is transferred directly to the Ministry of Finance and National
Economy as a national income.
Saudi television currently operates within a complex system of microwave relays, cable
and satellite connections which have expanded its coverage. This system has enabled the
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majority of people to receive signals from neighbouring countries. If they own satellite
equipment, the choice of DBS channels is even wider. Inevitably, this has consequences
for media regulation and information policy, the responsibility of the Ministry of
Information -
5. The Ministry of Information
The Saudi media came under the control of a centralised government agency for the first
time in 1953, when the government established what was called 'the General Directorate
of Broadcasting, Press, and Publication' to organise, coordinate, control, and supervise
broadcasting, the press, publications, and all other mass media means, and to disseminate
books and informational pamphlets. In 1962, as a result of the development of media
and due to the expansion of its responsibilities, the Directorate was elevated by royal
decree to the full status of Ministry. It is now called the Ministry of Information (see
Figure No.2). The main function of the Ministry is to plan, control, supervise and fmance
all informational projects such as radio and television broadcasting, to guide press
establishments, produce informational books and operate the Saudi Arabian News
Agency. 3 The Ministry is also in charge of censoring any print, audio, or visual material
at the country's entry points - borders, airports, and seaports. It has the additional
responsibility of issuing licenses to printing presses, as well as video and audio retail and
rental outlets. Functioning within the framework of the government and according to its
rules and regulations, the Ministry of Information is fmanced by the Ministry of Finance
and National Economy and is obliged to prepare and submit its annual budget to the
Ministry of Finance, which has the authority to accept, modify, subtract from, or even
reject proposals.
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The Ministry of Information is headed by a minister who is in charge of all its activities
and who is directly responsible to the Council of Ministers. Two deputy ministers and
seven assistant deputies work in close liaison with him (see Figure 2). The total number
of Ministry employees is 5,553, of whom Saudis make up 89 percent." However, the
system is subject to typical government bureaucracy and authoritarian practices. The
Ministry of Information has expanded its operations and has now become a huge
bureaucratic institution which suffers from many managerial and financial problems that
hamper the media's performance and application. It is seen as lacking the administrative
and financial flexibility which permits the accurate and speedy decisions required by
media operations on a day to day basis. A detailed analysis of these constraints on media
production will follow in chapters VIl-IX of this study.
5.1. Ministry of Information Personnel
Management, as we shall see later, is one of the weaknesses of the Saudi media system.
One of the causes is the fact that staff members in media facilities, because they work
for a governmental organisation, are civil servants and they do not see their role in
primarily professional terms (Shobaili, 1971). They experience indifferent treatment by
the Ministry of Information and the absence of incentives and personnel support
essential to a stable and creative workforce. This treatment, in fact, poses problems to
the national broadcast media. Shobaili's observation about staff treatment in his 1971
study was then considered astute, and it is still relevant in the late 1990s. The few
existing talented members of staff have felt that they are not fully appreciated in their
'civil service' and are seeking more lucrative jobs in the flourishing Direct Broadcast
Satellites (DBS) 'private' services; a situation which can be described as a 'talent drain'.
148
5.2. The Ministry of Information and Audience Research
Saudi Arabia's perception of mass media use is associated with sender-based
communication systems, the premise of which is that information suppliers determine
what information to supply and how the public will use it. It is a vertical, unidirectional
structure where messages descend from top (the government) to bottom. This system
assumes that people are passive viewers who accept whatever is given to them; it also
considers people to be an undifferentiated mass who think and act alike and who do not
know what they need and like (Alharithi, 1983). There is no evidence that this
observation has altered significantly in the new competitive environment of the media
in the 1990s (see Appendix F, cartoon No.6).
The Ministry of Information, the sole body responsible for media, print and broadcast
operations has not appeared to account for audiences' responses nor expectations from
broadcast media. Since the inauguration of the television service in 1965, the Ministry
of Information has not conducted, sponsored or initiated any large-scale audience
research, with the exception of a study carried out by the Mass Communication
Department at King Saud University more than ten years ago (Bait-Almal et a!, 1994).
There are, however, some small-scale and limited audience 'studies' conducted by some
media scholars as part of their academic work. Applying different sampling procedures,
these studies were designed to obtain data regarding media usage among small
populations of Saudis, and their results cannot be generalised to all Saudi viewers (see
Najai, 1982; Al-Attibi, 1986). Producers and programmers usually rely on their own
judgements in determining their audiences' choices and preferred programming. There
are no feedback mechanisms or arrangements, even after Saudi television started
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carrying commercials in 1982, a factor often thought to be a strong motive for audience
research and ratings.
6. Media Regulation and Information Policy
The first Saudi Information Policy was issued by Royal Decree by King Abdul Aziz,
following the proposal of introducing radio broadcast to the Kingdom in 1949 for the
first time. In essence, the policy prescribed general directions as to the manner in which
this new medium should be operated. It states:
'[...]foreign news should avoid bias, insults and defamation of anyone [...]
the local news should broadcast facts and the viewpoint of the Saudi
Government, while remaining silent on issues not usually made public.'
(Shobaili, 1971:188)
The radio output at that time - the early 1950s - consisted of religious programmes
whose content was based on readings from the Quran and talks about Islamic and Arab
history. Such programmes helped to alleviate the concerns of the religious elements in
society and absorbed their objections to the new medium. However, once King Saud had
succeeded his father, in order to clarify certain clauses, he issued a Royal Decree to
dissolve this policy (Alamoudi, 1984).
The introduction of television in 1965, and the opposition it encountered from certain
religious groups in the country, dictated the need for modifications appropriate to the
nature of the new medium. These modifications and the addition of new clauses were
designed to control the appearance of women on televised programmes. As a result,
women's appearances were confined to certain roles and certain types of programmes,
for example as hosts or guests in children's or women's shows. Women appearing in
these programmes were required to observe the strict Muslim dress code; they had to
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cover their hair and wear loose clothing to ensure that their bodies were fully covered
down to the wrists and ankles in order to prevent them from being exposed to viewers
(Zamakshari, 1994).
To screen and censor the content of foreign made programmes, a censorship department
was established. Its responsibilities included and still include the screening and editing
of scenes and language in imported and locally-made programmes to be more suitable
and consistent with the Islamic norms of Saudi society. However, the heavy dependence
on imported television productions and the relatively relaxed censorship rules, among
other reasons, contributed to a number of violent reactions from the religious element,
including the siege of the Holy Mosque in Makkah, described earlier in this chapter.
Before the occurrence of these events, Saudi Arabia did not have an aggressive
information philosophy, and so the 'silence' policy, which prevailed at the time, was
conducive to the spread of rumours and speculation about the siege, on national and
international levels. The treatment of this incident by the Saudi media and their
hesitation to reach a decision regarding the announcement of the development of the
event, led to the formulation of the current policy. Soon after this, Saudi authorities
implemented a ban on Western films and television serials or series on Channel 1. This
ban is still in force and any non-Arabic productions have been restricted to Channel 2.
The Supreme Council of Mass Communication, established in 1981 by Royal Decree,
finally formulated a media policy and it was approved by Royal Decree in May, 1983.
This legislation regarding television is part of the current Saudi Information Policy, as
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formulated in 1 9X2 by the Supreme Council of Mass Communication, a task force
committee consisting of academics and top officials at the Ministry of Information,
chaired by the Interior Minister, Prince Naif Ben Abdul Aziz. The policy refers to the
principles, goals and objectives of pnnt and broadcast media in Saudi Arabia. Emanating
from Islam and based on its laws and beliefs, the policy aims at establishing belief in
Allah, and raising the intellectual, cultural and moral levels of the Saudi citizens. The
policy also prescribes broad guidelines by which its objectives and aims are to be
achieved, and covers areas such as news, education, public awareness, entertainment and
cultural programmes. 6
Currently in effect, this policy is the most comprehensive one and provides general
guidelines and frameworks for media operations. Its execution was, understandably, a
life-line for the decision makers and practitioners within the media, both print and
broadcast. As one of the founding fathers of this policy indicated to this author:
'This is a complete and workable masterpiece which just needs to be
implemented. Its execution is in the hands of the management which
actually runs the media on a day-to-day basis.' (Ashobaili, 1997)
In addition, the policy contains articles that assert the need for harnessing the media to
numerous goals, such as preserving the country's cultural identity and protecting the
primary interests of the citizens first. It also gives the family, children, women and
teenagers the importance they deserve, and directs the media, especially broadcasting,
to respond to their needs and concerns through specially made programmes: '[...
attention will be given to the guidance, educational and recreational programmes for
children [...]'. Another article states: 'The Saudi mass communication will give the
family its due attention, being the essential unit in society [...J'.
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Given the fact that illiteracy rates are high in the country, the policy confirms the need
to eradicate the problem:
'Realising its significant role, mass communication will deal directly and
effectively to abolish illiteracy by adopting educational and scientific
principles, dedicating educational programmes to meet the needs of every
age and mentality.' (Article XVII, Saudi Media Policy, see Appendix B)
The policy has stated that the media should seek to be objective in presenting the facts
and should avoid exaggerations while guaranteeing freedom of expression to all.
What is significant about this media policy is that it is the first written policy to describe
how the Saudi media should be used. Previous policies were merely prohibitive ones,
that is, they stated what the media should not do rather than spell out their
responsibilities (Alharithi, 1985). It also contains articles that highlight the need to
encourage local production, albeit without prescribing what exactly should be done to
encourage it. Nevertheless, in short, the existing Saudi media policy is considered as a
complete and workable policy which covers a great deal of the media issues and areas
of concern. Executing this policy is a different matter and this poses a difficult challenge
to media executives and practitioners. Whether this policy, or parts of it, have been
applied to media operations or whether the media deviate from this policy, and fmally,
the nature of the obstacles that stand in the way of fulfilling this policy, are the issues
that will be examined in more depth in later chapters.
6.1 Censorship
Although a number of government bodies are involved in the regulation and censorship
of the media, ultimately, it is the Ministry of Information who has control over the
monitoring of the national news agency, radio and television broadcasting, and the
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enforcement of censorship laws and regulations. This government control was first
established in 1953, when King Saud issued a press decree giving authority to the
General Directorate of Broadcasting Press and Publication to supervise and manage
media performance. Commissioned to oversee all aspects of mass media in the Kingdom,
it was also to act as a government information source for the press agencies and to
supervise all facets of media broadcasting. 8 The General Directorate was not given the
function of a pre-censor but it was required to scrutinise information for potentially
offensive items. Messages or sentiments considered to be anti-royal, contradicting Saudi
foreign policy, actively pro-Zionist or not in accordance with the Islamic faith would
result in the withdrawal of the publication.
In 1963, again under Royal Decree, the General Directorate relinquished its office and
the Ministry of Information assumed its control of press and media regulation. The high
status of this cabinet office is indicative of how vital the Saudi government deemed
information regulation to be during this period. This is confirmed by the fact that the
Press and Publication law was created at the same time in order to regulate the media
even further.
The force and application of this law is still in effect today. 'While affording the press
some privacy and protection from government interference, the underlying principle is
to safeguard 'general welfare' or pro bono publico, but this objective remains undefmed
in legal terms. However, the effect is to eliminate certain items and features that can
potentially create discord between the ruling bodies and the population, in the interests
of 'each citizen's duty towards his religion, country and community'. 9
 Potentially
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offensive issues remain the same: anti-royal, anti-government or un-Islamic messages are
withdrawn.
The present role of the government includes the appointment of members of licensed
press establishments, whose duty is to supervise all editorial activities. Without a license,
a newspaper cannot publish. At the same time, editors and chairpersons of individual
publications are also government appointed and answerable to these committees. The
government therefore has the final decision on the 'hiring and firing' of committee
members and editorial executives, while having the power to suspend publication at any
stage.
6.1.1. Television Censorship
As mentioned above, in 1982, an information policy which also dealt with television was
formulated. As with previous legislation, the policy aims to prohibit items which may
cause friction within Saudi society from the social, moral, religious and political points
of view. Television in Saudi Arabia is thus subject to prior censorship and programmes
are screened, censored and sometimes edited in advance. Imported films, television
programmes and series are controlled by a Censorship Committee in the Censorship
Department, which in turn comes under the direct supervision of the General Director
of Television, who also appoints its members. The prior screening is necessary in order
to decide what is or is not acceptable to be broadcast from a social, political, or religious
perspective. In some cases there are occasional written instructions but generally,
censorship relies heavily on common sense rules (Shobaili, 1971; Najai, 1982; Al-Gami,
1991).
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Censorship practices include the banning of scenes which contain any depiction of or
allusion to the drinking of alcohol or the taking of illegal substances, impingement of
Islamic dietary laws, nudity, physical or sexual encounters between opposite sexes, and
anything that is purportedly un-Islamic or aimed at promoting other religions. Dancing
is also prohibited unless it is national or traditional and the performers, who are male,
must be appropriately dressed. The policy also forbids the communication of any
message that contradicts, opposes or criticises Saudi rulers, the government and its
principles and national policy. A list of general guidelines is given to programme
suppliers who deal with Saudi television. Although not exhaustive, this list provides an
overview of the specific scenes or subjects prohibited on STy:
• All scenes that arouse sexual excitement of whatever kind.
• Women appearing 'indecently dressed' or appearing in overt love scenes with men or
dancing.
• Women appearing in athletic games or sports.
• Scenes relating or alluding to the consumption of alcohol.
• Downgrading reference, whether explicit or implicit, to any of the heavenly religions.
• Treatment of other countries with praise, satire, or contempt.
• Reference to Zionism or any activity practised by Zionists.
• Scenes which threaten to expose the monarchy.
• All 'immoral' scenes.
• Scenes showing betting or gambling.
Although these guidelines were first formulated in the 1 970s, they are still applied and
followed when dealing with televised materials. Regarding current censorship laws,
Rampal describes the situation thus:
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'A censorship committee, comprising officials of the judiciary, the
Publications Department of the Ministry of Information, and the
Department of Education, reviews and censors all national and foreign
publications according to the policies of the state, including the 1958
censorship decree.' (Rampal, 1994:255)
This censorship regime will be discussed as one of the local constraints on media
industry development in chapter VII.
6.1.2. Video Censorship
Videos are also subject to rigorous control in accordance with government policy.
Statistics from 1980 reveal that over half the population had access to video material,
while the latest data show that there are three million video cassette recorders in Saudi
Arabia. '° The government, therefore, has had to apply similar control and regulation
over videotape as it has with other forms of media. Consequently, legislation was
brought into effect by the Ministry of Information in 1980 with the following guidelines:
firstly, video rental/sales shop owners must be over 18, full-time operators and have no
criminal convictions; secondly, the shop must be situated away from a mosque and on
a main road; fmally, women are forbidden to enter these shops. The same criteria on
which are based the guidelines of the regulation and censorship of the media also apply
to video sales and rental; the objective of these materials should be 'the dissemination
of culture, knowledge and innocent entertainment'. " Any video or tape material,
whether locally produced or imported, which impinges on the values stated in the
censorship legislation may be withdrawn and retail or rental outlets can have their
licenses revoked.
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7. The Arrival of Satellite Services in Saudi Arabia
7.1. ARABSAT
In the aftermath of World War II, the need was recognised for a unifying body to
promote the interests of the Arab States - the major impetus behind the creation of the
Arab League. From the very start, one of the League's chief considerations was to have
communications systems to link the states culturally and educationally, and to enable
these states to have a greater degree of independence in telecommunication technology.
In 1967, the Ministers of Information and Culture resolved to set up a system by which
the cultural and social activities of the member states could be integrated by satellite.
This was one of the reasons why, in 1969, the Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU)
was established (Almakaty, 1995). In its early recommendations, the Union stressed the
need for the Arab League to join other leading nations in the field of space
communication technology; an issue later supported in a UNESCO recommendation for
community television. After some years of deliberation, the League of Arab States
decided to create the Arab Satellite Communications Organisation, which would own
and operate a joint satellite service. A Constitutive Agreement was subsequently drawn
up and signed and on April 14th, 1976, ARABSAT was founded with the necessary
capital provided by all the League member states. 12
After a number of successive and successful tenders, AEROSPATIALE of France
constructed a series of satellites and by 1985, ARABSAT became an operative service
(Almakaty, 1995). Its first transmission was a broadcast from Makkah during the Islamic
pilgrimage (Hajj) in August, 1985. Since then, satellites 1A and lB have completed their
operational lives, while satellite lC is expected to stay in operation until 2OO2.'
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According to Turkistani (1988), the first two satellites were not economically viable as
they were not exploited to their full capacity. The Ku-Band, for instance, was not used
until 1993, when it was leased by the Egyptian Satellite Channel (Ashal, 1994).
Furthermore, the absence of an agreed policy among the Arab nations regarding the use
of community television meant that satellite television potential was not realised until
much later (Abu-Argoub, 1988). Still its capacity is not fully capitalised on as
telecommunication relations are dictated by political, social and economic factors. The
upshot is that those states with good diplomatic relations are more likely to reach a
reciprocal agreement regarding the exchange of programmes. Meanwhile, in May 1990,
during the thirteenth session of the General Assembly of ARABSAT, which took place
in Algiers, a major development occurred: amendments to the agreement were
introduced, effectively permitting ARABSAT to have greater flexibility and enabling it
to offer its services to the commercial market. It currently attracts users from both
members and non-members of the League as well as from the private sector. 14 The
combined service of the remaining first generation satellites now covers North Africa
and the Middle East, and extends to the Indian sub-continent. 15
In order to meet the rapidly growing demand for new satellite services, ARABSAT
decided to improve on the capacity, power, coverage and lifetime of the first generation.
These second generation satellites have enabled ARABSAT to meet the demand for new
telecommunications services and at the same time support the existing service. 16 The
next stage, that is, the launch of the third generation of satellites, will be dedicated
primarily to direct-to-home digital television and special discounts have been granted for
multiple transponder and long-term leasing.'7
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7.1.1. ARABSAT Services
Article 3 of the Constitutive Agreement outlines the main objectives for ARABSAT as:
'[...] securing public and specialised services in the field of space
communication for all members as well as other users in accordance with
the appropriate technical and economical standards.' 18
In fulfilling its goal, ARABSAT has further enhanced its Regional Television
Broadcasting Services by designing and installing two transponders in its satellites. A
leasing service guarantees infallible use of its satellite system. While the service is mainly
used to transmit major events across the Arab states, it also facilitates an exchange of
television programmes among the member states themselves. ARABSAT also leases out
the satellite transponders to provide local/domestic services, direct television and radio
transmission and multi-purpose use. 19 The use of second generation satellites vastly
amplified the diversity of the services that ARABSAT provided, and so the organisation
investigated the possible potential of adding new services to the existing ones.
The services provided by ARABSAT are employed by a wide range of parties, both
Arab and international. The users of the first generation satellites currently include all
telecommunications administrations of every ARABSAT member state; space television
channels of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Syria,
Sudan, Mauritania, the Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU), and MBC, ART,
ORBIT, CNN, Radio of the Orient, and the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC).
Second generation satellite users include those of the first generation, as well as Libya,
Yemen, Qatar, along with CFI, TNIBC, Future Vision and FEN (see Table No. la-c).2°
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Table No. Ia. Television Channels on ARABSAT 2A: (Ku-Band)
Trans	 Leased Station	 Polarisation	 Frequency (MGHZ)
9	 ART	 H	 12685,06
3	 ART	 H	 12562,77
11	 ART	 H	 12720,00
5	 Jordan TV	 H	 12604,53
7	 Kuwaiti TV	 H	 12646,30
1	 Qatar TV	 H	 12521,00
10	 Libya TV	 V	 12700,06
4	 Syria TV	 V	 12577,77
6	 Abu Dhabi TV	 V	 12619,53
12	 MBC	 V	 12735,00
8	 IQRA	 V	 12685,00
Source: ARABSAT, Riyadh, 1998.
Table No. lb. Television Channels on ARABSAT 2A: (C-Band High Power)
Trans	 Leased Station	 Polarisation	 Frequency (MGHZ)
16	 Dubai SC	 Circular/Left	 4057,50
18	 MBC	 Circular/Left	 409 8,50
20	 Oman TV	 Circular/Left	 4139,50
22	 Yemen TV	 Circular/Left	 4180,50
15	 SARA Vision	 Circular/Right	 4043,75
17	 SARA Vision	 Circular/Right	 4084,75
Source: ARABSAT, Riyadh, 1998.
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Table No. ic. Television Channels on ARABSAT 2A: (C-Band Medium Power)
Trans	 Leased Station	 Polansation	 Frequency (MGHZ)
2	 ART	 Circular/Left	 3 740,75
4	 ART	 Circular/Left 	 3781,75
6	 Bahrain TV	 Circular/Left	 3 822,75
8	 Future TV	 Circular/Left	 3 863,75
10	 Sudan TV	 Circular/Left	 3 904,75
12	 Qatar TV	 Circular/Left	 3945,75
1	 Mauritania TV	 Circular/Right	 3720,25
3	 Egyptian SC	 Circular/Right	 3761,25
5	 Nile TV	 Circular/Right	 3802,25
7	 CNN	 Circular/Right	 3843,25
9	 Morocco TV	 Circu1ar/Right	 3884,25
11	 STV 1	 Circular/Right	 3925,25
13	 STV 2	 Circular/Right	 3978,25
Source: ARABSAT, Riyadh, 199&
Since 16th July, 1998, ARABSAT has broadcast for free a number of Arabic channels
to Europe through Hot Bird 4 on 13 °E on digital compression. The channels offered are:
Saudi TV Channel 1, Ashariqa TV, Libyan TV, Kuwait TV, and Bahrain TV. ARABSAT
has stated that there will be more channels in the future. 21
ARABSAT now has three types of communication satellites; fixed satellite systems
(FSS); broadcasting satellite systems (BSS); and direct broadcasting systems (DBS);
which affect the balance of television viewership in Saudi Arabia. The fact that DBS can
be received directly by small dishes or antennas increases its accessibility, a factor of
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particular relevance to this study: access to uncensored international satellite
transmissions cuts across all the censorship regulations constraining STV performance.
7.2. The Development of the DBS Market
The value and potential of DBS was not fully realised until the l970s. Up to this point,
television signals had been transmitted via microwave towers; a system that proved
costly due to atmospheric conditions and the vast geographical area that the towers had
to serve. The other option was to adopt the satellite system. With this purpose in mind,
many Arab nations became members of INTELSAT, and INTELSAT transponders were
even leased out to Saudi Arabia and Sudan to provide a link with their own television
transmitters. The early 1990s saw a number of broadcasters using ARABSAT
transponders. 22 Thus DBS television signals were fmally delivered directly to homes in
a number of Arab countries.
Despite a ban, the beginning of the l980s saw the arrival of the first satellite dishes into
Saudi Arabia. Ashgie (1992) documents the installation of the first satellite dish in
Riyadh at this time. In the early years, ownership of satellite dishes was restricted to
members of the Royal family and prominent businessmen, but as the popularity of
satellite television grew, mainly out of an urgent need for news on the Gulf crisis of
1990, more dishes were purchased and installed. At the beginning of the 1990s,
wealthy families in most Arab countries started to acquire large satellite dishes to
receive unencrypted signals such as CNN. However, it was Arabic language news and
entertainment that the audiences wanted. Soon, every Arab country would have a
satellite service, if only broadcasting domestic prograniming (Boyd, 1998). Estimates of
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the number of satellite dishes owned in the mid-90s vary from 150,000 to 400,000
(Morad and Al-Marshed, 1993) (see Appendix F, picture No.1). 24 The viewing
population was estimated by one source to be 2 million. 25 By 1994, dishes were being
openly sold even after the ban, issued in March of that year. The ban never took effect
and possession of a satellite dish gave its owner some degree of kudos. In an attempt to
regulate the accessibility of foreign produced programmes, a further decree stated that
it was forbidden to import both dishes and devices that receive non-Saudi channels. This
ban was extended to decoders and prohibited the manufacture of satellite dishes or their
parts (Almakaty, 1995). A breach of the law would result in a $133,000 fme, but this was
never enforced and the equipment (dishes and receivers) has always remained available.
According to the Council of Saudi Ministers, the Ministry of Information was to act as
a filter, to sieve through the array of programmes available on satellite television and
select what was deemed suitable viewing for the Saudi population, in accordance with
Islamic rulings and Saudi social values. 26 The fmal selection would be transmitted by
cable. Prior to these restrictions, the price of a locally manufactured dish had plummeted
as low as $530. Since the decree's enforcement, the cost has more than doubled, while
installation charges have increased from $800 to $1 ,866, and receivers, essential for
decoding, have risen in cost from $227 to $400 (Almakaty, 1995). Nevertheless, satellite
dishes are still widely available.
Confusion as to whether the decree was retroactive, or whether there would be some
kind of amnesty for those already in possession of forbidden satellite items, led the
Ministry of Interior to issue the following declaration:
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'In accordance with Decree No.128 of the Council of Ministers issued on
March 10, 1994, regarding the organisation of the operation of satellite
television reception in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which stipulates a
ban regarding an alternative method that the state will provide and which
will be under the supervision of the Information Ministry, while forbidding
any other quarters from dealing in these matters; and because of
numerous queries that the authorities continue to receive from citizens
regarding this issue, the Interior Ministry would like to clarify, in the
following statement, everything that relates to the defmition of the
foundations and rules which will be implemented regarding all issues
related to satellite television transmission and within the framework
mentioned in the decree, as follows:
First, with regard to satellite dishes and unused ancillary equipment that
is actually in the possession of individuals, shops and warehouses, their
owners will be allowed to export them officially through all air, land and
sea outlets and anywhere abroad in accordance with the wishes of the
beneficiary party within a maximum deadline of one month as from the
issuance and the enforcement of this statement. Failing this, and following
the lapsing of the deadline defined in the first article, any equipment
found in the possession of individuals or commercial shops will be
confiscated and the offender will be subjected to fmes as stipulated by the
decree of the Council of Ministers.
a. All sizes and models of sateffite dishes
b. All types and sizes of receivers used for satellite television reception
c. Decoders
d. Low Noise Block Down Converters or LNBs
e. Feed-horn equipment
g. All other equipment and accessories used in the installation and
operation of satellite dishes.
Second, it should be particularly stressed that citizens must not deal or
trade in the banned items which have been defined in this statement and
in the content of the previous decision of the Council of Ministers.'27
Statistics show that there is currently a huge potential for DBS in the Arab states as
shown by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which currently have around 4 million and 8.5 million
TVHH (TV households) respectively. Circumstances which have helped in DBS
utilisation are improved economic conditions which entail a higher income per capita,
and increased availability of domestically manufactured and assembled receiving
equipment in the Arab world.
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7.3. PBS Offerings: The Scale of the Competition Faced by STY
Analysing the threat to STV and local production posed by DBS, Ali Najai, Assistant
Deputy Minister of Information for Television Affairs, comments:
'Saudi television does not fear competition from satellite television
channels because of Saudi television's unique approaches and objectives -
it represents Saudi society and Islamic values. There are many people
inside and outside the kingdom who regularly watch Saudi television
channels because they like its conservative approach.' 28
Others conclude that, given the choice, most viewers with access to satellite programmes
would choose to watch these on a regular basis. As previously mentioned, this can be
attributed to the effect of stringent censorship laws on Saudi entertainment and news
programmes; the dearth of Saudi nationals, especially women, appearing on these
programmes; and an over-dependence on foreign productions (Marghalani, 1997).
DBS currently offers a vast array of stations and networks as described in Appendix A,
while the region receives hundreds of satellite services from the West and East, both
clear and encrypted. On offer at present are 11 American channels, 12 British, 14
French, 10 Turkish and 15 from Hong Kong, besides a multitude of encrypted,
subscription based networks such as Orbit and Showtime. 29 Currently, the most popular
DBS channel is rvIIBC, with ESC, DSC, and CNN International following close behind
(Bait-Almal, 1993) but with the continuing establishment of new satellite channels and
with new products being made available, competition to attract and poach viewers is
fierce. The availability and accessibility of DBS can offer a wider variety and an
alternative discourse with a better quality of production than previously obtainable from
the local, national television system. It was inevitable that this would have a profound
effect on both the popularity of local transmissions and on the performance potential
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of local production companies in Saudi Arabia. The following examples of DBS offerings
demonstrate its appeal.
Entertainment in the form of drama, songs and music, and game shows, for instance,
dominates most of DBS output. On some channels it exceeds more than 90% (ART 4;
ART 5; MTV; and VI-Il), while on other channels entertainment occupies a substantial
share of the airtime. These imported soaps influence Arab production in both style and
content. The Egyptian drama Hwanim Garden City, which was shown on ESC in January
1999, is one example of recent attempts to emulate such soaps with a local twist and
flavour. The appeal of Syrian soaps lies in their ability to draw on historical and Arab
nationalism themes and the adoption of 'out-of-studios' production techniques. Strict
censorship laws in Saudi Arabia limit the quantity and quality of music programmes on
STy, but DBS offers a wide variety of these, both Arabic and Western, for instance,
MBC's Top of the Pops, ART'S Top 10, DSC's Sebag al-aghani ('The Chart Show'), and
Nile TV's Nile Hits and Nile DJ, among others.
The problems and shortcomings of STV news reportage are documented in the following
chapter. In contrast, MBC was voted as one of the best news services among the DBS
channels in 1997.° Its news operations rely on correspondents in Arab and European
capitals and in various parts of the world where events are unfolding. Aljazirah provides
a line-up of news bulletins every half hour as well as a number of dynamic current
affairs, discussion and commentary programmes. In asserting its independence it does
not succumb to pressures from Arab governments and it has adopted a high-risk
approach in opening closed files and in tackling sensitive issues, such as relations with
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the West, political participation, democracy, human rights and civil liberties in Arab
totalitarian societies. This approach is adopted in both its news programmes and in its
other investigative journalism features, such as Serri Lilghaya ('Top Secret'), and Nogta
Sakhina ('Hot Spot'), and in similar dialogue and discussion programmes, for example
Alitjah Almouakis ('Opposite Direction') and Akthar Min-rai ('More than One
Opinion'). These programmes allow for a great deal of viewer participation and have
become platforms for opposition leaders and subversive opinions which are less than
popular with certain governments. Aljazirah's perceived credibility, objectivity and
independence have made it one of the most popular news services in the Arab world.
This author has learned recently that a number of conservative Saudi viewers, who were
strictly opposed to DBS, have begun to install receiving equipment just to tune m to
Aljazirah programmes. STy 's news services are still limited by a reliance on ready-made
stories and an inability to compile impartial and informative reports independently.
DBS channels offer a number of political shows which contain interviews with influential
decision makers, thinkers and analysts who can provide valuable and genuine
contributions. Shows of this kind include Akthar Min-rai, AlitUah Almouakis, Bila
Hdood ('With No Frontiers') and Shahid ala Alasir ('A Witness at the Time'), all of
which are Aljazirah programmes. Similar productions also include Roaya ('Vision t ) on
DSC, Agenda on MBC and Kanadeel Fi Addalam ('Candle in the Darkness') on ANN.
They encourage and emphasise viewers' participation by means of telephone calls or fax
and frequently publicise their e-mail addresses, telephone and fax numbers for viewers,
who are invited to pose direct questions to the guests, or to voice their comments and
opinions. Aljazirah programmes, in particular, are renowned for their frankness and
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candour in their treatment of certain topics which are considered sensitive or taboo areas
and are generally avoided on STy talk shows.
Other talk shows on certain DBS channels are more sensational. They follow a tabloid
style in format and content, and emulate American talk shows such as Jerry Springer and
Oprah. Yahala ('Welcome') and Alylah ('Tonight') on ART, and Ashatir Yahky ('Who
Dares to Speak?') on LBC are examples of these. These shows, produced in Egypt and
Lebanon, are usually recorded with an audience present and also receive calls from
viewers.
DBS channels also offer a variety of medical and counselling shows. This category
includes productions such as Bsaer ('Insights') on Dubai S.C.,Fadaya Clinic ('ESC's
Clinic') on ESC, and Sihatak Bedonya ('Your Health is Important') on MBC. As their
titles suggest, they are designed to provide answers relating to health issues raised by
concerned callers. There are no similar programmes on STV and treatment of medical
issues is generally confined to government achievement only.
There are two kinds of religious programmes on DBS. The first is the conventional,
traditional question and answer format, similar to STV offerings, and features alem -
a religious scholar - who answers the viewers' questions regarding their religious duties.
Deen wa dunva ('A Religion and a Life') on ESC is an example of this type of show.
The other approach is extended to encompass Islamic views and solutions to
contemporary political and social dilemmas, such as JSC's Asharia ii'a Alhayah ('The
Shariah and Life'). This type of contemporary religious discourse is unparalleled on STV.
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Despite the objections of Islamists and moralists to certain aspects of DBS services,
these examples demonstrate a broader scope and a better quality of programming
unconstrained by the same limitations that currently reduce the potential of STV, as
described in chapters VII-D(.
8. Conclusion
The arrival of television in Saudi Arabia arose partly from a desire of foreign residents
in Saudi Arabia to gain a broader perspective of global developments and partly from
a desire by the indigenous population for a more informative media service, and one
that would facilitate the development of the country. In satisfying these requirements,
the government acknowledged the potential of the media to effect a greater sense of
national unity, and to inform, educate and entertain. Nevertheless, it can be argued that
while trying to enhance cultural self-reliance and development, Saudi Arabia has
increased its technological and cultural dependency on imported foreign products and
expertise at the expense of local media production.
The arrival of satellite services renewed conflicts between various societal elements, such
as the Islamists and modernists, in effect undermining the government t s attempt to
promote national unity and has increased the dependency on foreign imports as supply
meets demand in a perpetuating spiral.
As discussed in chapters VIl-IX, the establishment of the 1982 Media Information Policy
constituted an attempt to regularise media output to appease the various factions, but
coupled with stringent censorship practices and additional constraints, this has led to
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further limitations on local production, again increasing dependency on and preference
for foreign media output.
The following chapter examines quantitatively and qualitatively the local and foreign
television content on STV to which Saudi viewers are being exposed. This facilitates a
comparison of quality and appeal with alternative, DBS offerings, as described, which
in turn underlines the reasons for viewers' preferences for imported fare.
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CHAPTER VI
STV: QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS
1. Introduction
This chapter closely examines Saudi television and its policies with both quantitative and
qualitative analyses of its programming, including an extensive discussion of its position
and role in relation to the DBS phenomenon and its programming policies. First, the
extent and magnitude of dependency in the domain of media - and of television in
particular - will be quantitatively assessed and documented. Following this, the analysis
and discussion of Saudi television performance will be carried out in the light of the
traditionally held professional views regarding how a broadcast medium should operate
and be operated in a developing country with its own specific needs and priorities.
2. Content Analysis: Quantitative Presentation
The following data are based on a calculation of percentages of all programmes
broadcast by STV Channel 1 in the period from 1 St to 14th March, 1997. STy broadcasts
an average of thirteen hours a day. On some days, such as weekends (Wednesday and
Thursday nights), for instance, broadcasting is extended until well beyond the usual close
down, often until 3:00am. On all weekdays, except Friday, transmission starts at 7:45am
and ends in the early hours of the next day at 2:00am or 3:00am. A total of 173 hours
of programmes were analysed, which constitutes the total of STV broadcasting in the
fourteen-day period under investigation. Programmes were classified according to their
source and origins, genre and presentation format. As Table No.2 shows, during this
period, 53.8 % of STY programmes were locally produced shows, mostly religious talk
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shows and variety shows. 30.6% of all STV output comprised Arabic productions, 3 %
were jointly produced shows, 10.7% were foreign (non-Arab) productions and 1 % were
of unknown origin. 80.5% of the non-Arabic productions are imported from the United
States, almost all of these being animated cartoons for children and these American
produced cartoons are broadcast in English. 8.2% of the foreign, non-Arab programmes
are from the UK and 11 % are from Japan. Both of these are dubbed in Arabic (see
Table No.2).
Table No.2 Origin of all Saudi television output:
	
ORIGIN	 TOTAL IN MINUTES
Local production	 2750	 53.82
Joint production	 ..	 155	 3
Arab production	 . .	 . ...	 1564	 30.60
onAiab foLreJgn production .	 549	 10.74
US	 UK .	 . Japan
80.5%	 8%	 11.4%
	
Unknown	 :	 92	 1
Source: Table contents calculated from STY Channel 1 programme cycle for
Autumn, 1997 (Appendix C).
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Table No.3 Source of drama by country of production:
A.
EGYPT
Total minutes	 [	 •:	
% :: .	
.: : :
659 1_47.48
B.
SYRIA ___.: 	 _______________
Total minutes	 :	 ........:	 %
381	 24.44
C.
KUWAIT _____..' _____:. _::• _: __. _ H.
Total minutes	 ::	 : :. :	 : : : .	 i .
255	 18.37
D.
LEBANON......
Total minutes	 : I .:.	 :	 :•::	
.
93	 6.70
E.
LOCAL _(SAUDI):. :......: _.:::_______:
Total minutes	 . ...	 .	 .	 ..%	 . . :	 ::
0	 0
Source: Table contents calculated from STV programme cycle for Autumn, 1997
(Appendix C).
Arabic productions are predominately drama series and serials; 47.4% are Egyptian
series and plays, Syrian shows take second place, occupying 27.4% of all Arab
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productions and partly consist of dramatic series. 18.3% are Kuwaiti productions and
6.7% are imported from Lebanon (see Table No.3).
2.1. Programme Format
Table No.4 Saudi television programme format:
PROGRAMME FORMAT	 DURATION IN MINUTES	 %	 :::
Direct/Lecturing	 321	 9.59
Animation/Cartoon	 437	 13.06
Participatory	 75	 2.24
Talk/Discussion	 230	 6.87
Multiple format	 631	 18.86
Dramafic	 1584	 47.36
Music	 66	 1.97
Source: Table contents were calculated from STY Channel 1 programme cycle for
Autumn, 1997 (Appendix C).
2.1.1. Direct lecturing
As shown in Table No.4,9.5% of Saudi television programmes are of the direct lecturing
format where a speaker/presenter sits in front of the camera in a studio and either reads
a 'written speech' from a paper or ad-libs for the whole duration of the programme. in
each case, videos of any sort are absent both before and during the show. Religious
programmes are the predominant example of such a format.
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2.1.2. Interactive Programmes
Unlike DBS channels, which allow for a great deal of viewer feedback and participation,
only 2% of STV programmes allow any kind of viewer involvement. In such
programmes, although calls are always monitored, viewers can phone in with their
comments and/or questions. This kind of participation is seen on Face to Face, where
viewers can talk to celebrities or government officials. An additional programme, 'An
Answer over the Phone' receives viewers' inquiries on religious matters, they, in turn,
receive a response by means of an audio recording of a religious opinion from a scholar,
with the help of a mediator.
2.1.3. Drama Format
As Table No.4 shows, 47% of Saudi programmes consist of dramas. These are,
essentially, daily or nightly serials imported from other Arab countries, such as Egypt or
Syria. There are, however, short developmental messages produced in a dramatic format.
They are jointly produced within the GCC Joint Production Establishment and offer
advice regarding road safety and health matters. Due to their short nature, they usually
lend themselves to be used as 'fillers' shown repeatedly between programmes.
2.1.4. Animation Format
More than 13 % of STV output is made up of cartoons which account for the bulk of
children's programmes (73%). As mentioned earlier, with the exception of one daily 20-
minute Japanese show which is dubbed in Arabic, they are all imports featured in the
original language.
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2.1.5. Music Format
Shows which feature only songs and music account for just 2% of STy productions.
Most of the songs featured are called 'national songs' and are used as inserts or 'fillers'
in the few minutes before the main news bulletin or after the showing of an
inauguration project. They are used to complement features which praise the country's
leaders and their achievements. These songs are often accompanied by videos showing
aspects of modernisation and material progress. Other songs with different themes are
incorporated in variety shows or randomly scheduled during the course of the day. A
significant point is that since 1981 STV has not featured any songs performed by female
singers.
2.2. Programme Genre
61 % of STV output consists of entertainment shows, both local and foreign. The
imported programmes are mainly entertainment shows such as plays, series, serials and
cartoons. 4% of the imported programmes are of an educational nature, primarily
imported from the United States and the United Kingdom. Dubbed into Arabic, they
deal with the environment, space, global weather trends and related issues. STV has no
locally produced educational or documentary programmes, neither within its production
units nor supplied by local independent or non-local production firms.
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Table No.5 Daily programme percentage by genre:
DAY	 Saturday	 5unday	 :	 Tuesday	 Wednesday	 : Thursday	 - Friday
Inn	 X	 ann	 4	 miii	 4	 mm	 4	 miii	 2	 mm	 4	 loin	 .4
GENRE -.-	 .	 ::	 .	 -. .:.	 : •. '::::::.:: .
ReligiQII	 53	 6.46	 34	 4.53	 56	 7.34	 45	 5.75	 53	 6.55	 21	 2.85	 109	 21.54
Sport	 0	 0.00	 0	 0.00	 19	 2.49	 30	 3.84	 28	 3.46	 101	 13.70	 57	 11.26
Drama	 265	 32.32	 245	 32.62	 250	 32.77	 244	 31.20	 284	 35.11	 143	 19.40	 70	 13.83
Children	 124	 15.12	 122	 16.25	 75	 9.83	 81	 10.36	 62	 7.66	 93	 12.62	 45	 8.89
News	 108	 13.11	 128	 17.04	 115	 15.07	 131	 16.15	 134	 16.56	 132	 17.91	 142	 28.06
Development	 16	 1.95	 93	 12.38	 51	 6.68	 49	 6.27	 99	 12.24	 99	 13.42	 13	 2.56
Documentary	 0	 0.00	 0	 0.00	 0	 0.00	 0	 0.00	 0	 0.00	 0	 0.00	 0	 0.00
Vori-ty
	
120	 14.63	 42	 5.6	 61	 8	 00	 0.00	 00	 0.00	 00	 0.00	 59	 11.66
tstc	 0	 0.00	 14	 1.86	 19	 2.49	 15	 1.92	 44	 5.4	 7	 0.95	 11	 2.17
CuTtura	 0	 0.00	 0	 0.00	 0	 0.00	 68	 8.70	 0	 0.00	 61	 8.28	 0	 0.00
EdcatioM	 .	 30	 3.66	 41	 5.46	 44	 5.77	 38	 4.86	 24	 2.97	 0	 0.00	 0	 0.00
Talk -	 104	 12.68	 0	 0.00	 50	 6.55	 58	 7.42	 29	 3.58	 47	 6.38	 0	 0.00
Women -	 0	 0.00	 32	 4	 23	 3	 23	 2.94	 52	 6.4	 33	 4.4	 0	 0.00
TOT	 820	 100	 751	 100	 763	 106	 782	 100	 809	 1-00	 737	 100	 506	 180
Source: Table contents were calculated from STY Channel 1 programme cycle for
Autumn, 1997 (Appendix C).
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2.2.1. Religious Programmes
Religious programmes amount to 8% of the total STV output. In their traditional,
conventional form, they essentially consist of didactic and directive discourse including:
recitations from the Quran at the opening of transmission and just before close down;
live transmission of the call for evening prayers and the actual praying from the Holy
Mosque in Makkah; direct lecturing or 'talk' programmes regarding Islamic history and
traditions as well as Muslim duties and religious obligations; and fmally, question and
answer programmes presented by more than one scholar regarding social and marital
relations communicated to the programme by viewers, either by telephone or facsimile
or by mail. The only other format religious programme is Kisa Wa Aayah ('A Story and
a Verse') - a twice weekly, 21-minute Egyptian show which is a dramatic representation
of a moral or ethical issue mentioned in the Quran.
The majority of these religious programmes are studio-based; a scholar comes to the
facility and has the episode taped for production in STV's main studios in Riyadh or in
one of the six studios in other major cities. These 'religious' programmes restrict
themselves to explaining religious duties to Muslims, without indulging in any
philosophical, economic or contemporary political issues. In their limited form, they are
not conducive to the innovation of new ideas or interpretations. Some DBS programmes
such as Aisharia 'a Wa Aihava ('Life and Shariah'), which is shown on Aljazirah, a Qatar-
based satellite broadcasting channel, have provided this touch. A respected Egyptian
scholar called Yusif Alqaradawi, a jurist who has a great deal of insight into current
religious issues, provides answers to viewers' questions pouring in from Europe and the
Middle Eastern countries, including Saudi Arabia. STy used to present a similar popular
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religious programme for years, until recently. It was called Noor Wa Hedaya ('Light and
Guidance'); following the same format this programme was presented in an ad-lib,
spontaneous style by Shaikh Au Tantawi. A mixture of Islamic and literary
encyclopaedic knowledge presented with a sense of humour in answering viewers'
questions, which he received in letters, contributed to this programme's success for more
than twenty years. The programme was discontinued because the unique personality of
the presenter could not be replaced.
Since Friday is a special spiritual day to Muslims and is a holiday in Saudi Arabia, the
number of religious programmes are increased three-fold on this day, they are more
directive in nature and have very similar formats. There is, however, plenty of scope for
the visualising of the Islamic knowledge through dramatisation or dialogue and
discussion of contemporary issues or of topics derived from the Quran and from
Sunnah's books and studies, with the aid of appropriate video materials. The approach
of these programmes could be varied to target viewers of certain age groups or levels
of education, making the message more tangible and appealing. For example, an entirely
different and more simplified approach would be more suited to young children. There
are, however, some reservations among religious conservatives regarding animated or
cartoon depictions of Islamic characters, symbols or prophets, which arise from their
conviction that these representations are degrading, blasphemous and deemed
inappropriate for religious education.
2.2.2. Sports Programmes
Sports programmes account for 5 % of the total STV output. Traditionally, Thursday
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afternoon, which is a holiday in Saudi Arabia, is the slot for 80 minutes of sports
programmes dominated by football matches, results and comments. Another show is a
weekly, 30-minute slot of American wrestling, broadcast late on Wednesday nights. For
years this programme has been accompanied by an Arabic commentary given by a
distinguished commentator in his own unique style. STV has always maintained live
transmission of key football matches from the three major national football tournaments;
The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques Premiership, the Saudi Football Federation
Cup and the Tournament of the Crown Prince Cup. There is also a weekly, half-hour
report on equestrian sports on Wednesday afternoons and a live transmission of a major
horse race on Friday afternoons during the season. Finally, Thursday mornings see the
transmission of 20 minutes of aerobics and stretching exercises which are designed to
involve the viewers at home.
Sports programming on STy has failed to reflect the enormous progress achieved in the
realm of actual sports activities in Saudi Arabia. Vigorous policies and support to clubs,
and the building of modern stadiums have yielded their fruit. Saudi Arabian teams in
various games have been competitive and successful participants in regional and
international sports events, but such successes have not inspired STV to develop and
enhance its sports programmes, neither in quantity nor quality. In general, the main
sports programme, that is, the 80 minutes on Thursday afternoons, is considered a very
long one. Besides, it places great emphasis on the studio based interviews with the
players, relies heavily on videos from previous weekend games and is lacking in analysis
and commentary. It is inferior both in topic content and artistic quality to the more
sophisticated and analytically rich sports programmes found on DBS channels. For
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example, most of the DBS channels produce daily sports news bulletins to report sports
news from all over the world. Other DBS channels are devoted entirely to sports, such
as ART2, which is keen on providing its subscribers with live coverage of football and
boxing matches among a wide variety of other sports. This coverage is accompanied by
more commentary and analysis than is currently found on STy.
2.2.3. Drama
Drama is one of the genres most shown by STy. As Table No.4 illustrates, in the period
under examination, more than 47% of ST y
 time was devoted to the transmission of
dramatic series; most of these being imports from Egypt (47%), Syria (27%), Kuwait
(18%), and Lebanon (7%). These are shown immediately after the nightly news bulletin,
which is considered to be the peak hour and prime time. This slot has always been
occupied by nightly episodes of imported drama series. There is an additional drama slot
after the final news bulletin at 12.30, when dramas from Egypt, Syria or Kuwait are
shown. STV programmers usually 'shoe-horn' clusters of adverts into the minutes before
and after the nightly dramas. Local drama is very scarce and local production is mostly
exhibited during the Ramadan month only. This is the month when many broadcasters
in the Arab world believe that television viewership reaches its peak, not only in Saudi
Arabia, but across all of the Arab states. This presumption has been questioned by some
observers. Patterns of exposure are apparently changing as people tend to spend
evening hours outdoors, in public cafes, in all-night markets or on family visits where the
television simply provides background noise.
Other forms of non-entertainment drama that can be seen on STV are the jointly
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produced development/directive programmes. Lasting between 2 and 5 minutes, these
programmes provide some advice and practical tips regarding health and safety issues.
In these few minutes, viewers are informed of the benefits of breast-feeding, or perhaps
urged not to litter, to keep their cities clean or are offered tips on road safety. Most of
these programmes are produced by the Gulf Countries Cooperation Council (GCC) Joint
Production Establishment and are the result of efforts by information ministers at the
GCC. The essential drawback of these programmes, and one that could undermine their
overall message and appeal, is the fact that they are produced in a standardised fashion;
there is a profound lack of creativity and alternative discourse; they are repetitive and
lack variation; and there is no policy to research or update the information. The viewer
is likely to dismiss these programmes as predictable and uninformative.
2.2.4. Variety Programmes or 'Magazines'
About 9.5% of STV programmes are of the magazine type, where the programme
consists of interviews with celebrities in show business, actors, singers and sportsmen,
and the showing of taped materials, such as excerpts from plays, series, films or songs
(see Table No.6). These programmes take on different forms, the most notable being a
show where viewers can make requests and direct their questions to the celebrity in the
studio. Viewers are invited to interview these guests by phone or fax, and to ask them
about their careers, prospective new shows, albums and plans. Ahia Alayaly or 'The
Sweetest Nights', produced by STV in its main studios in Riyadh, is one example of this
format and is shown for one hour a week. The interviews are interspersed with inserts
or videos which serve as 'breaks'. A variation on this is also seen in Shaksavat Wa
Arqa,n or 'Celebrities and Numbers', a 40-minute programme which also carries this
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format. The basic idea behind this show is for celebrities to be interviewed, and then to
have a quick chat with a 'guest' in a selected location outside the studio where they are
asked the following question: W'liat is your favourite number? The guest then tells the
interviewer their number and a video with the corresponding number is chosen from the
television library. The guest must then tell the viewers why this number is significant,
for example, it could be a birth date, a wedding date or simply a randomly chosen
figure. The presenter then asks the guests what they expect to be on the video tape
bearing this number, for example, it could be a song, a clip from a film, an old football
match, or endless other possibilities. The presenter is also a comedian and performs his
own act in the form of short monologues between the interviews.
2.2.5. Music and Songs
STV devotes only 1 .34% of its time to music and songs. This relatively low percentage
represents all music and songs which are independently broadcast, as opposed to inserts
within other programmes. Known primarily as 'national songs', they take the deeds and
accomplishments of the country's leaders as their subject matter and are often
accompanied by videos showing the country's modern developments, progress and
capabilities, such as industrial plants, hospitals, motorways and military equipment. Since
the ban placed on female singers in 1981, these songs have been performed by male
singers only.
A second music progranime on STy is called Ma Yatlboho Almushahidoon or 'Viewers'
Requests'. A weekly, 40-minute programme, its basic idea, as the title suggests, is to
invite viewers to write or fax requests for their favourite songs, albeit from a selection
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already chosen by the producer. These 'requests' are then dedicated to relatives or
friends. There are an average of four songs in each programme. The presenter reads
some of the viewers' names, while additional names are seen on a generic line at the
bottom of the screen as the song is played. Unlike the songs that are commonly played
on DBS channels, STV is forbidden to show female dancers or singers, especially Saudi
nationals. In addition, special versions of certain songs are produced to take into account
the STy censorship rules and are usually commensurate in quality with the low price
which STy offers (see chapters VII and TX).
2.2.6. Talk Shows
Chat shows account for about 5% of STV output, as illustrated in Table No.6. At
present, Dayf Aishasha or 'The Guest of the Screen' and Wajhan Lewajh or 'Face to
Face' are two talk shows scheduled on a weekly basis. The former is based around an
interview with a guest, either in his own residence or in the studio, and is a pre-recorded
show of 45 minutes, while 'Face to Face' is a live, 55-minute show in which viewers can
direct relevant comments or questions by phone or fax to a panel; the questions relate
to a specific topic, usually social. Both of these programmes are STy productions.
Another item in this category is entitled Almamlaka Fi Ayoon Alaalm or 'The Kingdom
in the Eyes of the World' - a weekly, 30-minute panel discussion, in which a number of
journalists engage in an exchange regarding a certain aspect of the country's foreign
policies or its relations with other countries. The panellists usually concentrate on
positive national and international media coverage of Saudi Arabia and its leaders. In
this type of programme, tightly organised ranks of participants sit around a table and
engage in a discussion which is strictly controlled by a host, who directs the exchange
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towards carefully selected areas. In general, talk shows on STy eschew the immediate
burning issues and deal with non-controversial or so-called 'safe' topics with an approach
that overtly emphasises the positive aspects only.
Table No.6 Weekly programme percentage by genre:
DAY'::::.	 S8thrday:'	 Sunday'	 Monday'	 Tuesday	 : 4ediiesday	 'Thursday	 Friday	 ' Mean "	 STOEY
GENRE '	,	 ,,	 '	 '	 ''	 ,	 ,	 •':'	 ,,':	 ,:',:":	 '	 ,	 :	 '	 :	 "	 ",'
Religious	 6.46	 4.53	 7.34	 5.15	 6.55	 2.85	 21.54	 7.86	 6.21
'Sport	 , ,	 0.00	 0.00	 2.49	 3.84	 3.46	 13.70	 11.26	 4.96	 5.40
Draise' , ,
	
32.32	 32.62	 32.17	 31.20	 35.11	 19.40	 13.83	 28.18	 8.15
'Children	 ' 15.12	 16.25	 9.83	 10.36	 7.66	 12.62	 8.89	 11.53	 3.23
News	 13.17	 17.04	 15.07	 16.15	 16.56	 17.91	 28.06	 17.79	 4.79
Developeient , 	 1.95	 12.38	 6.68	 6.27	 12.24	 13.42	 2.56	 7.63	 5.02
Docurlerltary,:	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00
'Variety '	 '	 14.63	 5.6	 8	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 11.66	 9.49	 4.23
Music , ,'' :
	
0.00	 1.86	 2.49	 1.92	 0.00	 0.95	 2.17	 1.34	 1.03
Cultural	 ,	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 8.70	 0.00	 8.28	 0.00	 2.43	 4.14
Eduetlon ' , 3.66
	
5.46	 5.77	 4.86	 2.97	 0.00	 0.00	 3.25	 2.42
12.68	 0.00	 6.55	 7.41	 3.58	 6.38	 0.00	 5.23	 4.49
Womeo ,:
	 ' :	 0	 4	 3	 2.9	 6.4	 4.4	 0.00	 2.95	 2.15
TOIAL:	 :	 99.99	 99.99	 100	 100	 100	 100	 99.98	 99.99	 51.26
Source: Table contents were calculated from STY Channel 1 programme cycle for
Autumn, 1997 (Appendix C).
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3. Content Analysis - Qualitative Presentation
3.1. Introduction
For organisational purposes, STV output is categorised and analysed under the following
main groups: Children's programmes; News Programmes; and Entertainment. The
programmes are analysed in relation to their conformity to the Saudi Media Information
Policy, and whether it satisfies the preferences of or offends the Saudi television
audience. Following this there is an examination of the alternatives available and the
implications of this for STy.
3.2. Children's Programmes
STy output of children's programmes can be examined from a number of perspectives,
these include the educational value of their content - especially considering the lack of
other educational resources in Saudi Arabia; and their suitability for various age groups.
3.2.1. Sources of Children's Education in Saudi Arabia
Due to the complex nature of child psychology and the numerous influences on child
behaviour, the effect of television on children is one of the most vehemently debated
areas among media scholars. Despite the important presence of television in the lives
of youngsters, there are always other influential factors, such as peer pressure, school
teachers and parents, which are believed to affect children's behaviour and attitudes.
There is some agreement among scholars regarding the importance of television as an
education and entertainment medium (Home, 1993; McQuail, 1987). According to M.
Ayish, a leading mediologist and academic from the UAE, children's programmes suffer
from a lack of good writers who understand children's psychology. He believes that
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television authorities in the Gulf countries do not devote enough attention or proper
consideration to the importance of these programmes. The results are that many
programmes are cheaply made, based on little creative effort, and their main goal is to
entertain as opposed to enhance the children's (or viewers') knowledge (Ayish, 1994).
This factor is especially significant when one considers the dearth of other educational
resources in Saudi Arabia, particularly in non-urban areas.
Schoo's, which should provide for a major part of children's educational and social
needs, have not been sufficiently developed to function as social institutions, rather, they
act as places where youngsters learn how to read and write, and little else. Under
continuous pressure on government spending, as demonstrated by the ever-growing need
for more schools to be built to keep up with the increasing population, the idea of
having proper playgrounds, gymnasiums or swimming pools built is considered an
unnecessary luxury.
Children's cinema and theatre are absent from Saudi cultural life, even within extra-
curricular activities. Children in rural or less advantaged areas are deprived of these, as
well as of sports facilities, parks and safe playing spaces; the few recreational areas that
exist are operated as business franchises and are centralised in major urban regions
leaving towns and villages without any outdoor leisure facilities. Television, therefore,
has a particular prominence as an educational resource in this society, yet is not being
exploited to its full capacity.
This problem is compounded by a lamentable dearth of children's books on the Saudi
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literary market. The print media targeted at children chiefly consists of Arabic versions
or translations of well-known magazines and story books, such as Batman or Superman.
Hassan had been the only Saudi magazine published for children until it ceased
publication some years ago; Ashibi ('Youth'), Basem (the name of a character) and
Arrow are three other struggling magazines. Publishing for young readers is part of a
more complicated and profound phenomenon in Saudi society, based in economic and
cultural issues. Reading as a habit has not met with enough encouragement among Saudi
Arabia's young nor among its adults. It is apparent that Saudi society has leapt forward
to the electronic age without dwelling in its predecessor - the print age. In today's
societies, children do not only have unlimited access to conventional sources of
knowledge such as printed texts, but also have increasing access to Internet-linked
computers, from where information on any imaginable subject can be readily retrieved
from Websites. The Internet is due to be aailable in Saudi Arabia in 1999, but still faces
a number of obstacles pertaining to methods of censorship and the policing of Web
content. Meanwhile, access to computers by youngsters at schools is still, for many, just
a hope.
According to the 1992 census, the Kingdom's total population is 16,929,294.The number
of Saudis is 12,304,832,comprising 72% of the total popula lion. It is estimated that half
of those Saudis are under 16 years of age (Statistical Yearbook, 1994). This means that
the young population is around 6 million. As the following analysis demonstrates, this
statistical fact has not been recognised or appreciated by the broadcast media in the
form of specially planned and designed indigenous television programmes.
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3.2.2. Description of STV Children's Programmes
Saudi television exhibits three types of children's programmes: locally-produced in-house
shows; a joint production, and imported cartoons (see Table No.7).
Table No.7 Children's programmes on STY Channel 1:
	
PROGRAMME ORIGIN	 TOTAL MINUTES
	
Local	 57	 9
I: :
	 	 1	 111	 17.70
	
Foreign	 459	 73 2
Source: Table contents based on STY offerings during the 2nd week of March,
1997 (Appendix C).
Locally Produced Shows
As Table No.7 shows, 9% of children's programmes are indigenous productions. They
consist of two, weekly, 30-minute programmes called Baraem ('Blossoms') and Multaqa
Al-A (fal ('Kids Get Together'). These are STy in-house, studio-based productions,
usually produced by one of the main STy branches based in Riyadh, Jeddah, Madinah,
Dammam and Qasiem in rotation. The basic idea of the show is to gather a number of
participating children of all ages - from pre-schoolers to early teenagers - in one of the
studios, together with a host/presenter. The latter is usually a female, part-time, free-
lancer, with a background in the teaching profession, and she presents the show with a
younger co-host selected from among the children themselves. The show does not follow
a strict format, but a typical episode comprises a combination of games, quizzes and
competitions in which the childrenlaudience participate and win prizes. A considerable
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part of the show is topic-based and consists of the giving of directions and advice to
youngsters on issues related to social etiquette and positive behaviour at home and in
school. Other relevant issues such as road-safety and educational hints are also dealt
with. Such advice is relayed to the audience by the show's host in an authoritarian,
teacher-pupil setting. The programme occasionally contains a number of choral songs
performed by trained child volunteers, usually accompanied by a musical instrument such
as a keyboard. It also includes some video shots pertaining to the subject matter of the
songs.
Although in description these programmes are apparently appropriate and child-centred,
they do have major failings. Multaqaa Al-Aifal was designed to involve a young studio
audience and to encourage them to participate in playing the games and to answer
questions for prizes. In fact, the huge number of children confmed in the small area of
a studio - normally more than forty or fifty - creates a chaotic atmosphere which does
not prove conducive to constructive participation. In addition, a topic of potential
relevance will suddenly give place to a rather obtuse propagandistic report about one
of the governments developmental achievements. These reports are dry in presentation
and unaccompanied by visual aids, materials or footage, rendering their content
unsuitable and inappropriate for a programme designed to entertain children. For
example, in one of the episodes during the period under investigation there is a visit to
a doctor's surgery; disregarding the educational potential of such a visit, the doctor will
launch into a speech praising the generosity of the government. A further example of
unsuitability of message can be seen in the featuring of an item directed at young
viewers regarding the importance of immunisation. In general, such programmes are
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rudimentary and inferior in quality and discourse to DBS output to which Saudi children
could readily be exposed. This is especially true of those channels devoted to youngsters,
such as ART3, Nickleodeon, and others, that incorporate a wide range of appealing
characters, puppets and animations, which are liked by children and attract them.
Co-productions
One programme that does deserve recognition is a co-produced children's programme,
a brainchild of the Gulf Countries Cooperation Council (GCC) in the eighties, with
technical support provided by a New York based, specialist production firm called CTW
- Children's Television Workshop. Originally this 30-minute Arabic version of the famous
American production Sesame Street was entitled Open Sesame, but it has recently been
renamed Ifiah Ya Watani Aboabak or 'Open your Doors my Country!' This programme,
with its appropriate title, the clever application of puppets and its simple dialogue and
the use of music and songs, was initially aimed at pre-schoolers, and has grown in
popularity among generations of children. But still, despite its educational value and
success, this venture has met with criticism on a number of grounds; it is accused of
dealing with generalities which do not necessarily pertain to the requirements of Saudi
children while its Western slant does not integrate any Islamic values in its fabric
(Dosooqui, 1984).
Cartoons
Of the 11 .5% of STV's output targeted at children, as illustrated in Table No.6, 73% of
all children's programmes on STy are imported, animated cartoons, originating from the
United States (80%) and Japan (11 %). Since the inception of STy, cartoons have been
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a constant programme type throughout the history of Saudi television, while Hollywood
animated productions made in the 1980s have occupied a significant amount of the time
allocated to children's programmes. In the period under investigation in this study, STV
exhibited a daily amount of about one hour of American cartoons, featuring famous
characters such as Bugs Bunny, Popeye and Tom and Jerry. On a daily basis,
immediately following the start of transmission, cartoons take over and are shown for
another 35 to 40 minutes during the early afternoon. These cartoons are almost always
telecast in their original language, that is, English, without translation, dubbing or
comment, and are the only programmes in English to be shown on Channel 1. They are
rarely part of another programme, nor are they accompanied by any comments in Arabic
before or after their transmission. Such cartoons contain a fair amount of gratuitous
violence and reflect the values of their country of origin. In addition to these foreign
imports, there is a Japanese cartoon production entitled Yanabi Almarifah or 'Springs
of Knowledge'. This particular programme is featured in the afternoon and is dubbed
into Arabic. As its name suggests, this show consists of posed questions regarding
discoveries, nature, animals, and so forth, and through narrative form accompanied by
visual animations, it provides all the answers.
3.2.4. Comparison with DBS Alternatives
The failings of STV to cater for young viewers are accentuated by the growing number
of DBS channels, such as Nickelodeon, Disney channel, ART3 and Teletoon. Although
these channels show more sophisticated and appealing productions, continual exposure
to such shows has, in fact, raised the demands and expectations of young viewers, so that
when they compare what they watch on satellite television with what is available on STV
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they soon reject the local transmissions. The impact of imported cartoons on Saudi
society is evident in the fact that as a consequence of the relentless promotion of the US
cartoon culture, a Warner Brothers store recently opened in Jeddah - the product of a
joint enterprise with a Saudi company. The store specialises in the sale and promotion
of around 7,200 products pertaining to American cartoon characters and is the first
branch to be opened by Warner Brothers in the Middle East. Since then, other branches
opened in various areas of the Gulf region, such as Kuwait, Babrain and Dubai. 2
 This
is just one of the ways in which dependence on foreign programming is pervading other
areas of Saudi society, as discussed in chapter II.
Satellite television has little concern, if any, regarding watershed boundaries, nor with
the suitability of televised material to children at all. It is now commonplace for children
to stay up and watch satellite television until well after midnight. There has also been
a marked increase in the number of children watching adult movies or Mexican and
Brazilian dubbed soaps, which are scheduled at inappropriate times on DBS channels.
Weak parental supervision and the lack of control over television viewing are negative
factors which are increasing at an alarming rate. Children are often not prevented from
being exposed at all hours to violent scenes and a contradictory mix of messages
inconsistent with Saudi values systems, as described in chapter j3
Finally, there is concern among media scholars and child welfare groups in the Arab
countries regarding the new trend of dubbing cartoon animations imported from the Far
East and the West. According to the outcome of a specialised symposium held in Cairo
to discuss writing for the young and future prospects, the situation now is like 'pollution'.
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This refers to the flood of cartoon shows containing behaviour and conveying messages
that, Islamists and culturalists believe, contradict Saudi values and undermine local
culture, and which are believed by some researchers to have a profoundly negative
impact on our children.4
Nevertheless, among the plethora of inferior options there are a number of
commendable productions which attract interest in alternative offerings, and in DBS in
particular. Recognising the difficulty in sustaining the young viewer's concentration and
interest for the duration of a full 30-minute broadcast, certain shows have tried to
encourage a sense of involvement. These programmes, which invite young viewers to
participate and to express themselves, either in the studio or at home, have proved to
be extremely popular. Certain satellite television programmes, such as ART3 's Asdiqaa
Farah Wa Marah ('Friends of Farah and Marah'), and LBC's Kayf Wa Laysh ('How and
Why') allow and encourage young viewers' involvement and participation, over the
phone in the case of the former, and in the studio in the case of the latter.
In addition, there are other examples of quality Arab productions. Jordanian Production
is a leader in this field and is renowned for its quality. Shows, such as a joint production
by Jordanian TV and CTW called Almanahil ('The Springs') with their educational and
entertainment values take into account the developmental needs of young viewers.5
STY, as a result of political differences with Jordan, has implemented an undeclared
boycott on Jordanian productions. The consequence of this is a dearth of Arabic
children's shows and a continuous dependency on imported American-made cartoons.
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3.2.5. The Audience's Perspective and the Implications for STY
With the current inferior quality of standards caused by various constraints, as discussed
in chapters VIl-IX, children and youth are not satisfied with so-called children's
programmes, and it is safe to suggest that there has been a sharp decline in the
viewership of these programmes among many children in Saudi Arabia. The lack or total
absence of other forms of leisure or entertainment means that children spend more time
at home, increasing the likelihood of their watching television. With the scarcity of
quality programmes on STy, children and their families are deprived of constructive and
entertaining viewing time.
Children's opinions regarding programmes are invariably ignored by broadcasters. The
idea that STV might conduct regular research studies among all age groups to identify
viewers' preferences is remote. In an opinion poll conducted by TV Magazine among
young viewers in different countries in the Arab world, the majority of children said that
they were dissatisfied with what is being offered on Arabic satellite and national
television. Furthermore, children in Syria, Egypt and Jordan were not happy with 'the
way programme producers are treating them'. A great number of the children surveyed
could not fmd programmes suitable for their age and interests. A common feature of
children's programmes on Saudi television is that they tend to ignore age differences
among their viewers. Pre-school children, for instance, need certain subjects and agendas
to help prepare them for school and need to have these conveyed to them in a more
direct and simple way. Use of computer-generated graphics and characters would add
to the interest value of the programmes, as would further use of puppets, or songs and
music which occupy special places in the hearts and minds of young children. Older
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children, on the other hand, require more stimulating and thought-provoking subject
matter, but the heavy use of cartoons, which are cheap to buy, has squeezed out many
factual and drama programmes more suitable to an older age group. As one put it: 'They
insult our intelligence' when referring to the banality and lack of variation in topics in
the context of national and satellite television. The poll has shown that many young
viewers are tired of cartoon shows and would prefer factual programmes, dramas or
game shows. 6 Very few children's programmes and films have proved successful and this
is demonstrated by the fact that in television and film festivals, the prize in the children's
programmes category is usually withheld. There are no outstanding works to be
rewarded and this was apparent in the Children's Film Festival held in Cairo in 1997,
and in the 4th Gulf Television Production Festival held in Bahrain in March, 1 997•7
The Saudi Media Policy clearly stipulates the guidelines for informative, watchable
programmes which would be educational and entertaining. A successful informative
programme can provide young people with valuable impetus and the necessary
guidelines to demonstrate how they can effectively and productively utilise their leisure
time. Such productions would have the potential to generate new hobbies, broaden the
children's range of reading material and kindle interests which may become important
and satisfying pursuits in years to come.
However, young viewers are still treated marginally, the policy is not translated into
action and the result is a plethora of imported, cheap programming which, while
economically more viable, does little to develop local production of quality to compete
with foreign imports.
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3.3. News Programmes
In Saudi Arabia about 45 % of the domestic audience is literate whilst more than 90 %
of Saudi homes have radio and/or television sets (Nyrop et a!, 1982). As a consequence,
Saudi broadcasting has great potential for disseminating news and information to a large
number of people. Newscasts on Saudi television have been the subject of academic
studies in the past. Douglas A. Boyd, in his Ph.D. thesis on Saudi television, penned in
1972, provided a general descriptive account of the news programmes at that time
without actually analyzing the content. Other Saudi scholars, such as Aiharithi in 1983
and Najai in 1982, followed suit. Later, in a study by Jerry Hudson and Steve Swindel
which was published in 1988, the authors concerned themselves with news story subject
and story origination in news programmes presented by the Second Channel - which
broadcasts in English. But they totally ignored Channel 1 news programmes. According
to the previous studies mentioned above, Saudi television has 17% to 20% of its output
devoted to news programmes (Bait Almal and Ibrahim, 1994:351).
News programmes currently amount to 18 % of the total STy output. There are three
news bulletins at 3:00pm, 9:30pm and 12:30am, and three five-minute 'News-in-Brier
slots in the daily schedule every weekday, except for Thursdays and Fridays, while at the
weekend there is a news programme called 'the Televised Newspaper' or Aijareeda
Almuswara. In addition, everyday except for Saturday sees the transmission of another
news programme called Mm Arjaa Aiwatan or 'From all Parts of the Nation' which
barely differs from the former. Both programmes focus on the local scene and are
composed of news reports from different cities in the Kingdom concerning government
officials and government agencies and activities in these localities. An additional weekly,
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25-minute programme called 'The Event of the Week' or Hadath Alesbu is, in essence,
a re-reading of the main news stories broadcast in the news bulletins during that
particular week, without any commentary or analysis.
The three newscasts each commence with the main news, succeeded by news from
sources of local origin. Saudi television has an obligation to protect and maintain the
status quo, which explains why it is that ceremonial news about government officials
and/or members of the Saudi royal family have priority over the local news. There is
no set length for the newscasts but they range from 30 to 45 minutes and could reach
a maximum of 75 minutes depending on the length of 'local' stories. According to what
the Glasgow Media Group (1980) calls 'viewers' maxims', it is understood that the items
which are featured first on television news are the most important and that, generally,
items receiving more time are also more important (McQuail, 1994:272).
Their findings can be related to Saudi news reports where the position or rank in
government of the subject of the report is, self-evidently, a factor determining the
positioning of the news item in the schedule. News involving the King is invariably
transmitted first, followed by items about the Crown Prince, and then by the Second
Deputy, the Minister of Defence and Aviation. Only later comes news pertaining to
those other princes who are the governors of the main provinces in the country. These
are followed by other reports concerning relatively minor government officials and
ministers. The daily activities of the King and the Crown Prince constitute some 40% of
the local news stories screened. in fact, Hudson and Swindel (1988: 1005) in their study,
found that 23 % of the Saudi stories focused on the royal family. In the international
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news section, Arab heads of state are prioritised, followed by news from the Islamic
world and Western and Eastern Europe, succeeded by news from developing countries.
Bait-Almal and Ibrahim (1994), found that 55.8 % of all news stories they analyzed were
political. In the present study, almost 59.7% of the stories were political news, with
nature and violence, accidents and disasters amounting to 8 %, economic news
constituting 5 % and science and technology 4%. The Palestinian question and the peace
process were given priority over other stories in almost all news bulletins.
3.3.1. Results and Discussion
In this particular research the main focus is the discussion and investigation of the
overall Saudi television performance in the light of Saudi Arabia's declared policy on
Communication and Information. Therefore, the totality of the news programme analysis
should be examined as an integral part of the overall discussion and evaluation of Saudi
television performance. Content analysis was selected as the most apt method of
qualitative research for the purposes of this study. The content of the main nightly
newscasts presented by Saudi Channel 1 for the week Saturday 8.3.1997 to Friday
14.3.1997was video-taped at 9:30p.m. and at 12:30 a.m.The units of analysis consisted
of news story subject and news story origination. Several traditionally accepted
definitions of what makes news indicate that the following qualities should be present:
it must be circulated as quickly as possible after the event, be of wide interest, contain
information which the audience has not received before, represent a departure from the
everyday pattern of life and contain information that is useful in reaching decisions.
(MacBride eta!, 1980:156)
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News, according to Denis McQuail (1987), '[...] is the core activity according to which
a large part of the journalistic profession defines itself'. News programming has become
part of the culture of every society which embraces television, as well as a vital source
of information for many audiences (McQuail, 1987:203).
'If individuals are to play their part as responsible citizens in the
community at the local, national and even international level, they must
be adequately informed, possessing sufficient facts on which to base
rational judgements and select courses of action. A full understanding of
the events and issues which affect individuals can be attained only by the
simultaneous supply of a variety, even controversial if necessary, of
background data, information and facts.' (MacBride et al, 1980:156)
All in all, the judgement must be based on the value of the news story, its significance
in social, economic or political or human terms, and its likely interest to the audience
(Hetherington, 1985). Although these criteria are usually applied in determining what
is 'news' ,it is argued that the criteria vary according to the needs and cultural perception
of different societies. In this study, the content of the news items and their order and
prominence in the newscast were looked at as an indication of news priority and
newsworthiness attributed to news items by Saudi television.
Evaluation of the Quality of News Reportage
There is an old English saying that 'No news is good news'. The converse, that 'any news
is necessarily bad news', may not be universally true but, unfortunately, if one is
evaluating production values in Saudi Arabia, that tends to be the case. Quality counts,
and it may be inappropriate to evaluate the output merely on the basis of statistics which
might be misleading if taken out of context. Nevertheless, around 50% of newscasts are
devoted to news related to government officials and such statistics are self-explanatory.
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During the ceremonial news, which relates to governmental officials' receptions and
departures, there is invariably a lengthy video depicting the event accompanied by
orchestras and symphonic music. These videos are churned out for what seems an
interminable period (but is typically 'just' 7 to 10 minutes) without a spoken word from
the anchor. This a practice which, apart from failing on an elementary elucidatory level,
detracts from the programme's potential impetus and continuity. In his book Amusing
Ourselves to Death, Postman (1994) asks:
'What has music to do with news'? It is there for the same reason music is
used in the theatre and films to create a mode for entertainment. If there
were no music, as in the case when any television program is interrupted
for a news flash viewers would expect something truly alarming. But as
long as the music is there, the viewer is comfortable in believing that there
is nothing to be greatly alarmed about.' (Postman, 1994:130)
When Saudi news reportage is analyzed in relation to these news theories a number of
arguments for improvement or even radical reform are raised, and flaws are revealed.
After years of total dependence on ready-made news stories fed to Saudi Arabia by
news agencies and other television channels, Saudi television has come to realise during
the late 1 990s that its news reports must be independently compiled away from foreign
sources and influences whilst employing its own reporters. In this author's opinion, this
is a crucial development, despite the fact that the reporters who work for Saudi
television are usually freelancers and not Saudi nationals, and that they work as part-
timers. At present, Saudi television has 16 diverse correspondents in different countries
who can and do supply it with 70% of its news programme (Habib, 1997). The 'stringers'
or itinerant reporters working for Saudi television are usually Arab expatriates with a
journalistic background and their main task is to provide taped vocal narrative
accompanying the video footage. Rarely do they conduct interviews or provide live
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reports. Technical assistance to feed these reports is provided by World Television News,
which also receives the reports at its base in London and then relays them to Saudi
television (Habib, 1997).
In addition, there are other general characteristics of note. Most of the Saudi television
news is official and supplied by the government via spokespersons, press releases, etc.
Saudi television has not exerted any noticeable effort in the pursuit of news stories. It
simply takes and repackages what is already in the news domain. In doing so, STV
allows foreign sources of news to dictate their decisions regarding newsworthiness
instead of applying a home-grown, indigenous editorial policy.
Besides such shortcomings, news stories from Muslim and Arab countries are frequently
not accorded the attention their importance deserves. A small proportion of stories, 9.7%
in fact, originate from elsewhere within the Islamic world and include national disaster
news from Iran and Pakistan. This is a clear indication that the news exchange amongst
Islamic countries is rather minimal; a situation which is inconsistent with the Saudi
communication policy and that of Muslim and Arab countries as declared after each
conference (Arab States Broadcasting Union, 1995). As Attieb Saleh (1984), an Arab
writer and culturalist puts it: '[...]we know much about skiing resorts in Switzerland and
we know about a fire outbreak in Texas but we know very little about our neighbours. ..'
(Saleh, 1984:140). Even when there is a major news story, the coverage is still marginal.
On one day of the week under investigation in this study (Saturday, 8.3.97) there was
a story about a major earthquake which struck parts of Iran. Despite the immense loss
of human life and the magnitude of the destruction which left thousands of villagers
205
homeless, Saudi television scheduled this as the 21 St item in the main news bulletin with
mere seconds of aerial views of the massive devastation, preceded by trials, visits,
political turmoil in Albania and other news stories. The reading of a cable of
condolences sent by the King and another by Crown Prince to the Iranian leaders were
the first and second news items, respectively, in the programme. Meanwhile, an item
from Southern Lebanon concerning Israeli air-raids and shelling of small townships,
made 18th place because it was a little more graphic and exciting. This is the kind of
practice which may undermine perceptions of professionalism in broadcasting. The lack
of consistency and unswerving allegiance to the credibility of any medium which happens
to provide information runs counter to the process of getting the facts right in every
circumstance. The desire to air the truth is, of course, a fundamental journalistic
principle, yet, in Saudi Arabia the media - whether one looks at print or broadcasting -
fall short of this goal. Many of its staff are well aware that their work lacks credibility
because it cannot be construed as either impartial or objective. In a study complied by
this author in 1991, 38 % of Saudi media practitioners believed that Saudi media suffers
a credibility problem, a result of restrictively compiled reports (Al-Garth, 1991:83). This
is especially true when Saudi itself features centrally in international news, and several
examples illustrate this rather effectively.
A prime example in the local domestic arena concerns the event in 1979, described
previously, when a group of fanatics occupied the Holy Mosque in Makkah for 15 days.
For days the authorities hesitated over whether to announce the incident or not. As a
consequence of this trepidation, foreign news media, such as BBC radio, reported the
happenings before the Saudi media. This particular incident had far-reaching
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implications on Saudi information policy and resulted in the formulation of the existing
information policy (see Appendix B). The duty to inform the audience in the domestic
arena of political, social, economic and criminal news, and even accidents, many of
which affect viewers directly, vies with overseas stories which bear less immediate
relevance. Even after the adoption of the current media policy, on the domestic level
STy is barred from broadcasting news about accidents and crime. Nor is it permitted to
report any damage or loss caused by natural calamities. There have been numerous
occasions when torrential rain and flooding have caused substantial destruction to parts
of the country where villages are isolated and bridges and trunk roads have been swept
away. STV crew have not been allowed by local authorities to provide either coverage
of the Civil Defence rescue operations or reports of the damage visible in the aftermath.
Ironically, the print media have been there and have reported the stories over the
subsequent days.
The second example was an incident which had great significance and far-reaching
implications on Saudi's information policy. It took STV two days to announce the
invasion of Kuwait in 1991, and then the STV was used simply to relay CNN's coverage.
Some, if not most, of Saudi's media at that time hardly played a significant role in
informing and explaining to the local Saudi audience what was happening along their
own borders (Mustafa, 1997).
A third and rather more recent example is the civil war in Yemen, which lies at the
Southern end of Saudi Arabia. In 1996 the Yemen army was engaged for several weeks
in a war against Southern separatists who were, as their name implies, resisting the
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unification of their country. Although it is true that this was strictly an internal Yemeni
affair, it was hard to ignore because of the proximity and the possible, if not probable,
consequences of the event. Political differences between the Saudi government and that
of Yemen as a consequence of Yemen's position during the Gulf war in 1991 presumably
played a role in this wilful blindness. Again, foreign news media were there, and this
time with Arabic satellite channels. The news story about the collapse of the Soviet
Union was broadcast by STV as the 5th item after local and national news (Ashobaili,
1997) 8
These examples of restricted content, inadequate technical support, delays in reportage
and poor coverage of significant events demonstrate how the Saudi media has repeatedly
faltered in its duty to provide impartial and informative reportage of events that occur
either locally or externally, and this has subsequently increased the preference for
foreign news media.
3.3.2. Local News Reporting
On a local level, news bulletins, documentaries, current affairs and discussion
programmes provide an essential forum for public debate, without which the general
public would be ill-equipped to participate in shaping its destiny. News programmes in
Saudi television usually eschew the immediate burning issues and deal with what could
be named the 'safe topics' or the noncontroversial local issues. This practice has helped
promote a false impression that Saudi society is a 'perfect' one with no addressable
issues, thus leaving the Saudi audience easy prey for foreign news media, which can be
accused of sugar-coating its propaganda and presenting it as 'objective' news reporting
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(Ashobalili, 1992:45). The key failure of Saudi television news is that it has failed to
make what professionals would consider to be an elementary distinction between fact
and opinion; what is a factual news item and what is the official opinion of the
government. Were news programmers equipped to make this distinction, their output
would be more able to fulfil their viewers' rightful need to know and at the same time
they would be able as professionals to remain faithful to their inherited, but hard-to-
discharge, obligations to maintain the status quo.
What the viewers therefore receive in the form of news is essentially a main nightly
news bulletin which is possibly stalled for several minutes while its anchor team awaits
the outcome of a regular routine meeting of cabinet ministers. In addition, it is common
for reports on official visits to be spun out for as long as 20 minutes. As Ashobaili (1992)
observes, in most of the Arab broadcasting media, a typical news story regarding a visit
by an official will be more concerned with the ceremony and the formality of the visit,
preoccupied with such trivia as when the official is scheduled to arrive and who is to
accompany him, who met him at the airport, and the invariably 'warm' welcome he
received. If anything else is deemed worthy of mention, it is wrapped in banal and
redundant expressions such as 'bilateral relations between the two nations were
discussed' or 'this visit was successful and the dialogue was constructive' (Ashobaili,
1992:45). STV's news programmes contain a great deal of foreign news but there has not
been an attempt to put it in context as to how it would affect its viewers. This type of
coverage understandably incites the local populace to seek more substance-orientated
coverage with details and explanations as one has come to expect from the foreign news
media. Saudis cannot expect live interviews in their programmes, something which
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citizens everywhere enjoy as a right, and must instead make do with slides and pre-
recorded video material as the only visual aid. Nor are there such things as computerised
graphics, maps or charts to enhance reportage, only pre-recorded materials which are fed
by satellite or via microwave link.
SW newscasts lack certain features seen in modern news formats. There are no 'off the
beaten track' or general human interest stories included. Close to the end of the
programme, there is usually a 'news belt' of short items and less important stories. All
this is presented in too formal an atmosphere. Thus, further criticism can be aimed at
the news reader's presentation which, across the board, far from being punchy and
dynamic in its style, is ingrainedly official and po-faced. There appears to be no
intimation that underlying their frosty veneer is a capacity to deal with a soft, fluffy and
touchy-feely human interest story at the end of the programme, for example. No doubt
the pervading belief is that such a departure would tarnish the credibility and
respectability of the service, though in truth the converse is more likely to be the case.
The news bulletin is often read as if it were intended for radio medium as opposed to
a television audience in terms of tone, style, eye contact of the anchors, and the
synchronisation of video footage. Considering these shortcomings, Saudi television news
programmes have, nevertheless, made good use of video footage to complement news
items, both domestic and imported, in the period under investigation, statistics show that
more than 80% of news stones were accompanied by video. However, there were
problems such as the wrong use of captions, and negligence in the accurate labelling of
used footage, such as 'recent pictures', 'archive pictures', etc.
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The unsatiated need for news and information by local audiences is, in fact, the
commercial logic underpinning the thriving of foreign news media in the region,
facilitated by both radio and satellite television. The proliferation of satellite television
channels represents a significant addition to the amount of broadcast journalism
available to Saudi viewers.
A recent entry to the news market is Aljazirah - a satellite broadcasting channel
currently just over two years old, based in Qatar. This channel is a replacement for the
BBC's Arabic Television Service, which used to be part of Orbit Television Network
(Orbit Communications), and was cancelled on 21st of April, 1996, as a result of an
editorial dispute (see BBC news release, Appendix E). Aljazirah's service has seen
considerable success and a growth in popularity amongst viewers in the Arab world and
in Europe, based as it is on what is largely a compilation of news, current affairs and
documentaries. It broadcasts on ARABSAT All to the Middle East and North Africa,
and on EUTELSAT II and HOTBIRD 3 to North Africa and Europe, and on Echostar
to the US from February, 1999. It is also available on cable systems in a number of Arab
and European countries. What is significant about Aljazirah's service is its high standard
of professional news and methods of investigative journalism, qualities which had been
confined to Western media in the past. Another important breakthrough is that Aljazirah
has managed to establish and maintain a good relationship with Israeli politicians and
journalists, who have been interviewed on the programmes numerous times -a
phenomenon which has never happened in any Arab news media in the past. Aljazirah's
treatment of news has not been welcomed by certain Arab regimes; Kuwait, Bahrain,
Morocco, Jordan and others have all expressed their displeasure with the way in which
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they are treated in Aljazirah's taboo-breaking news and current affairs programmes. In
a recent development, the Jordanian government asked Aljazirah to cease operations in
Jordan and to close its bureau in Amman after an interview with a Syrian researcher
who landed an attack on the Jordanian government's position regarding the Arab-Israeli
conflict. The programme had in fact, in fairness, interviewed the last Jordanian Minister
of Foreign Affairs in order to allow him to respond. Qatar, the host country, who, in a
recent move abolished the Ministry of Information altogether, has always endeavoured
to nurture and maintain Aljazirah's independence.
3.3.3. The Challenge of Foreign News
When trend shifts in popularity of certain news media are considered, it is evident that
STy needs to radically improve its newscasting service to stave off the competition.
There is a long tradition of Arabs listening to radio broadcasts from the West and
numerous surveys have documented that Saudis are avid listeners to Arabic broadcasts
of British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Voice of America (VOA), and Radio Monte
Carlo Middle East (RMCME). Arabic is second only to English as the most used
international radio broadcasting language (see Boyd, 1998; A1-Oofy, 1994). This tradition
assumed another form with the advent of satellite as the new mode of delivery to
television signals. CNN - Cable News Network - has gained important prominence in the
region since its extensive coverage of the 2nd Gulf war in 1991. It subsequently became
one of the main sources of news among Saudi viewers in general and among the elite
in particular. In a study conducted by Ayman Habib (1997), CNN was rated higher than
all foreign news media. 56% of Saudi television personnel working in news departments
stated that they rely on CNN as a main news source, followed by MBC - Middle East
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Broadcasting Centre - at 32%, while the BBC is rated third highest with 16% (Habib,
1997). If Saudi news broadcasting intends to retain or increase its audience, a radical
overhaul is required in the production areas mentioned above.
The Gulf region takes third place after Europe and South Africa in the BBC's World
Service television coverage. The BBC broadcasts on the PANAM4 satellite system and
is available on cable systems in Dubai and Qatar, and on terrestrial Babrain
transmission, which can be received in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia. Euronews
started to broadcast in Arabic to the Middle East and North Africa on EUTELSAT II
Ni on 15th of April, 1997. According to its Arabic Service director, Euronews is now
watched by 86 million viewers throughout Europe and in the Mediterranean area.
ANN (Arab News Network) is the latest addition. A satellite delivered news service
broadcasting from London, the network is owned by a Syrian business entrepreneur close
to Asad, president of Syria and emulates the same style as Euronews. This kind of DBS
Channel news programme has had a slight influence on Saudi television news
programmes to the extent that there are signs that they are beginning to induce change,
borne from a perception that to do so is crucial to survival.
There are, sad to say, no other news or current affairs programmes within Saudi
television's output that warrant further analysis. The 'Events of the Week' programme
amply demonstrates this. It claims to be a 'news' programme yet is merely a re-reading
of some of the now-stale stories broadcast during that particular week - together with
another show concerned with readings from the press. There are neither commentaries
nor any in-depth analytic news programmes that seek to explain or interpret events in
213
a way which would enable the public to comprehend them in context and form opinions
which could be fed back into policy-making.
3.4. Entertainment
Television drama and entertainment programming are at the heart of every broadcasting
schedule. They inspire, entertain, criticise and amuse. STy is no different: entertainment
is the largest quantitative component of its output. Entertainment formats generally
include quizzes, dramas, game shows, and variety shows, but since STV shows little else
but imported dramas and serials in this genre, these are the focus of this section.
3.4.1. Soaps and Series
Drama is traditionally the most expensive genre to produce due to the high costs
involved. Growth of local production of television fare has always been rather slow and
inefficient, partly due to the fact that since the inception of STV in 1965 it has become
dependent on imported entertainment from the United States and the United Kingdom,
as well as from Arab countries such as Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. The proliferation of
television channels and the widespread use of satellite to deliver television signals has
created a huge demand on television programme production. Imported series are used
to fill out the schedule and the consequence is that viewers see the world interpreted in
terms of these images, which often convey un-Islamic values, as described in chapter I.
As Peter Meech observes:
'Ideological effects are by no means restricted to those television
programmes or newspaper articles which aim first and foremost to provide
information. Indeed, it is often argued that such effects may be strongest
where least expected, namely in items that are normally labelled as
'entertainment', for example, newspaper features, cartoons, comedy shows
and soap operas.' (Meech, 19X5:36)
214
Arabic Dramas: Egyptian, Syrian and Kuwaiti Drama Series
The abundance of DBS channels has created an unprecedented demand on the
production of Arabic dramas, with which the Egyptians alone, who are prolific producers
of such serials, could not cope, encouraging the production of dramas by other Arab
countries. Some of these have filtered through to STV in response to the viewers' desire
for a change in content. In the period under investigation, four nightly series financed
by Egypt, Kuwait and Syria were shown, as well as a 72-minute, two-part drama, also
imported from Egypt.
One Egyptian series is a prime-time show following the main news bulletin, and
therefore attracts high viewing rates. Called Aihub Wa Attoofan or 'Love and the Flood'
and with each episode lasting for 40 minutes, it is typical of low budget productions
which invariably revolve around the themes of love, family feuds and class struggles in
Egyptian society.
The plot is based on the life of a wealthy business man who is faithful to the old
traditions in his life and who is trying to similarly influence the lives of his two sons and
his daughter. After a terminal illness and a fight for her life, his wife dies; there is then
the need for someone to take care of their mansion and their daily affairs. A rescuer
appears on the scene in the form of a middle-aged woman who, after a violent, armed
robbery incident against her husband, is left penniless, vulnerable and a single mother.
She is forced to swallow her pride and succumb to the merciless demands of her
daughter - a student at college. They have some support from an aristocratic accountant
who works for the wealthy business man, but he soon dies too, and the woman is
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subsequently employed by the business man himself as a resident housemaid/nurse. This
triggers off hostile feelings towards her from the high-class daughter and one of her
brothers. The newcomers' vulnerability and their neediness encourage the harassment
and exploitative behaviour of the greedy, bullying son who tries on a number of
occasions to rape the maid's daughter. A machiavellian type, he will go to any length to
maximise his trade and profits in the family business. To counter this there is, of course,
the 'good guy' - the second brother - who arrives on the scene as a saviour and protector
of the young lady. Their feelings for each other develop into a romantic relationship,
entailing secret trysts. At the same time, the father - the wealthy businessman - has
developed similar feelings towards the mother and another romantic relationship
evolves. After several domestic disputes regarding the high-class and low-class conflicts
in the relationships, a happy ending concludes the episodes, everybody fulfils their
desires, despite the class barriers, and the message is that these barriers in society should
be overcome.
A general weakness of Egyptian dramas lies in their repetitiveness and redundancy of
topics which deal with the specifics of Egyptian society. Acknowledging that there is still
great potential for Egypt in the drama production market, they have built their
'production village' known as '6th of October City' - the Hollywood of the Middle East.
With advanced digital production capabilities it has been described as second only to
Universal Studios." Whether this will facilitate their success in the competition to
produce quality drama remains to be seen.
Syrian drama series, which take second place in STV scheduling, have met with relative
216
success when compared to the competition. This can partly be attributed to the support
given to them by the Syrian Government in various ways, ranging from the provision to
the industry of marginal freedom of expression as well as financial assistance and
production facilities. These dramas deal with topics and subjects which differ in context
from those of their Egyptian counterparts. There is a clear slant towards an historical
perspective resulting in the showing of dramatic depictions of their national movement
and struggle against the Turks, and more recently, the French. Aljwareh or 'Birds of
Prey' and Ikwat Alturab or 'Brothers of the Nation' are two examples of successful
Syrian works which have appealed to the Arab masses among the DBS viewers. These
dramas have been aesthetically enhanced by the wise application of outdoor video
operations since the Syrian production teams took full advantage of outdoor shooting
opportunities to film 'authentic' settings. Despite their quality, very few Syrian dramas
have actually appeared on STV. The chief reason for this is that the bulk of them are
produced with the DBS related censorship rules in mind and therefore cater to the
satellite television market, rendering them less suitable for Saudi television as they are
not up to Saudi censorship standards.
Kuwaiti drama is, in fact, the 'poor relation' among the Arab dramas and is struggling
to maintain its place on the schedules of both Arab national television and DBS
channels. Its lack of suitability for Saudi TV can be put dowii to the fact that although
there are cultural similarities between the two countries, there are also profound
differences, especially in issues concerning women's roles in society. In Kuwait, women
can receive a university education in a co-educational setting and are allowed to
participate in the employment market. These and other features of Kuwaiti society
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conflict with Saudi cultural values and affect the success of any Kuwaiti drama which
contains such topics.
3.4.2. Channel 2 Entertainment
There is a dearth of research into the Saudi television market, and especially into
Chaimel 2 entertainment, which is primarily intended for English-speaking expatriates
working in Saudi Arabia. The fact that Channel 2 broadcasts entirely in English has
created a climate not enjoyed by Channel 1 but the former is not regarded as an
autonomous and separate entity from the latter. For example, Channel 2 is consistently
used by STV as a substitute for Channel 1 when a scheduled news bulletin on the latter
coincides with a live transmission. Channel 2 entertainment programmes consist of
imported series, serials and films, most of which are American. Shows which include
children's cartoons, Phyllis, St. Elsewhere, You Asked for it, Only in Hollywood, Minder,
Spomvorld, Evening Shade, Believe it or not and Candid Camera are the mainstays of
Channel 2 output. This channel also features films every Thursday night, most of which
are Hollywood productions. Although these materials are subject to the application of
heavy censorship practices, still there are practices depicted in these programmes which
are considered inconsistent with the basic tenets of Islamic faith. Meanwhile, the
continual output of such entertainment increases the reliance on imported fare.
3.5. General Summary of STV Output
The consistency and conformity of the content of 'all' television output is, it can be
argued, a prerequisite for the survival of the society as a whole if it is to promote its
own national media industry and lessen its dependence on foreign imports. In turn this
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will help to preserve its religious and cultural identity and resist penetration by foreign
values. Analysis has shown that STV has a sizeable challenge to achieve this consistency.
Discrepancies between media messages and Islamic law are considered contradictions
and disparities. However, the programme content described contains a few examples of
inconsistencies, irrelevancies and un-Islamic values contained in STV output, and which
are not of the kind that deal with different aspects of Saudi life adequately or in a
manner conducive to increasing the popularity and appeal of STV output in general, and
local productions in particular.
While certain items on STy are censored, others cannot be, and this allows un-Islamic
ideas, practices and values to filter through. Although the Ministry of Information is
keen to enforce strict censorship rules on what STV can show, still the analysis of these
imported shows reveals that there is a great deal to be concerned about. Censorship
policies and practices as they stand show evidence of a lack of informed and
knowledgeable decision making. This problem of un-Islamic or inappropriate message
is considered a result of STy 's reliance on imported entertainment, produced in other
societies of different character and with different values. While on the one hand, STV
is criticised by Islamists for not being 'pure enough' in its programming policy, it is the
demands of the religious element in society and the censorious effects of the system
which encourage other viewers to turn to imported products. This dependence on
imported programming is reinforced by a lack of local productions with which to fill air
time on STV.
As far as Islam is concerned, there is nothing else deemed un-Islamic or contradictory
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other than the previously discussed moral issues depicted in entertainment fare. On the
contrary, Islamic doctrine actively encourages the media to play a constructive and
informative role by any means and in any form. Freedom and justice are two main
principles of Islam, as well as objectivity, fairness and tolerance in dealing with
controversial issues. Every individual in Muslim society is accountable and responsible
for his/her own actions, be it in a governing or governed capacity. The collective interest
of the society as a whole takes precedent over parochial self interest. These principles
could be integrated in media messages and operations and be translated into
programming. The absence of these guiding principles for STV output, and the continued
nullification of Saudi Mass Media Policy provisions have undermined the role of STV
and driven Saudi viewers to DBS channels in the search for alternative sources of news,
information and entertainment.
4. Conclusion: Discussion and Critical Comments on STV
In addition to the more detailed analysis in the preceding sections, and in order to
provide a further critique regarding STV scheduling and programming strategies, this
section will summarise previous discussions in this chapter as well as throw light on
programme genres which were not included earlier, either because they were scarce and
marginally treated by STy, or because they were totally absent from its schedule.
Despite a recent move by the Ministry of Information to establish what is called the
'Programmes Improvement Committee', an ad hoc body formed from top management
in STy, the best that this committee has achieved is a series of face-lifting and cosmetic
measures only, such as rescheduling some programmes and renaming others. These
measures are merely 'quick fixes', like bandages rather than cures, and far from being
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genuine reform measures they are simply placebos. It is clear from the comments which
follow that effective measures are urgently required if ST y is to hold its own against its
competitors and provide a worthwhile service to Saudi society and its viewers.
I There is a serious dearth of educational programmes; the few that are transmitted are
Western imports translated into Arabic, and they often bear no relevance to the specific
situation in Saudi Arabia. There are, of course, programmes that deal with scientific or
neutral issues that add to the viewers' understanding and general knowledge of the
natural sciences, but STV generally relies on old films which deal with irrelevant topics.
S As the analysis of so-called 'religious' programmes reveals, they were originally
broadcast as isolated programmes that take into account the Islamic teaching and
philosophy in the messages that they convey to the viewers, but the conformity to Islam
is undermined and dissipated, resulting in conflicting programme content. Despite the
didactic nature of so called 'religious' programmes, there is insufficient guidance for the
young viewer, who is left perplexed as to whom to believe and what to follow.
S There are no factual current affairs programmes nor documentaries, nor in-depth news
analysis included in STV scheduling (see Appendix F, cartoon No.3). Noticeable, too, is
the absence of informative quiz shows. Viewers who are looking for such types of
programmes have to turn to other broadcasters, who, of course, are not concerned with
current affairs in Saudi Arabia nor local cultural issues. Many programmes on satellite
channels receive telephone calls from viewers in Saudi Arabia who wish to participate
in the discussions or answer quiz questions or even ask questions pertaining to the topics
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dealt with in particular programmes. However, local issues and immediate concerns of
local viewers are left unaddressed.
• A constant feature of all STV programmes is their official tone and authoritarian, top-
to-bottom nature of discourse. No consideration is given to viewer interaction
whatsoever, nor to feedback (see Appendix F, cartoon No.6). There are no interviews
with people who could voice their concerns or present their opinions regarding issues
which affect their lives. This situation raises the question of accessibility of television to
the people. There is also a significant absence of programmes on STV that survey the
views and opinions of ordinary people on issues such as television programme content
and scheduling, current issues and trends. Little importance is given to allocating a
facsimile or telephone number through which viewers can relay their reactions to these
aspects of Saudi life. Viewers, the intended targets of all media messages, and their
opinions, are totally ignored.
I As regards scheduling, STV programmes are poorly scheduled on a day-to-day basis
and throughout each season. On the daily or weekly basis, sports programmes, which are
predominantly scheduled for Thursday afternoons, are considered very long - roughly
80 minutes. However, this is the only sports programme that concerns itself with sporting
events taking place in the country for the whole week. More than eight football matches
are played during each week of the football season. These matches are played on
Mondays, Thursdays and Fridays in different cities in the country. Such sports events
require more coverage and more in-depth reports to sum up the events on the same day
of play, and should perhaps be scheduled later in the evening.
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An examination of scheduling on a seasonal level reveals that locally produced dramas
are usually scheduled during the month of Ramadan, a boosting move by the Ministry
of Information and STV operators to encourage local production. Packing local
productions into this month while leaving the remaining eleven months without a single
Saudi drama show has adversely affected local production. They simply overexpose and
deprive the viewers of alternative, more balanced schedules.
A further point regarding scheduling is that STV programme schedules are subject to a
short notification of change, and occasionally no notice is given at all. The coverage of
ceremonial events involving the presence of government officials inaugurating a project,
or visiting a particular part of the country will replace the regular programme which had
been announced. There are instances when regular programmes are delayed, cancelled
or re-scheduled to another day because of what are called 'special' programmes. Such
sudden shifts in programme times will result in an inconsistent and unreliable service,
affecting viewership, viewing habits and patterns of exposure to STV output.
S Until 1999, STV applied advertisement block-programming tactics. This entailed the
showing of advertisements in blocks instead of dispersing them between or during
programmes and meant that advertisements were played back-to-back during the day
and night, cramming ten or more advertisements together. Inevitably this diminished
their appeal and perhaps increased the level of boredom among the viewers. An
alternative approach to advertisement programming would have improved ST y 's position
in the advertising market against DBS rivalry. However, it is only recently that under
economic pressure, and after experiencing a sharp decline in advertising revenue that
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STy has changed tactics. In a drive that is expected to enhance its position in the media
advertising market, STV has decided to insert advertisements during programmes and
to reduce the minimum available advertising space from 60 to 10 seconds. 12
• The majority of STV productions are of a studio-based nature. Religious programmes,
talk shows, women's programmes and variety shows are all produced in-house by STV.
The advent of the portable video camera has made this type of production outmoded.
Authentic talk shows and religious discussion programmes can be produced only in the
studio, but viewers' participation may be taped elsewhere. Showing relevant videos could
provide a break away from the monotony of having a person talk to viewers for half an
hour or more in a manner more appropriate to radio broadcasting.
• A constant deficit in STV programmes is that they seem to be compiled in a hasty and
unprofessional manner and are often lacking in proper research regarding the topic at
hand. If sufficient preparation and survey were carried out, it would enrich the
programme and give it more balance. The professional handling of a television
programme requires the programme producer to go back and read, or carry out some
video library research, or delve into archives in order to produce a watchable and
authentic production. Viewers today expect television output to contribute to their
understanding and enhance their knowledge.
• STy programmes are also very traditional; they have had the same contributors,
presenters and style for years. There are no significant innovations despite the rivalry
presented by satellite services. The 'summer' programmes, for instance, are intended to
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boost local domestic tourism and attract people to parts of the country which have
milder weather during the summer season. In general, they consist of interviews with
officials in their offices, welcoming the holiday makers and assuring them that all the
services they require are available, followed by another interview, or two, with holiday
makers praising the efforts by local authorities and by the central government. These are
accompanied by relatively old videos showing some scenic views of the immediate
vicinity and the region. The potential to showcase the area more effectively and to
ensure tourism makes a more substantial contribution to the economic well-being of the
region is being overlooked.
• Apart from two programmes targeting farmers and teachers, there are no programmes
geared to addressing segments of the viewing population who may have special interests,
nor to particular age groups. As discussed in the section relating to children's
programmes, the 8-14 age group do not have any programmes that they are attracted to
or could benefit from. Such viewers have special requirements and are the future of the
nation. Yet, they are left easy prey for some of the satellite channels producing
programmes that convey un-Islamic messages. Pre-schoolers also tend to be neglected
by STy. The only programmes directed at this group are the daily 40-60 minutes of
imported cartoons. There are no programmes that could provide practical advice or
assistance to viewers in areas such as home improvement or DIY for example.
• STy does not show any promotional features for new or future programmes, for
instance, there are no trailers for forthcoming programmes. Instead, announcers 'read'
the names of the daily programmes and the time that they will be shown at the
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beginning of transmission, and another reminder is given after some hours of
broadcasting. There are no reminders at short intervals of broadcasting to keep viewers
informed and updated with the line of upcoming programmes and their content. This
failure to inform will serve to distance the viewer, and increase the likelihood of that
they will be more inclined to switch to other channels after a short time.
4.1. Programming, Relevance, Tasks and Accessibility
Robert McLeish (1994) proposes a set of criteria which enhance a programme's appeal:
'The qualities which people enjoy and which will attract them to a particular programme
are:
• Humour that appeals
I Originality that is intriguing
I An interest that is relevant
I A clearness which can be appreciated
I Simplicity - a non-confusing message
I Good technical quality (sound and picture).' (McLeish, 1994:112)
As the description of STV programme content and the critical comments have
demonstrated, STy has not been keen to address local issues and concerns of its viewers,
neither in news programmes or entertainment and drama, nor in documentaries and talk
shows. Avoidance of the immediate and relevant issues has been a constant feature
typifying the majority of STV programmes. In fact, the domestic arena as a whole is
noticeably absent or out of focus.
Numerous local and international cultural organisations have great confidence in the
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importance of the so-called 'localisation' of the media. The first measure is to minimise
the dependency on foreign-produced, cultural materials, and that includes television
programmes, by encouraging local production and alleviating local constraints. The next
measure is to utilise the national media system to deal with issues that have a practical
bearing on the lives of the audience. In the words of one media scholar:
'It is well established that the effectiveness of any media discourse is
contingent upon its credibility and its relevancy to the people's needs.'
(Ashanqeeti, 1991)
In this regard, Saudi TV could focus its attention on issues such as unemployment, health
and education, local environmental problems, public safety, and socially-based obstacles
to development such as tribalism or adherence to traditions.
Each and every one of the aforementioned issues deserves its due consideration. When
Saudi television puts education on its agenda, for instance, it will logically follow that
the national school curriculum and teachers' qualifications and performance will come
under scrutiny. Experts and educators could be interviewed or invited on to talk shows
to debate such aspects as the status of public (as opposed to private) schools and the
suitability of their physical environment to accommodate pupils. This is currently a
central issue in educational development; the situation at present is such that Saudi
Arabia relies on rented accommodation for schools and these are often unsuitable in that
they are mostly cramped, inadequate teaching areas with limited or no access to
computers, playing areas or sports facilities. However, there are no television talk shows
which could be effectively exploited to provide a public forum to discuss these issues,
shed some light on the current situation and inspire other solutions.
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The same can be said about health institutions, the rapid trend towards privatisation in
the health, education and utility services and the implications of this for Saudi citizens.
Safety standards and precautionary measures in workplaces, homes, schools and streets
are other fields of inquiry fit for consideration on STy. These issues are not placed at
the top of STV's list of topics for priority treatment and there is a discouraging climate
for further projects. In programmes on the environment, for instance, methods of refuse
disposal, domestic and industrial waste dumping, and whether the current system is
environmentally friendly are areas open for discussion. Other matters worthy of
discussion and deliberation include recycling schemes and the need for STV to campaign
for the introduction of accessible, practical recycling points. The importance of this type
of journalism is summarised by Lent (1993):
'Development journalism in its original form was an honourable attempt
by independent journalists to report comprehensively and accurately the
development story of a nation in a way that it related to and benefited the
masses.' (Lent, 1993:247)
Consideration is not given to the environment in terms of the endangerment to wildlife
and there is little evaluation of the government's measures to preserve some preferred,
privileged species. The importance of the environmental and the local ecosystems
necessitates the programming of local shows depicting local wildlife and the results of
human interference with it. Hunting practices, the use of vegetation cover and over-
pasturing are related topics that could be examined in this context, but from the
viewpoint of people with perceptions derived from either a nomadic or tribal existence.
The plight of animals being wiped out as a result of ignorance or apprehension, or
simply destructive farming practices could be brought to the attention of Saudi people
to inform them of their own wildlife and natural habitats.
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There are, of course, other areas of importance which directly affect the citizens' lives
and well-being, and which do not receive media attention in Saudi Arabia. Road
accidents are one clear example. Fatal road accidents are the biggest killer in Saudi
Arabia and are the cause of 81 % of deaths, while the injured victims occupy 20% of
hospital beds. Between 1974 and 1996, 65,000 people were killed in such incidents.
Efforts to control the situation are currently in the hands of the traffic police alone.
Television in particular could play a vital role in conveying road safety messages in
different formats and they could be made the subject of various programmes, not just
during 'Traffic Safety Week' - an annual occurrence in Saudi designed to raise awareness
of road safety, but at more frequent intervals. For example, there could be factual
programmes about roads, driver behaviour, the roles of the police and paramedics, etc.
This problem could be approached from different angles to sensitise viewers to both
causes and solutions. At present, STV's only offering on this subject consists of 5-minute
long 'directive' programmes, which are the products of joint efforts with the Gulf
Countries Cooperation; STV also produces Hadith Wa Ebrah - 'An Accident and a
Lesson' a 30-minute programme shown once a week. Hadith Wa Ebrah, however, fails
to deliver the road safety message because it always places the blame on the motorists
alone. This programme is meant to be presented in an 'on the spot' style, interviewing
the drivers involved in intercity road accidents and the police officers attending the
incident. Despite this programme's tendencies to fault the motorists without questioning
safety measures on that particular road or inadequate policing for instance, it is still the
only programme recorded outside the television studios with a sense of spontaneity.
Short 'directive' programmes on STV convey standardised awareness messages which are
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aimed at all the Gulf States. The high rate of road accidents is a common problem
across the board, but each country has its own characteristics. Saudi Arabia is
individualised by its topography and unique circumstances and the measures required by
the government to minimise or eradicate the road accident carnage must be designed
with these specificities in mind. One solution may be to lift the current ban on screening
and announcing accidents which has been imposed on STV, and to raise public
awareness of all the aspects of this issue.
Besides communicating the standard safety message, STV could work in conjunction and
in close cooperation with specific local elements to design special campaigns. This type
of orchestrated work could approach the problem from a number of angles, such as the
responsibilities and behaviour of the road users - both motorists and pedestrians. The
responsibilities of the authorities involved - the police, the municipalities and educational
institutions - is another theme to be tackled. This is in direct keeping with the Islamic
Shariah, which is based on protecting and preserving five fundamental necessities: one's
religion, self, mind, offspring and wealth.
In conclusion, it can be argued that the magnitude and consequences of the high road
accident rate in Saudi Arabia have not been adequately reflected upon by ST y. The
reliance on the standard safety message is not enough since it does not take into
consideration the individual characteristics of Saudi Arabia, differences which set it apart
from the other Gulf States and which require individual treatment. This is demonstrated
by the fact that the death rate has remained static.
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The Saudi media in general can also be accused of failing to deal with the
unemployment problem with any seriousness or conviction. Unemployment figures are
rising every year, but little is being done to bring this problem to the forefront of the
national agenda. The Saudi government is the main employer through the Civil Service
Bureau, which is responsible for announcing the government's limited needs and
fulfilling its employment quota with suitably qualified applicants. In addition, the
government has made concerted efforts to utilise the education system to cater for the
needs of the job market, and in the process it has established a number of vocational,
technical and training institutes in many cities in the country.
The free-market employment policies adopted by the government, combined with the
private sector's need for cheap labour has led to a massive influx of foreign and
expatriate workers from many countries. According to the recent census of 1992, the
foreign population in Saudi Arabia currently stands at 4,624,459 (The Census of
Population, 1992, Statistical Yearbook, 1994). There are, however, unofficial estimates
which put it at roughly 6,OOO,OOO Saudi Arabia is therefore in the position of being
one of the countries most dependent on a foreign workforce in the world. Saudi's special
circumstances do have some influence on these statistics; every year hundreds of
thousunds of visitors flock to the holy sites and a substantial number of these 'pilgrims'
do not leave the country on completion of their religious duties. They stay on as illegal
immigrants in search of work. The seriousness of this syndrome has caused the Ministry
of Interior to engage in a massive crackdown campaign to expel the illegal immigrants,
resulting in the departure of more than 752,000 people up to May, l998.'
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Despite the ambitious and successful nationalisation of the job market in the public
sector, the private sector is still highly dependent on foreign labour. This dependency has
implications for Saudi Arabia's security and economy. Regarding the former, according
to recent statistics published by the Ministry of Interior, there is an increase in the crime
rate with most offenses being committed by foreign workers and illegal immigrants.
These include crimes which are usually alien to Saudi society, such as armed robbery
arid car theft (Statistical Yearbook, 1994). On the economic front, financial transactions
by expatriates amount to 48% of the nation's oil revenue, that is, 51.7 billion Saudi
Riyals, the equivalent of $13.9 billion (US). 16
The Saudi government's policy regarding the issue of unemployment is based on a
principle of non-interference in the private sector's employment choices. Rather, it
attempts to influence it by appealing to big businesses and multi-national and national
corporations to assist in accommodating the influx of job seekers, whose numbers are
soaring annually. Certain government agencies have worked closely with universities to
organise a 'Careers Day'. This annual event, which takes place in some universities,
involves meetings where executives and prospective employers discuss their essential
needs and inform the universities of what these needs are. In this way the universities
can respond accordingly by introducing modifications in their curriculums. Despite these
efforts, the private sector in Saudi Arabia is still heavily reliant on foreign workforces.
The potential role of the media has, evidently, not been fulfilled. What STV in particular
could offer is active engagement in addressing the issue, documenting the private and
public sectors' employment policies and working as a platform on which both sides could
mediate and attempt to resolve this growing problem. What is of relevance here is that
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STV, as demonstrated in the programme content analysis section in this study, has not
been involved, as if unemployment rates were not of any great concern.
4.2. Dissemination of Knowledge and Information
As the analysis has shown, STV has not been an active source of information on local
domestic issues, nor on international ones. Information is a vital commodity in
contemporary societies and an essential requirement if citizens are to have qualified
opinions or make informed decisions. Moreover, it is a guaranteed right of the public
to be adequately briefed and empowered by knowledge. Saudi Arabian citizens need to
know more about events and happenings taking place in their vast country. Until there
are local media outlets in each region of the country, it is up to the central television
system to bring the various parts of the country closer to each other. The truth of the
matter is that unless there is a top official involved in the making of an event, very little
or nothing is reported about it. This de-linking or disassociation of STy
 from the local
scene has, unforttmately, become the norm. There is clear evidence that Saudi Media
Policy is aware of the value of the task at hand. Article VI states:
'All the mass communication will seek to strengthen the bond among the
citizens by informing them of the numerous parts of their cotry.' (Media
Policy, Ministry of Information, 1982)
In adherence to this policy, STV could adopt a more analytical approach to the news by
offering explanations and commentary and lessen the harsh official propagandistic tone
in news programmes. With the advent of modern technology, news from outside Saudi
Arabia has become more widely available. What is missing, however, is an interpretation
of the events so that viewers are aware of the impact that such developments may have
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and how certain events may influence the interrelated and interconnected world
economies.
Further opportunities for STV's role in the dissemination of knowledge are revealed
when one considers the paucity of information derived from local government agencies
regarding their activities and their services. The roles of the public relations departments
could be expanded and be made more effective if there were closer links with the
media. STV could adopt initiatives to make information more readily available to the
public, especially to those who are illiterate. Saudi citizens need to be made aware of
their right to information. For example, they need to know how government services will
be affected by privatisation and how this trend is going to affect the population as a
whole. Regarding the economy on a local level, there is a distinct lack of output by STV
on local economic or business news, apart from a brief run-down on currency rates and
oil prices. Again, Saudis are not made aware of the immediate effect of these changes.
Moreover, the people need and are entitled to independent, unbiased advice to enable
them to make informed decisions in the face of commercialisation and unratified claims
made in advertising. It is imperative that there is a voice advocating and defending their
rights as consumers, and again this is a role that should be fulfilled by their media.
On the international arena, STV again fails to provide sufficient information. Unless
there is news about a major disaster or an official visit, little is communicated about the
outside world. News and reports about the Muslim and Arab world are rare. Knowledge
about other countries, their way of life, culture, customs and needs are not depicted on
234
STy, in spite of the emphasis which Saudi media policy lends to this particular aspect
of media. Article XX in the Media Policy states:
'The information media will seek to bring closer all the Muslim people,
their countries, potentials and capabilities.' (Media Policy, Ministry of
Information, 1982)
4.3. Access and Participation
Feedback from the public regarding the government's actions, policies and services has
never been accommodated by STy. Development plans do not account for the citizens'
opinions. The people are simply cast as passive recipients who have no say in the
progression towards modernisation and development. Council and municipal services
could discover a great deal about the success of their projects and the success of their
performance in their professional capacities once there is a chance to find Out the
reactions and views of the citizens whom they try to serve. This authoritarian stance is
reflected in STy . Content analysis has demonstrated that STV programme content is
uni-directional, comprising top-to-bottom discourse relayed in an authoritarian tone. No
consideration is given to its viewers' opinions or preferences.
In a fast moving television market with appealing services, STV needs to pause for a
moment and assess its performance. The growing need for audience research instead of
relying on broadcasters' perceptions of viewers' preferences and requirements must be
satisfied. Recent studies suggest that STV is at the bottom of viewers' choices (A1-Oofy,
1994). Such alarming facts should induce STV policy and programme makers to ask
'why'?' As the analysis has shown, one major influential factor is that STV programmes
do not allow a sufficient degree of viewer participation, nor are their views reflected to
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any extent in programme content. The actual social life of Saudi citizens and their
interactions have not been depicted by STV. This can be attributed in part to the influx
of foreign entertainment shows, but it can also be put down to the absence of a will to
focus on the local scene with all its complexities and its very individual nature.
Because of the centralisation of media facilities and operations, participants, writers and
presenters of STV programmes have been the same for years and there have been no
attempts made to widen the circle to incorporate new ideas, new faces and new
approaches. Naturally, this has resulted in content which can only be described as boring
and redundant. The obvious consequence is that the situation will be exploited by other
media services, and this is what has happened. Direct Satellite Services such as Arab
Radio and Television (ART) and MIBC, for example, have invested in the production
of programmes about Saudi social life and have provided an outlet for some local
productions which cannot be accepted by STy . This is despite the fact that they tend to
gear the content to a more universal appeal, suitable for Arab viewers all over the globe
and with a predominantly entertainment oriented content. Customs and traditions from
all over Saudi Arabia were exhibited by ART in more than one programme, for
example, Treasures of the Tradition. Thus viewers were able to see performances by
singers and actors, and even factual programmes dealing with unique marriage
ceremonies.
Analysis of STV programmes reveals that the majority are studio-based productions with
inferior artistic quality. The portable camera has revolutionised the making of television
productions. STV producers should make use of such technology and produce shows that
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depict a more realistic portrayal of the Kingdom from various locations within it. A vast
country with diverse demographic and social characteristics, as Saudi Arabia is, should
be the source of ideas for factual information and documentary series. This is STy's
domain and territory which will enable it to distinguish itself from other broadcasters,
and this is what will give STV its unique character and flavour. Such a task should not
be delegated to MBC, ART or any other DBS service.
There are distinct segments of the Saudi viewing population which are under-represented
in STV scheduling and programming; women, children and the rural population among
them. Their individual requirements and concerns have not been addressed by ST y
 and
there is little opportunity for them to communicate. So-called 'women's' programmes
consist of a 30-minute show screened three times a week. Their primary concern is with
the urban housewife and her interests while the content is limited to housekeeping tasks
and cookery. They do not accommodate the fact that the female viewer may have other
interests and they fail to sustain a broad view of women's interests as a whole.
With regard to children, as they grow up and become more receptive to the world
around them, their inquisitive minds constantly lead them to question 'how?' and 'why?'
These are the questions that STV should endeavour to answer through informative
children's programmes designed to stimulate interest and broaden the outlook of
individual children. At the same time the children will be encouraged to learn about
science, for instance, or other areas of particular interest. Until STV are able to offer
informative and educational programmes in accordance with the Media Policy, foreign
imported programmes will continue to be more appealing.
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In addition, the accessibility of the media in general, and television in particular, by the
peripheral and geographically remote regions is limited. Although STV has branches in
seven regions, they consist of production studios and equipment which have not been
utilized to successfully fulfil the function they were designed for, namely, to provide an
opportunity for local, regional production and to communicate the unique character of
that particular region or province.
4.4. The Illiteracy Problem
The illiteracy rate within Saudi Arabian society is still relatively high. UNESCO
estimates it to be between 44% and 55% .' Yet, there is no apparent effort being made
by STV to deal with such a problem nor to assist illiteracy campaigns. Illiteracy does not
only imply the inability of a person to read or write, it also relates to the deficit of
information and knowledge acquired by an individual. Many can read and write but lack
the necessary information to form an opinion or to make an informed decision. A lack
of information or possession of misinformation are other ways in which illiteracy
manifests itself and which require STV programmers to acknowledge and to take action
to alleviate it. The popularity and ability to reach the masses of the medium of television
should inspire planners, educators and broadcasters to exploit its potential. Through
programmes of different genres; news reports, documentaries, current affairs and talk
shows, if viewers' interests are put first, they could become far more enlightened and be
made much more aware.
In fairness, the Saudi government does in fact allocate a large amount of its revenue to
building new schools and establishing educational projects in every part of the country -
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an effort that STV has not managed to illustrate and reflect on in any meaningful way.
Without a doubt, illiteracy is a great obstacle in the path of any genuine development.
In Saudi Arabia a substantial segment of the population is deprived of any type of
formal education, a problem which has prevented these people from participating
constructively and effectively in the projects which target them. They have been unable
to reap the benefits of national development plans and remain marginalised outside
mainstream Saudi society. This is especially true of the rural community. The ability to
make discerning, rational demands for facilities and services and to make full use of
these has been hampered by the inability of these people to read or write, let alone
think positively about what is essentially required to improve their living standards and
conditions. The way to inform them of their rights and to realise their potential is by
empowering them with knowledge. However, Saudi television does not broadcast a single
programme that could be useful in this respect. In a developing nation where illiteracy
is high and social awareness remains minimal, informative and educational programmes
are urgently needed - not imported entertainment. Through years of observation and
monitoring of Saudi television's performance, Saudi media planners and programmers
have not recognised the problem of illiteracy and the lack of information and knowledge
among the people. This is despite the articulated emphasis in the Saudi media policy on
combating illiteracy (see Article XVII, Appendix B). Continuous education programming
and the recommendations of numerous regional conferences outline the point that
recognition alone, if not coupled with actions, is worth nothing (Hussain, 1988). If Saudi
television could make use of its potential for high penetration and expanded coverage,
some headway could be made in solving the illiteracy problem.
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The discrepancies and variations between the formally stated Saudi Communication
Policy and the actual media operations and output is a major drawback. Article XVI of
the Saudi Media Policy reads:
'Realising its significant role, the media will deal directly and effectively
to abolish illiteracy by adopting educational and scientific principles,
dedicating educational programmes that meet the needs of every age and
mentality.' (Ministry of Information, 1982)
Yet analysis of STV output reveals that there are no such programmes and this has been
the situation for years. In an interview with two members of the Supreme Council of
Mass Communication, both agreed that such a discrepancy exists. The Saudi Mass Media
Policy is 'a masterpiece' according to the Deputy Minister of Information. He added:
'but the people who have articulated it have nothing to do with the media,
they are intellectuals and literate: they did not give much thought as to
how this policy could be carried out."8
This task is left to television executives who have failed to translate those general
guiding policies into actual programmes.
5. Implications for Dependency
When STy 's deficiencies are examined in the wider context of Saudi Arabia as a
developing society with a highly individual character, it is possible to detect how the
problems which Saudi has encountered in its growth and development are mirrored in
the difficulties which have arisen in the attempt to establish a successful local media
industry. These problems can partly and similarly be attributed to the clash of traditional
and modern forces which dictate media content. However many of the media's
shortcomings relate to specific problems within the Saudi media industry itself which,
as described in the following chapters, limit its ability to be self-reliant and produce
content of high production quality.
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When STV operations and output are analysed in isolation, the shortcomings of the
Saudi media industry can be perceived quite clearly. However, when this analysis
juxtaposed with an analysis of available imported alternatives, it becomes apparent that
the strength of foreign competition and more economically viable media imports, as well
as the appeal of better quality production accentuates the deficiencies of STy
programming content. Saudi television has the transmission and reception infrastructure
but it has failed to make any consistent or substantial effort to produce or co-produce
quality home-grown programmes. As a result, it has been accused of belittling its
audiences by dismissing and marginalising their interests. Boyd (1982) attributed the
scarcity of reliable audience research in the Arab world, and particularly in Saudi
Arabia, to a perception that broadcasters do not consider it necessary or worthwhile to
sample audience preferences, opinions or behaviours.
The causes of STV's failings, as discussed in the following chapters, contribute greatly
towards STy 's present inability to sustain a captive audience for indigenous production
and a failure to provide a viable alternative to imported programming. In this way, a
preference emerges for foreign media products, such as DBS offerings, which are
considered by a large segment of the Saudi viewing population to be more appealing.
Despite the legislative stipulations, DBS is not limited by the same political and
economic constraints which currently reduce the growth of national television systems
and local production. As discussed in chapter II, while this may foster interaction and
understanding, it may also be considered as contributing towards a dependency on
imported programming and perpetuate the failure to develop local production.
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CHAPTER VII
POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CONSTRAINTS
1. Introduction
The constraints which thwart the development of the local media industry and local
production companies also ensure the perpetuation of poor quality STV output in terms
of skilled production, artistic quality, and stimulating content, thereby increasing the
preference for foreign imported programming. These constraints are interrelated and
there are aspects which overlap. As a result, it is difficult to rigidly separate them.
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this discussion, they will be dealt with as distinct
entities.
Table No.8. Local production constraints as perceived by 20 local producers
CONSTRAINT	 I•
STV censorship rules
	 98
Ministry of Information bureaucracy
	 95
Lack of artistic professions 	 90
Economic hardship and Ministry of Information pricing tariffs
	 96
Lack of resources and sponsorship 	 95
In interviews, twenty independent local producers described the constraints as they
perceived them (see Table No.8). These include political constraints, such as censorship
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rules and government bureaucracy; and constraints related to professional and artistic
arrangements and to institutions in Saudi Arabia, which inevitably encompass
recruitment policies and training schemes adopted by the Ministry of Thformation. Other
impeding factors appertain to economics and to the pricing policies implemented by the
Ministry of Information; advertising revenue, budgetary allocations, and so forth.
1.1. The Establishment of Local Production
More than 25 years ago, Saudi television produced the majority of its programmes
(70%), by itself, as in-house productions. 	 Despite its lack of expertise and limited
experience, local indigenous shows were on the Saudi television screen every season,
along with a number of American, British and Arab productions, consisting of soaps,
movies and plays. Skilled producers and directors, as well as talented Saudi actors and
actresses popular at that time, were working close to, and within, the television facilities,
despite the humble payment schemes and wages being offered. 2
In the mid-eighties, 'the years of change' in all aspects of Saudi life, the Ministry of
Information sought the discontinuation of made-for-television drama, in particular, so
as to concentrate on producing religious talk shows, news programmes, 'variety' shows,
and 'directive/informative programmes' - those which are designed to publicise the
government's plans and efforts to develop the country (eight years ago, the latter was
also delegated to ARA - an independent producer). At the same time, the Ministry of
Information granted the necessary permission and encouraged senior actors to establish
private production entities which could satisfy television's need for drama series and
shows. These entities, as we shall see, have faced, and are still facing, a number of
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difficulties, which prohibit them from fulfilling their envisaged role. A number of
complex social, economic and political factors were - and still are - responsible for this
failure.
In discussing and evaluating Saudi media policies - the regulatory foundations and their
role in preserving Saudi culture and eradicating or minimising dependency on foreign
produced television materials (which might have cultural influences on Saudi society) -
the role of these local production houses has to be investigated. This role seems to have
slipped through the net of past enquiry pertaining to Saudi media. In order to
understand the role local producers could play and before any judgement is made, one
should investigate the legal, social, economic and political circumstances within which
these producers are functioning. Such investigation is vital if we are to understand the
reasons for any shortcomings.
The discussion which follows in this and the next two chapters is primarily based on the
outcome of a survey conducted on local independent producers, media officials and
policy makers. The constraints to be discussed are, according to the producers, the main
hindrances to the fulfilment of their envisaged role:
'The biggest hurdle television in the Third World has faced hitherto has
been the lack of interest local governments have shown in the technical
and journalistic quality of national television. So long as television was
politically tamed and could be used as a kind of government public
system, those holding the reins were quite content.' (Berwanger, 1998:200)
Besides the problems arising from irrelevant and un-Islamic content amply found in
these and other imported programmes, imported television fare presents a number of
more complex issues. These include a tendency towards the denial of the opportunity
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for local production companies to accumulate artistic and creative experiences and
traditions, which could be the weapons to defend national identity against overwhelming
floods of foreign produced materials (Tash, 1997). Inevitably, this cycle perpetuates
itself. The important role that home-produced materials has to play in Saudi culture is
clearly acknowledged:
'Despite all fashionable talk about global culture, home-made mass
communication seems to be preferred because it is valued for its cultural
identity.' (Kivikuru, 1993)
'Indigenously produced material is still considered as offering more
"identification poles".' (Desaulniers, 1987:122)
Despite the importance of STV's cultural role in Saudi society, a number of political and
religious factors have contributed to the situation where local producers in Saudi Arabia
are currently not being given the chance to reflect on and deal with the tremendous
changes Saudi society has witnessed in the past, and is still experiencing on a day-to-day
basis. Censorship in all of its forms is the most notable factor but all of these
impediments and difficulties will be the subject of the following discussion.
2. Censorship
2.1. Background and Principles
In 1982, an information policy which dealt with television was formulated. As with
previous legislation, the policy aims to prohibit items which may cause friction within
Saudi society from the social, moral, religious and political points of view. When Shaikh
(1989) put the following question to the censors in STV: 'Are there any formal or
mfonnal rules or guidelines on what to look for when deciding to approve or reject a
particular programme or film?', all of the respondents answered, 'Yes. 'Their responses
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can be summarised as follows: the content of imported programmes should be
compatible with the religious principles of Islam, that is to say, modesty and the
maintenance of the Islamic traditions and values should be observed. The guidelines and
rules can be categorised according to the areas with which they are concerned.
The religious line concerns itself with scenes or programmes that contradict the
principles of the Islamic faith. Any programmes that show scenes of abuse of Islamic
people, that expose the Prophet and his companions to disrespect, or that depict nudity,
physical or sexual encounters between the opposite sexes, scenes aimed at promoting
other religions, the depiction of or allusion to the drinking of alcohol or the taking of
illegal substances, impingement of Islamic dietary laws, gambling, immodest women, and
so on, are rejected; scenes featuring music and dance are also rigorously vetted.
There is a political line which states that 'Any scene that is derogatory toward the
policies of the Saudi government and other countries, as well as leaders of Islamic and
other nations will be censored.' Thus, the communication of any message that
contradicts, opposes or criticises Saudi rulers, the government and its principles and
national policies is forbidden.
The social line stipulates that 'Whatever conflicts with the traditions and customs of
Arabic nations will be censored.' The technical aspects of the programmes, such as the
actors' performances, dress, subject matter, objectives and direction are also scrutinised.
In addition to the aforementioned guidelines and values, the general taste and trained
good sense of the censors are also taken into account (Shaikh, 1989). The effects of the
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interpretation of the censorship policies will be examined in the following discussion.
Compounding the restrictive effects of the censorship laws on Saudi media is the fact
that Saudi media operations are constantly under pressure from different elements in
Saudi society. The most formidable pressure comes from politicians and religious people;
both groups exert their influence for different reasons. Some local provincial authorities
scrutinise and even manipulate STV programme content produced in their region.
Certain local governments try to exploit the media, both print and broadcast, to
communicate a favourable picture of their province in the periphery of the country,
regardless of the reality of the situation. Any producer who comes to that region has to
engage in a 'prior arrangement' with local authorities, which inevitably limits the choices
and discussion of the producers. This 'prior arrangement' also necessitates the obtaining
of 'permission' and requires that a civil servant from that particular governorship
accompanies the television crew throughout the shooting to 'facilitate' their task and to
ensure that things are going according to the 'prior arrangement'. In such an atmosphere,
producers usually show no resistance and succumb to pressures. As one producer
informed this author: 'The ghost of the censors is always over our shoulders.'
2.2. The Role of the Censoring Committee
At present, censorship laws are customary practice and comprise excessively wide, vague
and loose terminology. The manner in which the censors interpret these laws represents
a formidable threat to the freedom of expression in view of their vast potential for
abuse of power. A constant concern among all producers is that censorship decisions are
arbitrary and based on personal judgements and preferences which are subject to the
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censors' moods and whims. Producers complain about the parochial, over-conservative
and short-sighted censorship decisions, which are neither constant nor realistic. The
censorship rules affect every aspect of the 'work' :the story-line, the characters involved,
the language used, the dress codes and even the names used in the dramatic shows are
subject to rigorous scrutiny. Decisions made by a censorship department cannot be
contested and are final; in other words, there is no chance of appeal by the producer.
Some decisions, when applied, can mutilate a story and disrupt the sequence of the
scenes, with the end result being a useless and worthless show. Many of the producers
interviewed by this author are not happy with the censorship rules. One producer has
told this author that every producer is aware of the sensitivities of the country and
therefore adheres to censorship regulations by self-censoring, but that the problems arise
from the 'censor's interpretations of what is being said'. He adds: 'We know and observe
what our religions require us to do, it is in the Quran'. He quoted the following verse:4
'Those who love (to see) scandal, published or broadcast, among the
believers, will have a grievous penalty in this life and in the hereafter:
Allah knows and ye know not.' (Quran, 24:19)
There is a common complaint among all producers regarding the arbitrary and subjective
interpretation of members of the censorship committee and their lack of 'adequate
knowledge,' as more than one producer has put it. 5
 The censorship department has to
examine the work twice; initially, as a proposal on paper and Imally, when it is
completed on tape. Each process often takes a long time. Conformity and total
agreement are not always achievable. There has to be a unanimous decision by the
censoring committee regarding any issue raised in the proposals of new shows, serials
or series. If one member of the committee has 'reservations', the proposal could be
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rejected out of hand. Some have called for 'a more realistic and wise censorship', arguing
that there must be an emphasis on the quality of the censors and there have to be clear
standards that could be applied to minimise the reliance on personal and subjective
evaluations of programme content.
The process of censoring new proposals is, conclusively, a time-consuming and lengthy
one. What could further delay the decision is the fact that some of the committee
members are not from the television profession, or they may work for STV on a part-
time basis only. Inevitably, the delay in the decision making process adversely affects
local production companies. Not only do they have to conform to ambiguous censorship
laws, but they are forced to await the outcome of their efforts to produce a suitable
production.
Censorship has always been the main concern of independent producers and creators in
other countries as well, and many are clear about the measures which have to be taken:
'To face the potentially negative effects of foreign media on local cultures,
national media censorship laws have to be lifted without compromising
moral and decency obligations.' (Ayish, 1994:52)
At the 5th Television Production Festival in the Gulf States, which took place in Bahrain
from the 17th to the 20th of March, 1997, independent producers, media decision-makers
and directors from Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and the six Gulf States (Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates) attended symposiums to
discover the effects of censorship on the advancement and progress of television
production in the Gulf States. These independent producers were against censorship
practices and expressed a belief that it is an outdated and useless practice which, some
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contend, should be abolished completely.
Included in the duties of the censors is the assessment and evaluation of the artistic
quality of the production. Such a task could not be left to television critics or the general
viewers. This evaluation by the censors directly influences the rates of production, which
ultimately affects the price the Ministry of Information will offer to that particular
programme -
2.3. The Religious Line
A suitable production which considers the censorship regulations over religious issues
must take into account the fact that it is not permissible, according to the majority of
Muslim scholars, to personify prophets or their companions in any televised work. This
is to preserve the high regard in which they are held and the respect they are given.
Muslim scholars in Saudi Arabia have widened this ban to encompass not only many
Islamic subjects and stories but also any religious symbols from other faiths, such as
Christianity or Judaism. Producing an animated show based on an Islamic story, for
instance, even though it may be an educational and informative tool, especially for
younger viewers, is not acceptable by STV standards.
A production acceptable to the censoring committee must also take into account the
religious constraints on music and dance, which are controversial areas in STV. Muslim
scholars are divided regarding the issue of legality of music and singing. The majority
of scholars believe that they are illegal and they base their decision on their
understanding of the following Quranic verse:
252
'And amongst men, are those who purchase idle tales without any
knowledge; so that they may mislead (men) from the path of Allah; and
they are the ones for whom there is a disgraceful punishment; and when
our laws are rehearsed to them, they turn away in pride as if they did not
hear them; as if there are plugs in their ears. Give them the news of a
dreadful punishment.' (31:6)
Commentators of the Quran, such as Mujahid, understand this verse to forbid music,
singing and novels. The reason for the prohibition on music and singing, according to this
view, is that such futility and nonsense (Lahw) causes a diversion from the remembrance
of Allah, and may revoke lustful thoughts which could lead to the practice of sinful acts
(Alawdah, 1990; Sultan, 1992). The other school of Muslim thought, which includes some
contemporary scholars, legitimises music and listening to songs as long as the lyrics do
not allude to vanity and indecency (Alqaradawi, 1995). Despite external pressure, STV
does not impose a total ban on singing or music. Songs are carefully selected to be
appropriate for male singers only, and with no overt love themes, nor accompanied by
female dancers. As a result of censorship rules, and specifically those pertaining to songs
and movies featuring women, many of these materials have become obsolete while
others have been offered to other broadcasters.
2.4. The Political I Moral line
Concerning political and moral issues, the Saudi media policy of 1982 states:
'The media should seek to be objective in presenting the facts and avoid
exaggerations, and should guarantee freedom of expression to all.' (See
Article XXVI, Appendix B).
Freedom of expression is also a guaranteed right in Islam and it is the obligatory duty
of the Muslim state to inform the public (Mohammed, 1983). However, censorship laws
are equally stringent when dealing with these non-religious aspects of Saudi society in
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the media, with the result that not only have censorship rules in STy affected almost all
aspects of its operations and programming but also they have effectively diminished
freedom of expression. Local producers find it difficult to reconcile the Islamic principle
of freedom of speech with the constraints imposed by censorship laws:
'STV censorship wants local producers to actively engage in depicting
Saudi society as an ideal one. They want a rosy picture to be painted
about Saudi Arabia and Saudi people. They want us to show the Saudi
citizen as if he or she were an angel, an infallible person, which is not a
realistic picture at all.'6
'We were banned from dealing with what we believe are very important
issues affecting our daily lives; issues such as drug addiction and its
dreadful consequences for the people involved and for society as a whole;
the reliance on so-called traditional healers' by some desperate patients
whose faith in modem medicine is low and who fall as prey in the hands
of some sorcerer or dishonest 'healers' who will rip them off, taking
advantage of their desperate situation. [...]too many topics that we could
deal with in a positive way, and yet we always stumble in the prohibition
mentality of censorship.
The existing censorship rules and the way they are interpreted and applied has not
encouraged local production to any degree at all. As one producer puts it:
'It is as if you chain an athlete and ask him or her to race free competitors
on the track. We cannot compete with other broadcasters in the region nor
with DBS from a distance under such restricting rules.'8
Most of the producers surveyed have their moments with the censorship laws.
'It is the hope of many journalists, producers and engineers in the TV
stations of the Third World that international competition will at last force
their governments to give them the freedom they need.' (Berwanger,
1998:200)
According to 98 % of local independent producers, censorship rules constitute the main
obstacle to the development and advancement of local production (see Table No.8).
There are rare instances when censorship rules have not been applied, for example, to
the local serial Tash ma Tash ('Enough or Not'?'). This particular show has been in the
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early evening slot for the last four Ramadans and during this time it has become a
distinctive early evening ritual for viewers. It is important to note that viewership during
Ramadan is different from the rest of the year: friends and family gather shortly after
sunset every day of the month to break the fast and, of course, to watch television. Tash
ma Tash has cultivated enormous popularity not only in Saudi Arabia, but also in the
neighbouring Gulf States. The producers of this show tackled, in a rather satirical,
critical and humorous way, a number of issues, such as government bureaucracy and
unnecessary time-consuming routines, the lack of certain essential services, such as the
availability of telephone lines, and inadequate health and municipal related services.
Ironically, STV itself became the subject of criticism in one of the episodes. The show
grew in popularity and was re-run on a number of DBS channels, such as ART, MBC
and Dubai satellite channel and other national television services during 1998. It has
proved that local producers, with the help of favourable conditions and prices, can
produce appealing and entertaining competitive shows. The producer of this show has
revealed that, due to the personal intervention of the Minister of Information, the strict
censorship laws were relaxed and thus he attributes the show's success to this factor.9
It enabled the comedy duo, A. Sadhan and N. Gasabi, who write stories and scripts and
act at the same time, to tackle issues which were formerly taboo for other producers.
The basic thematic elements include the contradictions in Saudi social life, modes of
modernity, government bureaucracy, and the routine its offices pursue in carrying out
their various services to the citizens. The milieu in which the stories take place, the types
depicted, the language spoken and the themes are all topical. Moreover, they reflect
contemporary issues and refer to the Saudi milieu through critical realism. The viewers
can, therefore, vicariously relive all the irritations and frustrations of everyday life as the
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protagonists do and say what the viewers themselves would do and say, but in a
humorous way. This privilege has not been enjoyed by other producers, who have
criticised this favouritism and believe it has put them in a disadvantageous position: they
ask for a level playing field and equal opportunity in regard to censorship rules and their
application, and the price offered. Their complaints are justified: Tash ma Tash has been
awarded prizes in a number of television production festivals, for example, in Bahrain
in 1997 and in Cairo in 1998. If the suggestions of the censorship rules were to be
considered by the producer, it would ruin the work and it could not be sold to other
television stations in the Gulf Area or to the DBS service. When it fmally agrees on the
work, STV will unilaterally edit and cut parts of the show. This particular action will
minimise the show's duration and that directly affects the amount of money STy pays
the producer. This is one of the points of contention in the relationship between the
independent producers and STy. Such concern has been raised by a number of
producers and has adversely affected any future cooperation between the two parties. 10
Nevertheless, the rules are still applied:
'Because of the traditional culture of this Islamic country, programming in
Saudi Arabia is unique. Programmes which are imported from Western
countries and from other Arab countries are censored to ensure that they
are what the government believes to be acceptable to the majority of
viewers.' (Boyd, 1972:227)
Censorship, it can be argued, has been, and still is, as a counter-productive measure
which hampers the free flow of ideas and news in society when it is most needed. It is
claimed to cause the credibility of the media to be strained and minimises the potential
of the media as a resistance tool for foreign cultural influences. When we speak of
censorship, we do not mean the clear, obvious exclusion of unacceptable topics or
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scenes. We are talking here about very small details. For example, censorship has
prohibited the showing of a corpse in one of the shows. It also refused to let an actor
pronounce the word 'cancer' and objected to a depiction of a patient dying in a
government hospital for fear that this could be interpreted as a case of malpractice by
the hospital or the medical staff. Uninformed and blind application of censorship rules
with reference to depictions of sex on television has always been an issue, even relating
to wild-life shows which sometimes depict the sexual behaviour of a species. In an
Australian wildlife show aired by STy Channel 2, words used by the original
commentator to describe this ilmate behaviour were censored and deleted. Censors
apparently considered such words to be vulgar and indecent. Producers of entertainment
fare in Arab countries always observe the special requirements of STy. As one Egyptian
producer stated:
'The rich markets for state TV are in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, and we
will not produce anything that will alienate the Saudis. Like all Arab
governments, they want to preserve the status quo, so that is what we give
them.' (Tracey, 1985:24)
There are exceptions; when it comes to gratuitous violence in most of the imported
shows, the same rules are not rigorously applied. STV Channel 2 shows clear examples
of productions which have too much violence in their content. According to the
censorship agenda, the censorship of ethical and moral imagery receives a higher priority
rating than violence. This system of ranking potentially censorable items reflects the
viewpoint of the religious element in society who do not object to depictions of violence
as much as other scenes in the belief that it is less threatening to Islamic values.
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2.5. Censorship Targets
2.5.1. Participation of Women
There is an anfavourable attitude in Saudi culture towards females carrying out certain
jobs in the performing arts: acting, singing and musical careers are stigmatised,
discouraged by many families and have never been appreciated by the conservative
lobby in Saudi Arabia. These views are based in Islamic teachings which call for strict
moral codes, especially regarding women. The underlying principles are that any action
or activity which may potentially lead to 'sin' must be avoided. A woman's role in the
workforce should therefore, they believe, be restricted to necessity only. For example,
if a woman is widowed with children and is forced to become a 'breadwinner', then it
is permissible for her to earn a living. She should, nevertheless, carry out only the work
that is essential in order to sustain her family and meet their requirements. If a woman
has professional skills that are needed by other women or society as a whole, then it is
permissible for her to practise her profession outside her home provided that she
adheres to the conditions prescribed by Shariah and has the permission of her legal
guardian. Evidence for such an opinion can be found in the fact that at the time of
the Prophet, midwives used to attend women in labour, and skilled women used to
practise nursing for the wounded. This indicates that it is acceptable for a woman to
practise her profession, but permission is granted only on the condition that the work
does not affect her duties at home regarding her husband and children, and that she has
her husband's consent. These duties are her obligations and take precedence over her
responsibilities towards the community. Where there is any conflict of interest, her
individual duties must come first.'2
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This view, coupled with the bad reputation given to acting and singing, has contributed
to the recent 'repentance' of a number of famous actresses, dancers and singers in Egypt.
Although such a phenomenon has been understated by some media critics in Egyptian
society, it came about as part of what is termed 'Islamic awakening', which means a
major return by young individuals to their faith and the application of Shariah laws to
their personal affairs. This also includes the return to the widespread use of the Hjab
(the women's veil) and Islamic mode of dress across the Muslim world.
Opposition to female employment is, nevertheless, not as strong as it used to be and
such conservative attitudes are dissipating slowly. At present, the participation of women
in the Saudi workforce is still minimal and limited to specific domains, namely, the
medical profession and education in girls' schools. According to the latest statistics, Saudi
females employed in the medical field number ll,195,which represents 17% of the total
female workforce (Statistical Yearbook, 1994). In addition, modifications have been
made to the workplace in order to segregate the sexes. Cultural and social circumstances
have thus stymied the potential of Saudi women to participate in the workforce.
One of the factors which in the past has restricted employment opportunities for females
was the lack of formal education for girls, officially introduced years after male
education. Initially, a large segment of the Saudi population were reluctant to educate
their daughters, but attitudes changed and female education is currently widespread and
operates from primary to tertiary level. At present, girls are enrolling at universities in
their tens of thousands. The estimated number of female graduates from university in
the Sixth Development Plan (1995-2000) is 782,000 (Statistical Yearbook, 1994).
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Educational reforms notwithstanding, there is still a current shortage of employment
opportunities for women. As a result, the Saudi Government has prompted a shift to the
private sector. Saudi women are encouraged to form their own private enterprises or to
work for private clinics, translation services and related corporations in accordance with
the laws of Shariah. ' But still there are a number of bureaucratic hurdles which have
to be surmounted before any significant difference can be perceived. Saudi Arabia
remains dependent on large numbers of the female work force in the health profession
and, to a lesser extent, in education.
Despite the paucity of Saudi females working in the broadcast and print media, there
are some female writers and columnists employed by newspapers and magazines and,
in particular, by STV Channel 2. However, in its English and French news programmes,
STy
 is dependent on non-Saudi, female newsreaders who originate from other Arab
countries and who are fluent in these two languages. There are also a limited number
of female presenters whose contribution to television is confmed to children's and
women's programmes. In recent years, to overcome the objections to the appearance of
females on television, there have been attempts by some producers to include women's
participation over the phone, without the necessity for video-recording them. In this way,
women are enabled to voice some of their concerns over family, education or cultural
matters.
In the field of performing arts, there are very few Saudi actresses and singers, and so
local producers have to depend on actresses from other Arab states, for example, Egypt,
Syria, Kuwait and Bahrain. The problem with this is that it is difficult for actresses from
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other countries to imitate the vernacular and so producers subject them to some sort of
training before filming. Actresses from the Gulf States are generally preferred because
of their ability to master the Saudi accent. It is, however, becoming increasingly
inconvenient for local producers to invite foreign actresses to Saudi Arabia because of
the strict immigrations laws and requirements.
Apart from these examples of female participation in the arts, there are also a number
of female singers in Saudi Arabia who perform mainly at female gatherings, such as
wedding ceremonies and ladies-only events. Some of these singers have progressed to
radio and television. After the ban on STV of female songs in 1981, a few of these
singers chose to reside in other countries, such as in Egypt and Kuwait, where they could
sing in more welcoming and favourable environments.
2.5.2. News and Journalism
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates freedom of
expression and freedom to receive information from any source. It follows that the
public of every country is entitled, as a right, to receive news, information and views,
without interference and regardless of frontiers (MacBride et al, 1980). The right of
freedom of expression, including the right to seek, receive and impart information is a
valuable human right which is essential for the enjoyment of other fundamental
freedoms in society. It is also a prerequisite for meaningful social, cultural, economic and
political development. 'The rights of interpretation and fair comment are valuable not
only to the profession but also to readers, listeners and the entire public' (MacBride et
al, 1980:240). Yet, despite these views, one major result of the censorship regulations has
261
been to curtail freedom of speech in news reportage and journalistic features. Journalists
are responsible to sub-editors who have overall responsibility for ary breach of the law,
and offenders 'accused of breach of regulations are tried by emergency courts' (Rampal,
1994). As a consequence of the application of these rules to news programmes, a
producer is unable to provide impartial and adequate coverage of any story and is
expected to exercise extreme caution in handling any news item: 'It is like working in
a minefield. You have to be careful not to offend anybody; not only that, you have to
please everybody all the time' (see Appendix F, cartoon No.3).'4
Given that one journalistic function is to inform society, overt or covert censorship is a
measure which drastically limits the journalist's capacity to carry out his/her professional
function effectively. A climate of fear can insidiously result in self-censorship and a
failure to deal adequately with social problems. This will result in a defiance of any
influential role by the media and, inevitably, will result in an absence of cultural
congruence, thus widening the gap between the state and society.'5
'Active pursuit and disclosure of facts which are of public interest is one
of the criteria by which to judge a journalist's professional capacities. The
role of the investigative journalist is to question and to probe the actions
of all those in authority and to expose them wherever there is abuse of
power, incompetence, corruption or other deviations.' (MacBride et a!,
1980:234)
Undermining this principle is the degree of immunity to criticism and accountability
which is 'given' to all incumbents of public offices in Saudi Arabia. Such unwarranted
immunity has encouraged wrongdoing and abuse of power, especially in the absence of
any form of watchdog organisation in society.
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2.5.3. Print
Print medium is also subject to censorship. In accordance with press and publication
laws, newspapers and magazines undergo censorship screening at post-publication stage.
In order to publish a book, an author has to submit a manuscript to the Ministry of
Information to be scrutinised and has to have it 'cleared' before printing. The complex
and difficult procedures which have to be followed in order to obtain a permit for a
broadcasting station or a publishing house in many Arab countries have been the main
reason for many Arabic newspapers, publishing firms, and broadcasting organisations to
base themselves in Western capitals. London in particular, chiefly for political reasons,
is home to many new and 'migrant' newspapers and magazines.
2.5.4. Advertising
Censorship rules are also applied to advertisements on STV. Guidelines for advertising
procedures are clearly specified and can be referred to by the censoring committee in
the publication The Principles and Basic Rules for Commercial Advertising on Saudi TV,
produced by the Department of Commercial Advertisements. Under the section entitled
'The Main Principles', a number of articles explicitly define the boundaries within which
the advertisers may operate. The underlying principles include: 'To avoid criticising
religion or religious men and their dignity or their prestige.' Moreover, 'It is not allowed
to advertise for non-alcoholic brews or liquors such as alcohol-free beer and champagne.
Such an action may initiate an undesirable reaction within the Muslim soul.' Further on
it states: 'It is not allowed to use vulgar expressions during advertisements. Exaggeration
should also be avoided.' Finally: 'It is not allowed to advertise for any film or play
before having been submitted to the Ministry of Information's Censorship Department,
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and the other concerned departments. It is also not allowed to advertise for contests
involving gambling or lottery.' Section 3 of the same publication rules: 'Both form and
content of the commercial advertisement are subject to the censorship of those
responsible for such in STy. They may accept or reject, without giving reasons, any
advertisement item not complying with the given rules and standards.'
The principles and basic rules of advertising on ST y also dictate the boundaries of the
role of women in this field. A section which delineates advertising procedures stipulates
that: 'Female figures are to be restricted to advertisements relating to home and child
affairs. Modesty in voice, appearance, movement and attire is to be observed.' The two
articles which follow this rule that: 'A suitable, nice-looking head-dress is to totally cover
the women's hair' and 'Children as well as adults are not to wear short dresses rising
above the knee. (Females).' Articles 19, 22, 24, and 25 in the same section provide
further guidelines as follows: 'It is not allowed to show bathing scenes, be they
performed by males or females. A hand-douche and a bath robe, on the other hand, can
be used to imply the bathing process' and: 'It is forbidden to show a woman dancing or
singing, whether individually or within a group of a singing chorus, in sound or picture'.
It adds: 'When advertising for cosmetics and perfumery, the emphasis must be laid upon
the product, a commentary by the female sound is OK, and in the case of advertising for
products bearing female figures on covers, such are only allowed within the limits of
modesty, a (close-up) shot though, is not allowed.' Finally, this section also rules that:
'Modesty in female attire means that the clothes must cover all the body save the face
and hands. Sports clothing is not allowed.' Such rules have, in fact, deterred some major
advertisers, especially those dealing in cosmetics, perfumes and health and beauty
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products. They believe that the editorial climate is unfavourable towards featuring their
goods and this is one of the reasons why sizable advertisers are demonstrating
preference for DBS channels, where there is less rigidity in moral censorship.
2.5.5. Information Technology I WWW
Information technology is also affected by the censorship screening process. In 1996, the
cabinet of ministers agreed to the introduction of the Internet to the country.
Nevertheless, the WWW (Internet) is still not widely accessible in Saudi Arabia. The
King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology was authorised by the cabinet to ensure
that service providers would comply with a number of censorship requirements, which
include 'any illegal usage which contradicts social, cultural, political, religious and
economic values of Saudi Arabia' 16 Although the service has been available since
January 1996, the adoption and usage of the Internet is affected by the relatively high
subscription rates resulting from the high tariffs set by the national telephone network
which is monopolised by a private enterprise free from competition. Recently, what are
known as 'Internet clubs' or 'Internet Cafes' have increased in number and continue to
spread. It is not yet known how many visitors they attract and what kind of usage is
sought.
2.6. The Effect of Media Censorship on Saudi Society
'Censorship is a matter which is seldom far from the surface in considering
television's role in society' (Paterson, 1998:67)
Strict censorship rules have, in effect, presented obstacles and impediments to the
freedom of expression in the elementary, prerequisite form of creativity. Such rules have
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obfuscated the progress and development of ideas in Saudi society. The manner in which
censorship laws have stymied the political empowerment of the people and limited their
awareness of pertinent issues is equally clear.
According to Fouad Mukhaimar (1998):
'Muslim rulers have to let the reformers direct them and their nations
freely to the benefits of the whole people and society [...J then the
ultimate goal will be obtained, which is stability and security in Muslim
countries.'
However, the common people's views - the Vox Populi - cannot be recorded unless it
is a sheer commendation to the government services and its policies. A climate of fear
prevails. Even when there is a chance to voice concerns or opinions, members of the
public and officials are reluctant to do so, knowing that he/she will be subject to
censorship laws.
In the few instances on STV phone-in programmes when viewers could voice their
opinions regarding STV programmes, callers to live broadcasts have franidy criticised the
absence of analytical and free discussion regarding contemporary relevant matters, and
have expressed their unhappiness with news programmes in particular. One caller said:
'Your news is just about welcoming and bidding farewell to officials on visits, and
nothing more'.'7
Islam has made it a duty of the people to put things right in society. The Prophet says:
'He who witnesses any vice should change it.' (A1-Bukhari, 1996)
Objective and constructive criticism is, in fact, an Islamic tradition, although every
Muslim individual has a duty, under certain conditions, to abide by a 'no naming, no
shaming' code of practice. Traditionally, Jummah orations (Friday sermons) have been
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used to criticise any negative situations, policies or behaviour in the Islamic community,
and to offer advice and reform measures to policy makers and to all members of society
equally. In modern times, with financial assistance from charity organisations, such
sermons have been taped onto audio-cassette and duplicated in great numbers in order
to be used as alternative discourse. In Islamic countries, this phenomenon is on the
increase: there are special stores which sell audio-cassette tapes among other products,
such as perfume. This new medium has, in fact, been encouraged and has flourished as
a result of the shortcomings of national media systems which are impermeable to any
diverse opinion. Sermons could be exploited as an effective tool for educational
inspiration and change. When utilised correctly, they could also be constructive in
forming strong Muslim individuals and structuring communities. Preachers usually deliver
these sermons to large numbers of congregations in all Mosques, not only to urge the
congregation to abide by Islamic moral standards and observe their duties in
worshipping, but also to encourage them to be more responsible and more productive
in their lives. According to Islamic doctrine, there are no restraints on the content and
topics of preachers' sermons (Ashanqeeti, 1994).
The notion of diffusion of tension and the maintenance of peace and stability in society
are related to the amount of freedom of expression that the media in that society is able
to enjoy. Strict censorship rules have contributed to the production of redundant,
unappealing and repeated themes over and over again. Hamdy Qandeel (1997), a
mediologist and broadcaster, explained in a television programme:
'Despite the relative improvement in the freedom of expression that some
government controlled television services were forced to introduce to be
able to compete with DBS channels, the majority are still acting as trustees
in the minds of their people. '
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To face the influence of DBS on local culture, STV should be more open to diverse
ideas, for example in news and in entertainment, and to be more caring about its viewers
by giving them facts and true information. It needs to instil self-confidence to enable the
viewer to be more equipped to make informed decisions. As Turki Alhamad (1996)
when evaluating the media systems in the Gulf States termed it: '[...] excessive
propaganda and ostrich-like practices' •20 The opinion of members of the public adds to
the coverage of a topic and could provide a valuable contribution from a unique
perspective. If such opinions are constantly excluded, undoubtedly, the ensuing discourse
will be imbalanced and incomplete. However, with the advancement of new technology
and means of imparting information, the State's censorship and power over information
has been diminishing gradually and may further diminish in the future (Tash, 1995).
3. Bureaucracy
Many local producers surveyed have presented a number of proposals for a variety of
indigenous programmes, but these proposals are always circumscribed by the complicated
standards of the lengthy bureaucratic decision making process, which can last months or
even years. For a number of reasons, these local producers are fmding it increasingly
difficult to follow up their proposals through the web of red tape inside the Ministry of
Information. Producers in cities far from the centre, with no contacts inside the Ministry
of Information, cannot leave their own city headquarters and live for any length of time
in Riyadh, where media facilities and decision makers are based. Should a producer risk
this venture, there is no key contact point or liaison office where they can enquire about
the outcome of their proposal. As one producer indicated: 'There is no clear answer and
we do not know whom to talk to' 21 Besides, the nature of the Ministry of Information
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offices makes them inaccessible and there are difficulties in entering the facility, for
security reasons. Although there are branches for the Ministry of Information in two
other major cities: Jeddah, in the Western province, and Dammam, in the Eastern
province, there is no authorization to make any decisions regarding local production
proposals. Any major determinations have to be made in the centre. The difficulties
resulting from government bureaucracy and convention were acknowledged in the
'Symposium for Television Production in the Arab World' held in Tunisia in 1983, where
there was a recommendation to establish production units which could be independent
from government administrative hurdles, and be more able to respond to the dynamics
of the production processes (Masmoudi et a!, 1987).
The intricacies and delays of the bureaucratic procedures affect other areas of
production. For example, local producers find it an arduous and difficult task to obtain
the necessary permission to shoot in public locations; there are five or six different
parties, including the police, traffic wardens, and municipal authorities, and the producer
has to obtain permission from each. This is a time consuming process.22
Routine also affects STV in-house production. Because the infrastructure revolves
around a model of centralised administration, producers at STV have to engage in a
lengthy process of paperwork and follow a chain of commands to acquire a piece of
equipment for their project. Decisions relating to a spare part for a camera, or a
decorative piece for a placard which is urgently needed, for example, have to pass
through a slow, bureaucratic process which can take days or even months before
reaching the centralised decision-making circle and being acted upon. Inevitably, this
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delay adversely affects production. To be responsive, day-to-day broadcasting operations
require more speedy decisions.
The same applies to any proposal for a new local production; its route traces the
following course: Firstly, there is the submission of the written script with detailed
information about the new work to the censorship department to be scrutinised. If
approved and cleared by censorship, the 'work' is referred to a committee for evaluation
and rating. Following this, it is directed to another conimittee called the 'Programmes
Development Committee'. The work is then transferred to the Director of Channel 1
and subsequently directed to the Deputy Minister of Information for Television Affairs.
Next, the Minister of Information is approached to sign the approval. Finally, the work
is passed to the Deputy Minister for Administrative and Financial Affairs, from where
the matter is directed to the Finance Department to arrange for money allocations,
according to their annual fiscal plan.
In order to expedite the various stages of this painstaking process it is essential that the
producer has some connections inside the Ministry of Information and in ST y. A clear
example of the benefits of having the right connections is illustrated by one local
production company which was provided with numerous facilities and exempted from
the tedious red-tape procedures; it was also given access to a wide range of locations and
granted use of Civil Defence helicopters. The company was owned by an influential man
who had links with the royal family; not a privilege enjoyed by every producer.
Some producers have suggested that there are also fmancial irregularities within the STV
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circles and that certain officials are abusing their positions in cases where there might
be a conflict of interests. One of the Ministry of Information's problems is that the rules
pertaining to local production are heavily influenced by the personal discretion of top
officials. 'These rules are subject to changes whenever a new official is parachuted in. t23
Ali Najai, the Deputy Minister of Information for Television Affairs is convinced that:
'Media operations in our developing country should not be subject to the administrative
and financial routines applied in other governmental organisations because they are
different from media operations' (Najai, 1996:162). Obviously, holding such a view could
not, and did not, alter the reality. STV is a rigid, centralised, bureaucratic system of
administration weighed down by inertia and resistance to innovation and change.
4. Conclusion
Interviews with local producers have revealed that religious, political, moral and social
principles underpin media censorship practices but these are executed in an arbitrary,
inconsistent and subjective manner. Moreover, the pressure from different elements in
society ensures that producers will continue to see their work subjected to this treatment
and this, they claim, has a profoundly discouraging effect and detracts from production
quality. In addition, the unnecessarily long and involved procedure entailed in submitting
a production acts as a further deterrent.
This chapter has also revealed inconsistencies in both censorship and pricing policies
which relate to relations within the industry itself, with STV policy makers and with the
various government departments. As a result, productions are being made to satisfy the
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censorship and bureaucratic criteria rather artistic, innovative or informative ones. As
demonstrated by Tash ma Tash, local production companies have enormous potential
for development if only these restrictions were lifted. These factors contribute to the
disillusionment of local production teams, the absence of quality programmes on STy
and the continued preference for and reliance upon imported media fare.
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CHAPTER VIII
PROFESSIONAL CONSTRAINTS
1. Introduction
'The development of a core of trained communicators and a creative
community is as vital to a communication infrastructure as the mechanical
aspects of the system.' (MacBnde et a!, 1980:2 10)
The following discussion examines professional constraints and their implications for the
development and effectiveness of the media in Saudi society. These restricting factors
include not only the approach by the Saudi government to recruitment and training, but
also its policies regarding professional and artistic arrangements, its attitude towards
women's role in the media, its inadequacy in attracting talent in the absence of lucrative
payment schemes and the establishment of cultural organisations, which could have
enormous potential, but are circumscribed by rigid constraints and what could be
perceived as questionable motives.
2. Training
A fundamental prerequisite for the development of culture and the arts in any society
must be the provision of adequate training in the form of direct instruction, the
availability of the means and channels to gain experience, opportunity to practise and
apply the skills acquired, and equal opportunity for all. Motivation is a key factor, thus
appropriate incentives, both professional and economic are vital in maintaining a cultural
community.
Article 18 of the Saudi Media Policy states that: 'The media should encourage and
nurture new talents until they reach high levels' (Saudi Media Policy, Appendix B). In
275
reality, this obligation has been delegated. There are currently no arts schools or
training institutions in Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, university theatres are the main source
for talent spotting: the few skilled individuals who have made it in show business are the
windfalls from university theatre groups or from activities carried out by the Saudi
Arabian Society for Culture and Arts (SASCA) (see Table No.9). Suggestions have
frequently been made by intellectuals and media scholars that arts schools should be
established within the country, but nothing of this nature has ever happened. In fact,
many local producers list the shortage of actors and actresses and supporting artistic
careers as a main impediment to the development of local television production.
Table No.9 Training workshops in theatre, organised by The Saudi Arabian
Society for Culture and Arts (SASCA) during the period 1973 - 1988.
	
CITY	 NUMBER OF WORKSHOPS
	Riyadh	 3
	
Alahsa	 0
	
Jeddah	 4
	
Taif	 3
Dammam	 4
	
Abha	 3
	
Qasim	 2
	
Madina	 0
Source: SASCA Report, 1988.
The idea of establishing a training organisation dates back to 1966, when a study was
proposed by Abbas Gazzawi, then General Director of Radio and Television, for the
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establishment of 'a radio and television school' consisting of up to three training courses
in the fields of engineering, programming and production. The idea of this 'proposal' was
not adopted by the Ministry of Information, largely owing to financial considerations and
'the need to study the proposal with other government agencies' (Ashobaili, 1992).
Writers to this day are still appealing to the Academy of Arts to establish a domestic
form of training and nationalise it.'
The quality of any system is largely determined by the calibre of its operators. In the
television business, training at all levels and in all forms is of paramount importance and
the demand for skilled staff is always there. Of particular importance is the training and
development of creative and artistic individuals and groups for all aspects of television
work. There is a growing need for training among STV staff in particular; a need which
has been expressed to this author by many in the upper management of STV. Hasan
Alhamdan, the Head of Drama in STV, believes that staff need on-job training. He adds
that it is the most suitable and fruitful way of training, where actual working conditions
could be present all the time. He recalls a successful training scheme years ago which
was designed to provide knowledge and expertise for crews broadcasting live sports. The
focus was on camera technique replays and on-the-spot production methods. 2
Although at present, STy does not engage in any form of on-the-job instruction, the
importance of training to keep up with changing technology and equipment is recognised
by STV controllers. Najai (1996) writes:
'Training in new technologies in operating and maintaining modern
equipment will enable trainees to fully utilise the potentials of such new
technologies.' (Najai, 1996:162)
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Despite STV's elaborate, state-of-the-art facilities and the financial incentives offered
to producers to encourage their application, many producers are reluctant to use them
because of the dearth of experienced operators. As more than one producer remarked:
'There are no qualified staff to operate the equipment and the producer
has to struggle to keep the available less-motivated staff together.
Remember, they are civil servants who are bound by specific work hours.'3
Limited training in technical and engineering aspects of broadcasting is usually provided
by the two colleges of telecommunications in Riyadh and Jeddah. These are training
schemes for broadcast transmission and studio engineering only (Saati, 1992). In an
interview with Dr. Abdulrahman Ashobaili, a member of the Higher Council for Mass
Communication, he indicated conclusively that:
'STV is not taking professionalism seriously. This has resulted in very poor
in-house produced programming. Thirty years ago ST y
 was producing
much better quality.'4
According to Turki Aihamad (1996):
'Lack of professionalism is a common feature amongst all media
operations in the Gulf region, despite the tremendous importance of such
activity which is directly responsible for the shaping of public opinion and
attitudes [...] Both decision makers and practitioners in the
communication process are mainly unqualified to do a proper 'job' and are
unaware of the critical task at hand. '
One source of instruction can be found in the Mass Communication Departments in five
of the seven universities in Saudi Arabia. These departments, although emphasising the
theoretical aspects of media studies, also provide a small dose of basic training for
students wishing to specialise in broadcasting. The input they receive is not enough to
start a career in this sphere and they are usually in need of additional training. There
are no industry-based training providers available in the country and anyone interested
in gaining practical experience has to travel abroad, but this could be a foundation to
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build on. Training abroad is limited to the Arab Training Centre for Broadcasting, based
in Damascus, Syria, and affiliated to the Arab States Broadcasting Union.
Among the Gulf countries, there is a news anchor exchange scheme, organised by Gulf
Vision, by which each country in the GCC sends a news reader and receives one from
that particular country for ten days. Many consider such a scheme as a token one which
has limited value. Nationally, there are some training schemes in two other institutions;
first in the Institute of Public Administration, which offered instruction in areas such as
censorship, maintenance supervision, and public relations; and second, in the Institute
of Diplomatic studies, in fields such as International Relations, Gulf Studies, Information
Affairs and Diplomacy Conduct. 6 Both institutes rely on taught courses without any type
of actual practical coaching.
3. Recruitment and Payment Schemes
After completing the STV infrastructure in 1964, fifty four Saudi people were recruited
and trained in the United States and, in 1970, the Corps of Engineers trained 105 Saudis
in the USA (Boyd, 1972; Alkheraiji, 1990). These trainees have returned and become
the nuclear operating staff at STV along with employees transferred from radio. The
total number of STV staff currently amounts to 914 employees: 96 in administration, 494
technicians, 258 cultural and social staff, 25 craftspersons, 8 operational staff and 33
professionals. The impression formed after numerous personal contacts with STV
personnel is that these members of staff suffer from low morale. From observing STV
performance it can be gathered that STV professionals are constrained by a
comprehensive set of standards and they adhere to them rigidly. They are underpaid civil
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servants who, in order to receive promotion, are bound to the rules and regulations of
the Bureau of Civil Service. In addition, they are lower paid than their counterparts in
DBS. Although STV staff used to be paid extra bonuses and overtime for any work
performed outside normal working hours, these payments were axed following budgetary
reconsiderations.
The situation is that the emphasis among Arab media systems has always been on the
hardware facilities, which consume the lion's share of the available funds allocated to
media facilities, and there is no matching emphasis on software, human resources or
training schemes (Tash, 1996). The Deputy Minister for Information Affairs states that
the emphasis in the past was on building and completing the media infrastructure, while
training and development of human resources was neglected. 8 This malaise within the
industry is exacerbated by an arbitrary demarcation of duties, for example, technicians
are also weighed down by administrative responsibilities. Nor is there any form of union
for actors, technicians, and artistic professionals which could represent their interests or
be used as a policy platform.
An apparently minor, yet significant professional constraint on Saudi media is the great
importance placed by STV and radio on the classical Arabic language, sometimes at the
expense of other important qualities. Saudi communication policy emphasises this, and
there are strict rules which demand of news anchors, programme presenters and even
participants that they use this form of language as opposed to the vernacular. Proficiency
in the classical Arabic language is one of the main criteria required of applicants wishing
to work for STV or radio. This explains why there are a number of anchors, especially
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in radio, who are originally Arabic language teachers now employed as cooperating part-
timers.
Regarding recruitment policies, the Ministry of Information does not have clear
strategies for 'head-hunting' talent, and on STV there are no programmes that could
feature new performers. The Ministry of Information and STy's staffing requirements
are usually satisfied through the Bureau of Civil Service recruitment schemes. Job
seekers submit their credentials and CVs to the Bureau, who already possess information
regarding the different governmental organisations' and institutions' needs. In recent
years, due to budgetary considerations, very few applicants have been provided with
jobs, not only in the Ministry of Information, but in all branches of government
administrations.
Independent local production entities are, as a consequence, now dependent on
production teams and performers from other countries, such as Egypt, Jordan and Syria.
Saudi television in particular lacks the necessary domestic talent and professionalism for
drama production. Since for a long time this was never high on STV's list of priorities,
there was no cultivation of such careers, and therefore no training or recruitment
schemes. Local producers compensate for this by seeking foreign talent; actresses in
particular are sought from other Gulf States for the similarities in accent. However,
inviting artists from abroad to reside in Saudi Arabia for an indefmite period of time is
costly and burdens the local producer with additional expenses. It happens when the
story or plot necessitates it and when actresses are needed. To cut these additional costs,
local producers tend to squeeze the production and the staff time. ° Sometimes local
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producers along with Saudi actors have to travel abroad where talent and suitable
production arrangements can be found. Since Saudi actors are frequently involved in
other careers, they have to request a holiday from their work in order to be able to
participate.
In order to encourage and assist Saudi actors to participate in television shows produced
in other Arab countries, STV states that any production which includes Saudi actors will
enjoy an additional amount (around £900 for each actor), once it has been decided to
purchase a particular production. According to a number of local producers, this policy
has been abused by Arab producers and the intended goal has not been achieved. In
order to take advantage of such an incentive, Arab producers include in their shows
trivial and unimportant roles for Saudi actors. Many local producers and actors were
strongly opposed to such marginal participation.
Some actors value such an experience and are keen to participate. They believe that it
will provide them with an opportunity to gain experience from well-known performers,
and will increase their exposure in many Arab countries, thus gaining publicity and
increasing their own fame. Nonetheless, there are some actors who are reluctant to take
part in certain productions where their roles have to be performed in an Egyptian or
Syrian accent. Apart from the difficulties they encounter when trying to master a foreign
dialect, they find it distasteful and unnecessary. 12
This system of artistic exchange within the Arab countries is not necessarily as successful
in other arts and media spheres. Many producers believe that there is a lack of Saudi
282
script and scenario writers, and such a task cannot be supplemented by scenario writers
from other countries. They believe that scenario writers have to originate from the same
culture in order to understand the use of the language and apply it properly. Writing for
theatre and radio is as old as the radio service itself. Hussain Seraj, a pioneering Saudi
poet and intellectual from Hejaz, has written a number of plays such as Addalem Nafsuh
or 'Injustice to Oneself', in 1932; Jameel Buthina or 'Buthina's Lover Jameel', in 1942;
and Gharam Wallada or 'The Adoration of Wallada', in 1 952.' Other famous writers
include Hussain Arab, and Abdullah Balkhair. ' At present, however, the situation is
that local producers write the dialogue and scenarios themselves. According to a number
of producers, it would be a great improvement if specialised writers were to be given
these tasks as it would vastly increase the touch of professionalism. ' But as noted by
Mohammad A. Yamani (1984):
'The prerequisite for any creative writing is a cultural atmosphere that
fosters and encourages such writings, including a theatrical and publishing
movement and a cinematic industry. Such a movement will also thrive and
flourish on television in a reciprocal relationship.' (Yamani, 1984:72)
4. DBS Channels
There is a specific problem for those Saudi television directors presenters, cameramen
and technicians who, by virtue of their positions as civil servants, are bound by
government legislation. Compounding the effects of the constraints imposed by these
regulations is the fact that they are paid substantially lower salaries than their
counterparts working in the private sector or for the satellite channels. Personnel and
their salaries are controlled by government regulations and regulatory bodies. The Head
of the Production Unit in Saudi television revealed that: 'There are not enough
incentives to attract or even to keep the remaining staff.' The low salaries paid by STy,
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for example £12,000 for a director, have compelled talented professionals to seek work
with lucrative satellite broadcasters instead. Underpayment and bureaucracy in national
television systems in different Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, have now caused
what has been referred to as a 'talent drain9.
In recent years, the satellite channels have opened new opportunities for local talent and
producers. After years of dependency on Saudi television as the only buyer, some Saudi
producers have found a new potential outlet in the DBS channels with the participation
of local actors. The demand for drama has increased and a number of local producers
have entered into a co-production agreement with ART (Arab Radio and Television)
and the MBC (the Middle-East Broadcasting Centre). The flexible rules, regulations and
the relaxed censorship have opened new horizons for some Saudi producers and actors.
A recent example broadcast in January 1998 coincided with the Ramadan month - the
high season for drama in all Arab television services. It is called Awained Yagzoo
Alrnadinah or 'Awained Invades the City'. Filmed mostly within the city of Jeddah, it
is based on a young villager's experience of living in a big city with different norms and
diverse lifestyles. Recently, a local producer managed to have his work, a serial called
A yn Atareeq or 'Show Me the Way', featured by MBC and Future TV, as well as by
Bahrain TV and Kuwaiti TV.' 6 Since the cooperation between the Saudi producers and
satellite channels is a recent venture, it is premature to evaluate this experiment.
Recent years have therefore witnessed what could be called a 'mass exodus' from all
state-run television stations in the Arab countries to the satellite broadcasting market.
News anchors, directors, producers, sports commentators and actors have all found
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themselves lured by appreciative employers to more lucrative positions, as one popular
sports commentator publicly revealed. The flexibility these broadcasters as employers
have in the decision-making process, certainly as regards recruitment and payment
practices, is what the government-run media facilities lack.
5. Cultural Organisations
An investigation and appraisal of the existing cultural organisations in Saudi Arabia
reveals an enormous handicap to the development and success of media and the arts.
In the first instance, the number and size of the organisations dedicated to culture and
the arts is so minimal as to dilute any substantial effect they could possibly have. A more
in-depth evaluation uncovers a school of thought which believes that while some bodies
are virtually disabled by their individual constraints, others' duties are, in effect, more
concerned with policing the arts instead of fostering them.
5.1. The Saudi Arabian Society for Culture and Arts (SASCA)
The Saudi Arabian Society for Culture and Arts (SASCA), a governmental organisation
established in 1973, gathers together all sports and cultural activities in the country. This
society has seven branches in different cities and it operates under the General
Directorate of Youth Welfare. Included in this body's responsibilities is the adoption and
support of actors, singers, folk-dance groups, theatrical performances as well as the
organisation of public literary lectures. Among the SASCA goals is its aim to foster and
support new talent in all these areas. In each branch of SASCA there is a theatre
committee whose task is to encourage and promote theatrical performances and provide
support to theatrical movements in general. It organises workshops and training sessions
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in various aspects of theatre such as directing techniques, the art of performing, and so
on.' 7 The problems facing such an ambitious project is that the actors and performers
are hobbyists who engage in such activities on a part-time basis only. They are always
busy with their own careers and full-time occupations and are usually summoned by
SASCA to participate in seasonal festivals and local and national celebrations and
ceremonies after little or no rehearsal. A second significant problem is that very often
these actors and performers are called to act time and time again by the same producer
because they are friends, regardless of their ability to perform or suitability for the role.
As one producer stated: 'If you tell me who the producer is, I can tell you the names of
the participating cast'.'8
The General Directorate for Youth Welfare oversees and supervises sports and cultural
activities in Saudi Arabia. It seems that managing sport federations and organising
tournaments in different sport activities has overwhelmed its cultural responsibilities.
5.2. Cinema
Cinema theatres are not allowed in Saudi Arabia, but many years ago there was
instituted what could be called a 'mobile cinematic venture'; an illegal, underground
'cinema'. It comprises a risk taking entrepreneur, who owns or rents a projector and
hires a suitable venue. He then crams as many people as he and his assistants possibly
can into the 'cinema' to watch a James Bond film, for example, or an Egyptian
production. The audience consists of film goers, mainly youngsters, who are eager to see
such films. Such viewing experiences are often interrupted by a raid of so-called religious
police, whose task is to observe and maintain morality and modest behaviour in society.
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They normally confiscate the projector, if they can get hold of it before it is smuggled
out through the back door and used to restart the venture elsewhere. The absence of a
cinema culture in Saudi Arabia places further professional constraints on the
development of indigenous talent, and reduces the potential for professional
development in this art form. The consequences are the 'talent drain' referred to earlier,
where local producers and performers will seek opportunities in cinema industries
outside Saudi Arabia, and a continued dependency on televised foreign films as potential
Saudi expertise remains an untapped resource. Should Saudi Arabia decide in the future
to encourage the development of a local film industry, it would effectively increase its
dependency on film-producing nations in the West, such as the USA and Britain for
production and directing techniques, technological expertise and professional training.
5.3. Theatre
It has been said that 'Theatre is the father of the whole arts.' Theatre, as a cultural
institution, is absent from Saudi cultural life. There are no private theatres and the only
theatrical performances can be found in amateur experiments within some universities
and at SASCA, under the auspices of the General Directorate of Youth Welfare. The
creators, actors and directors involved are far from being professionals and the majority
take part simply as a hobby. The first attempt to establish a private theatre was in 1961,
when Ahmad Asobai, a progressive Saudi intellectual, submitted to the Ministry of
Information his request to open a theatre in the city of Makkah. He called it 'Dar
Quraish Litamtheel Aleslami' or 'Quraish's Islamic School for Acting'. The Ministry
granted him permission and he embarked on its construction and organisation, initially
by building the stage. He then established a drama school and annexed it. A week
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before the inauguration of this ambitious project, conservative elements in Saudi society
intervened: they approached King Saud with the intention of scuppering the plans for
the theatre and in the hope that they could persuade the King to veto the proposal. They
succeeded. The motive behind the intervention of these religious elements was their fear
that the theatre could harbour futile, un-Islamic activity (Alkhateeb, 1987). After the
infanticide of this brainchild, there were no more attempts until the establishment of
SASCA in 1973.
In the same year, SASCA was given sole responsibility of cultural activities, including
theatrical performances. Following this, a number of plays were performed on its stages
in different cities, the most notable being Tabeeb Bilmishaab or 'A Doctor by Force' and
Akher Elmishwar or 'The End of the Road'. More than forty plays were acted out in the
years that ensued and many were featured at theatre festivals in a number of Arab
countries, but few were televised and no apparent reason was given. During these years,
STV continuously featured Arab produced serials and plays, but very little attention was
paid to local productions. Local producers began to sense this indifference and it left
them feeling both discouraged and demotivated. After such a passionate and successful
start, the theatre movement in Saudi Arabia is now dissipating for a number of reasons:
firstly, because of the absence of clear planning and the total lack of encouragement
given by STV to local producers, then because of the dependency in the 1980s and 1990s
on cheap television shows imported from Arab countries such as Egypt and Syria.
Alhamdan, the Head of the Drama Department in ST y, observes that: 'The absence of
theatre from our cultural life has its impact on the development of local drama
production'.
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In addition to the problems described, the one major impediment to the success of local
production, whether it be theatre or television drama, is nepotism. Once a producer has
succeeded in securing a deal with STy, the participants or actors chosen for the
prospective show, especially if it is drama production, will be his close friends. Each
producer has a number of acquaintances who work with him, despite their suitability for
the roles. There are frequently cases when the plot and scenarios are modified to fit
such participants.
6. Conclusion
To conclude, the lack of artistic and creative personnel and the absence of cultural
institutions are major impediments to local production. Recognition, encouragement, and
financial rewards and incentives are crucial to boosting creativity and productivity among
practitioners in all aspects of the media and this is what has been lacking in STy. 20 The
unsuccessful private theatre project, the ban on cinema, and the non-existence of schools
dedicated to the performing arts have contributed to the dearth of talent currently
pervading Saudi society. Local producers, in light of this, are now dependent on hired
staff from other countries. STV recruitment practices and the lack of practical training,
along with the paucity of incentives have been the principal obstacles in the way of
realising the potential of its elaborate facilities, equipment and arrangements. Many
producers have hopes for theatre, but they believe that the efforts exerted by SASCA
to encourage theatre are not enough. It is vital that a plan be formulated to revive it:
a plan which includes a mechanism whereby other countries' experiences in theatre
could be used and exploited. Some producers and actors suggest that until there are
specialised arts schools, visiting experts in theatre arts could be invited to Saudi Arabia
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to conduct workshops and seminars for local talents as a first step in this direction. 21
More flexible recruitment, training schemes and incentives for television staff, and the
close co-operation through co-production with satellite companies are also essentially
needed.
In the sphere of the broadcasting media, the current performance of STy in general, and
its news reporting programmes in particular, leaves a great deal of scope for
improvement.
'STy is required to have confidence in local production, and has to exert
efforts to discover Saudi talent, and has to play a more positive role in
encouraging local production and use its capabilities. Importation and
dependency on foreign produced television materials has negatively
affected local creativity and harmed Saudi talent.' (Ashobaili, 1992:73)
For the local Saudi production companies to prosper and play a significant role in
eradicating the cultural inconsistencies in foreign-made television materials, the Ministry
of Information rules and regulations have to be reformed and revised.
However, the broadcasting industry suffers from the same constraints as the arts industry
as a whole: a lack of incentive and inadequate training schemes and facilities. These
have resulted in limited indigenous human resources and weak production teams leading
to poor quality output. This has not only helped to continue the reliance on imported
media fare and foreign human resources, but also encouraged Saudi actors and
producers to look outside Saudi Arabia for professional development, draining the
country of its native talent with which it could develop a self-reliant media industry.
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CHAPTER IX
ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS
1. Introduction
The economic constraints on STV activities can be seen to pervade every facet of its
production potential. The following discussion examines how sources of funding for STV
are monopolised by the Government and looks at the ramifications that this lack of
financial independence has for STV itself and for local producers. While this funding
would naturally include direct government subsidies, it also encompasses income derived
from advertising and sponsorship on STV itself. This chapter also considers how the
absence of consistent pricing policies and arbitrary budgetary considerations have led to
ill-conceived programming schedules, the featuring of poor-quality productions and
limited the production capacity of STy's facilities; factors which have served to
discourage and deter local producers from attempting to negotiate with STy.
2. Economic Constraints on Artistic and Technological Capacity
SW possesses the latest in equipment and technology and maintains elaborate facilities.
For example, it has on-line studios and advanced sound-mixing systems with off-line
suites. The production department comprises five studios between 350 and 500 square
metres, and a purpose-built theatre stage equipped to suit live, televised broadcasts. It
has a capacity for an audience of 900, camera and light control rooms, and make-up and
dressing rooms attached. STV also has a complete cinematic production unit with a
special film development and exposure laboratory. A number of mobile transmission
vans have all the equipment necessary to provide on-the-spot, live coverage of unfolding
events. There is also a production services department with all the vital support units of
workshops and accessories needed for any production process (see Table No.10). These
advanced studios are, in fact, available for local, private producers who wish to use them
at a 20% to 25 % discount of the original agreed cost.
Table No.10. Saudi Television Studios
• :.	
••. SAUDI::1TELE\SION.STt5DIOS. :: ::. :
STATION	 STUDIO	 AREA	 PURPOSE
NAME:"':	 • :	 ::::::: i 	:::::
Riyadh	 A	 500 sq.m	 Production
Riyadh	 B	 326 sq.m	 Production
Riyadh	 C	 326 sq.m	 Production
Riyadh	 1	 150 sq.m	 News
Riyadh	 2	 150 sq.m	 News
Riyadh	 1	 42 sq.m	 Continuity
Jeddah	 1	 200 sq.m	 Production
Dammam	 1	 225 sq.m	 Production
Dammam	 2	 8 sq.m	 Continuity
Madinah	 1	 150 sq.m	 Production
Alqasim	 1	 150 sq.m	 Production
Abha	 1	 150 sq.m	 Production
Source: Ministry of Information 1997.
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Although STV has this production potential, it limits itself solely to the making of studio-
based religious talk shows, the daily news bulletins, special programmes on National
Day, for example, and the broadcasting of ceremonies and sports events. One of the
consequences of the economic constraints on technological and artistic training is the
profound lack of skilled technicians and artistic professionals who could operate such
equipment and facilities to their full capacity.
3. STV Funding
Despite the introduction of advertising in 1986, STV operations are subsidised not from
the advertising revenue, but by a budget directly from the government. This is due to
the centralised fiscal system by which any revenue generated from a Government-run
institution, including oil exports, must be deposited with the Saudi Arabian Monetary
Agency (SAMA), which acts as a central bank. These revenues come directly under the
control of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy. The budget of the Ministry
of Information, as of any other government body, is allocated according to its perceived
forecast needs for the fiscal year, in line with the proposals prepared by the Finance and
Administration Department, which belongs to the Ministry of Information. As with other
government bodies, such proposals are subject to negotiation and deliberations between
officials from both Ministries. The need for such negotiations and the axing process that
often follows have been common practice in recent years because of the sharp decline
in government revenues caused by a depreciation in oil prices. Oil sales are the mainstay
of all government funding, accounting for 80% of the national income. Recent studies
completed by the Centre for Energy Studies, based in London, anticipate that this trend
will continue in 1999 and beyond. 2 According to 'The Economist', 3 Saudi Arabia's
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revenue in 1997 was $45 million and will be around $30 million in 1998, with a deficit
that could reach 13 million US dollars. Such financial difficulties have, in fact, affected
not only media operations but also all other areas of govermnent and non-government
spending.
3.1. Sponsorship
The financial hardship experienced in the 1 990s caused STy officials to consider other
non-government sources of funding. In 1994, an ad hoc, task force sub-committee was
formed to explore new avenues of funding to subsidise some of the programmes and to
minimise the dependency on government funds. The current members include the
Director of Channel 1 STV and the Head of the Communications and Advertising
Department, as well as the directors of various other departments at ST y. Together,
they outlined a number of strategies designed to lure advertisers to sponsor programmes
in exchange for broadcasting their advertisements (Alkheraiji, 1994). Since then the
committee has managed to find sponsors for a number of programmes, such as an
equestrian show, which is sponsored by the Ford Cars Dealership in the Central region;
a so-called family programme - a house-keeping show directed primarily at women and
sponsored by a commercial firm who provided a complete kitchen in order to have its
name publicised before the programme started; and a children's programme. Certain
sports programmes have been sponsored by the Gillette Corporation and the Visa Credit
Card Company. The committee completed a draft of a contract agreement with terms
and conditions applicable to STV and to any potential sponsor, and referred it to the
management for ratification. It is also hoping, according to the minutes of its meetings,
to attract more sponsors for a wider range of programmes to reduce the strain on the
296
Ministry of Information expenditure."
3.2. Pre-advertising
In 1969, when STV was undergoing a management overhaul, the potential of advertising
as a source of income was examined. In advocating the adoption of an administrative
system similar to that in the United States, Shobaili, Head of AVCO staff at the time,
offered the following advice:
'Commercial broadcasting operates on the principles of supplying the
greatest number of viewers to an individual advertiser, therefore
commercial revenues are vital to the success of commercial television in
the United States. In Saudi Arabia, the TV network can operate with the
American method of management successfully without the requirements
of satisfying the advertiser, or some public group.' (Shobaili, 1971:224)
This was a giant step away from a government monopolised television station towards
the establishment of a public corporation partly funded by advertising revenue. In 1972,
Shobaili requested the endorsement of advertising on television. In his proposal he
highlighted the fact that advertising revenue could partly relieve the government of the
financial burden incurred by media funding, but it was ignored.
Since 1970, STV has incorporated advertising in the form of another type of production
sponsorship. The committee members initially appointed to deal with this were the
Deputy Minister for Planning Affairs, Mr. Shehab Jamjoom; and then the Deputy
Minister for Television Affairs, Mr. Mohammad Haidar Mushikh. The project has
encouraged businessmen and national enterprises to endorse certain productions by
supplying equipment in return for credit and acknowledgment:
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'The only occasional type of TV commercial used in Saudi Arabia is that
where a station is supplied with props or prizes for drama and quiz shows
and in return the station broadcasts at the end of the programme the
source of materials furnished by a dealer or company.' (Shobaili, 1971:241)
Advertising opportunities increase during the month of Ramadan when national
corporations and local enterprises are invited to sponsor the four quiz programmes
shown at this time. The advertiser's name is displayed for a few seconds before the show
begins. The financial management of these shows is the responsibility of the Deputy
Information Minister. His office stipulates the deadline for submission of applications
for advertising, which is usually around 15 days before transmission. However, the
decline in the oil revenue and its repercussions on international economies has reduced
the willingness of these potential advertisers to participate in production sponsorship.
There are still problems pertaining to the programming of advertisements before and
after a sponsored programme, for example, no interruptions are permitted; a long
standing practice by STV which is believed to deter and discourage this form of
sponsorship.
3.3. Advertising
Support for television advertising began in the early 1980s among officials in the
Ministry of Information, the Supreme Council for Mass Communication and certain
business circles. The print media were used as a mouthpiece to advocate the need for
television commercials and to convince decision making bodies of the potential benefits
to the economy that advertising would bring. Alkheraiji (1994) describes a proposal
aimed at encouraging the Government to take action, put forward by Okadh, a daily
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newspaper. He summarises its suggestions as follows:
1. Introducing advertising would not mean that the Government would be
unable to support the broadcasting system in Saudi Arabia, and that the
Government's generosity could continue.
2. Regulations such as those found in other countries might be applicable
to STV so as to protect the media from abuse by advertisers.
3. Twenty minutes a day would be a reasonable share for advertisers, any
greater time allocation might deviate television from its educational and
social responsibilities.
4. Strong regulations would give TV stations the upper hand in protecting
children and viewers form any advertising abuse.5
In 1983 the Minister of Information was granted permission by Royal Decree to
establish the introduction of television advertising, albeit with restrictions, to Channel
2. He set up a committee to expedite this process and to outline the necessary directions
and procedures. 'The go-ahead for the English-only channel indicates some significant
policy assumption to do with the preservation of control over Saudi culture' (Alkheraiji,
1994:141). In August 1983 a committee meeting took place, the outcome of which is
outlined by Alkheraiji (1994) as follows:
1. That television stations do not have either the manpower, the
experience or the facilities to deal directly with advertisers or to handle
the advertising procedure and filing.
2. As an alternative, the committee agreed that STV should contract the
largest advertising agencies to perform the marketing within the limited
time allowances and prices set by STy.
3. Advertising agencies would be responsible for ensuring that all
advertisements shown on STy are within the set regulations, and would
protect the consumer from anything misleading.
4. Advertising should, in the beginning, be carried on the second channel
only (English channel), and the time allocation for advertisements should
not exceed 15-20 minutes a day; to be divided into three periods during
the day.
5. The committee studied the prices set by Egypt, Lebanon, and the Gulf
299
States, and had taken into consideration the population, the number of
television sets, the national income and individual Saudi's standard of
living, and suggested that STV advertising prices should be double those
in Kuwait. (Alkheraiji, 1994:141)
The prices which were originally suggested have been modified. Nevertheless, the cost
of advertising on STV is still considered to be higher than on any other television
company. 6 There are also two systems of rates currently in effect, one for national
industries and the other for international industries (see Table No.11 and Table No. 12).
The committee also proposed that revenue derived from advertising should be invested
in television production, but this suggestion has never been adopted and all advertising
revenue has to be absorbed by the government as part of the national income (see Table
No.13).
300
Table No.11
Rates of commercial advertising on both channels for national industries.
TIME IN	 'TZM1 IN
	 MORNJNG	 REGULAR	 WSTLNCUISIIED	 SECJAL
MINUTES	 SE(ONIS	 I'EiUOD	 PRR1OI :.	 .: PEkIOD •.	 •.iERIOD
One	 CH.1 1750	 CH.1 3500	 CIII 5250	 CH.1 6300
quarter	 18
	
CH.2 1225	 CH.2 2450	 CH.2 3150	 CH.2 4200
One	 CH.1 2800	 CfI.1 5600	 CH.1 8400	 CH.1 10.500
ball	 25 - 35
	
CH.2 1750
	 CH.2 3500	 CH.2 5250	 CH.2 7000
Three	 CIJ.l 3850	 CII.! 7700	 CH.1 11.200	 CH.I 8400
quartera	 . 40 50
	
CH.2 2450	 CH.2 4900	 CH.2 7000	 CH.2 8400
ODe minute
	
	 CH.l 5250	 CH.J 10.500	 CH.1 14.000	 CH.1 17.500
55 - 60
	
CII.2 3150	 CH.2 6300	 CH.2 8400	 CH.2 10.500
10 Saudi Riyals = £1.66
Source: The Principles and Basic Rules for Commercial Advertising on Saudi TV,
1996.
Table No.12
Rates of commercial advertising on both channels for international industries.
TIME IN	 TlMI IN
	
MORNING	 . REGULAR: . DISTINGUISHED :::
	
SFECIAL:
M1NLTES	 SE('GNI)S	 IER1OTh	 ...	 *pIuior
One	 CH.I 2500	 CH.I 5000	 CH.1 7500	 CH.1 9000
quarter	 IZ - 18
	
CH.2 1750	 CH.2 3500	 CH.2 4500	 CH.2 6000
One	 CH.1 4000	 CIII 8000	 CII.1 12.00	 CH.1 15.000
half	 25-35
	
CH.2 2500	 CH.2 5000	 CH.2 7500	 CH.2 10000
Three	 .	 .	 CH.1 5500	 CH.1 11000	 CI1.1 16.000	 CH.1 20.000
quartere	 40 50
	
CH.2 3500	 CH.2 7000	 CH.2 10.000	 CH.2 12.000
One minute	 CH.1 7500	 CH.1 15.000	 CH.1 20.000	 CH.1 25.000
55 - 60
	
CH.2 4500	 CH.2 9000	 CH.2 12.000	 CH.2 15.000
10 Saudi Riyals	 £1.66
Source: The Principles and Basic Rules for Commercial Advertising on Saudi TV,
1996.
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Table No.13
Saudi Television Advertisement Revenue (1986 to 1997) in Saudi Riyals.
YEAR	 : __::..:: : 1. : _: AMOUN .1(In Rii)
1986	 44,297,101
1987	 139,015,529
1988	 168,350,116
1989	 202,157,144
1990	 161,674,684
1991	 181,032,104
1992	 241,348,556
1993	 226,554,581
1994	 213,439,850
1995	 174,066,003
1996	 128,320,490
1997	 110,989,450
Source: Figures obtained personally from the Department of Administration and
Finance at the Ministry of Information, 1997.
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According to an unpublished study on advertising expenditure by the media in Saudi
Arabia, carried out by the Pan Arab Research Centre in 1998, STy revenues from
advertising have been decreasing since 1995 (see Table No.14).7 The rates of advertising
on STV are considerably higher than the rates offered by DBS covering the Saudi
market. Such high rates, when coupled with poor output and unpopular productions, as
well as the ill-conceived programming strategies adopted by STy, have created an
unwelcoming and discouraging editorial climate which is unable to lure advertisers.
Although the Saudi market advertisement expenditure was the highest of all GCC
countries in 1997 at $340 million (29.8%), ST y's share was only 9.5% as opposed to
62.5% for newspapers, 17.5% for magazines and 10.5% for outdoor activities.8
Increasingly, major advertisers targeting the Saudi market are now by-passing STy and
are dealing with DBS channels such as LBC, Future TV, MBC and ESC, not only in
placing advertisements on these channels but also in sponsoring their programmes (see
Table No.14).
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Table No. 14 Advertising expenditure by media showing annual changes in percentages
(Figures in US$-000's)
MEDIA	 Jan-Dec	 Jan-Dec	 Jan-Dec	 Jan-Dec	 Jan-Dec	 Jan-Dec	 Jan	 Jan
_________	 1994	 1995	 1995	 1996	 1996	 1997	 1997	 1998
	
z	 x	 x
Saudi
Media	 ______	 ______	 ______	 ______	 ______ ______ ____ _____ _____
STV 1	 53630	 45283	 -16	 45283	 40787	 -10	 40787	 30803	 -24	 2675	 1772	 -34
STy
 2	 3107	 2330	 -25	 2330	 1734	 -26	 1734	 1134	 -35	 39	 7	 -82
Total SN
	 56737	 47613	 -16	 47613	 42521	 -11	 42521	 31937	 -25	 2714	 1779	 -34
Magazine	 47179	 55713	 18	 55713	 62977	 13	 62977	 59592	 -5	 5463	 6461	 18
NEWP	 160053	 165512	 3	 165512	 185433	 12	 185433	 212755	 15	 22117	 22335	 1
OUTDOOR	 0	 0	 0	 0	 37776	 100	 37776	 30135	 -20	 3002	 2719	 -9
Pan Arab
Media___________ ___________ 	 ___________ __________ 	 __________ __________ _______ ________ ________
MBC	 41296	 40344	 -2	 40344	 49832	 24	 49832	 55881	 12	 4106	 5835	 42
ESC	 16314	 16519	 1	 16519	 15156	 8	 15156	 14844	 -2	 1325	 4411	 233
DXB	 2996	 3305	 10	 3305	 fl83	 87	 6183	 10990	 78	 660	 2717	 312
ART	 5044	 15315	 204	 15315	 17584	 15	 17584	 13399	 -24	 2702	 6777	 151
JORDAN	 265	 480	 81	 480	 83	 83	 83	 1283	 1446	 6	 58	 867
LBC	 0	 0	 0	 0	 13740	 100	 13740	 104826	 663	 4824	 10811	 124
nV	 0	 0	 0	 0	 602	 100	 602	 41614	 6813	 1462	 9163	 527
A.DHABI	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 5441	 100	 0	 2021	 100
SYRIA	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 561	 100	 0	 8	 100
AL	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 2284	 100	 0	 609	 100
JALIRAH______ ______	 ______ ______	 _____ ______ ____ ____ ____
Total	 65915	 75963	 15	 75963	 103180	 36	 103180	 251123	 143	 15085	 42410	 181
satellite__________	 __________	 __________ __________ 	 _________ _________ ______ _______ _______
(AGAZINE	 49583	 61112	 23	 61112	 81475	 33	 81475	 86106	 6	 6668	 6155	 8
NEWP	 8449	 10791	 28	 10791	 11982	 11	 11982	 12913	 8	 1122	 1009	 10
MBC FM	 0	 8076	 100	 8076	 12636	 56	 12636	 10732	 -15	 1312	 691	 47
Source: Unpublished study conducted by PARC, Pan Arab Research Centre (1998)
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4. Subsidy of Independent Local Production
Although nobody was willing to discuss the financial aspects of the private companies'
operations, one can infer quite easily that they are not flourishing and are struggling on
shoe-string budgets. The majority of these independent production companies are
without sufficient sustainable resources. The instability of the market caused by low
demand does not allow for the regeneration of capital and profits: a situation which
leaves these companies extremely vulnerable. A delay in the production process by the
Ministry of Information's crippling rules and lengthy bureaucracy brings the producers
to the verge of bankruptcy. Local production has not been successful in gaining subsidies
from Saudi investors and their capital. As Dr. Aljasir, the Deputy Minister of
Information and member of the Supreme Council of Mass Communication, has indicated
to this author: 'Local business people prefer to invest and deal in the tangible
materialistic goods and not in any form of cultural products.' 9
 This is mainly because
of their lack of expertise in this area and the element of high risk involved. With a few
exceptions, local production companies are chiefly operating on the windfalls from the
personal savings of their owners, without real investment or stable fmancial
arrangements.
5. Pricing Policy
The existing pricing policy for television programmes dates back to 1982 when it was last
revised (see Appendix D). In the absence of fixed rates and prices, if work is acceptable
and fits the criteria for the Ministry, it will be rated as either 'excellent' or 'good' by an
evaluation committee. This system of production rating directly affects the price offered
and consequently invites the producer to engage in a haggling process with the Ministry.
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The Ministry usually pays for what Saudi television actually broadcasts, not for the
whole 'approved' work. Besides, these rates and prices are indiscriminately based on the
screen-hour as a unit, with no serious consideration of the quality of the broadcast.
In more detail, the current system is such that production companies, whilst dealing with
STy, could choose to submit a programme proposal (a written script, a production plan
and a budget) or a 'finished' ready-made programme on tape, known as 'available
production'. In both cases, Ministry of Information approval must be obtained. The so-
called 'available production', if it conforms to the Ministry of Information's conditions,
can fetch 30,000 Saudi Riyals for one televised hour. This type of production involves
a considerable risk to the producer, as more than one producer has indicated to this
author, since the approval and acceptance of the Ministry of Information has to be
obtained at a very late stage after the actual production has been completed. Censorship
and budgetary considerations are the most obvious criteria which form the basis for the
Ministry's decisions. There are instances when STV arbitrarily and unilaterally edits the
'available production'; a process which happens at a very late stage and directly affects
the quoted price and the amount of money the producers will receive because of the
Ministry's price per broadcasting hour policy. There are also cases where the Ministry
of Information asks the producers to replace these edited materials, burdening the
production with additional costs.'° This right that the Ministry reserves for itself is also
applicable to other forms of production.
Producers frequently engage in a time-consuming haggling process in an attempt to
convince the STV authorities. One producer, in a personal interview, told this author
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that her programme proposal was circulated through the bureaucratic decision-making
avenues for more than two years, finally to be rejected on budget grounds. After a time-
wasting bargaining and haggling process, the projected proposal was dropped, only to be
picked up later by one of the satellite channels. According to the producers, the Ministry
of Information is using their authority to dictate the prices that suit their budget. ' The
rates and prices adopted by the Ministry of Information are indiscriminately based on
the screen-hour as a unit, with no proper consideration of the production quality. Many
producers believe that such a criterion does not do justice to the quality shows and
programmes which may be of a superior nature. Some producers believe that there
should be a tiered price tariff with fluctuations based on different criteria such as
production quality and actual production cost. 12 They also feel that the insensitive
pricing policy has actually encouraged the production of cheap low-quality shows
designed to be budgeted to those prices and to allow for some extra profit.
The dated and arbitrary pricing policy, coupled with lengthy bureaucratic processes,
deters many producers from making new proposals. They believe it is time for these
rates and tariffs to be revised. Under the present 17-year old tariff, the Ministry pays
8,000 riyals an hour for a children's programme, the equivalent of £1,300. Drama is
traditionally the most expensive genre and quantitative analysis shows that STV devotes
about 47% of its time to imported dramatic shows (see chapter VI). According to some
producers, STV spends around 15 million Riyals annually on imported drama showsf
STY officials have declined to discuss its financial matters. Nevertheless, this author has
learned from au courant inside sources that ST y allocated 40 million Saudi Riyals to
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satisfy its programming requirements and the payment of royalties for copyrighted
material in 1996, and 30 million Riyals in 1997 (10 Saudi Riyals = £1 .66). According to
Dr. Ali Najai, the Ministry of Information Deputy Assistant for Television Affairs, STV
has spent not more than 2 million Saudi Riyals annually on local production in past
years. But in 1997, STy spent 10 million Riyals on locally produced programmes
supplied by local independent production companies. 14 The availability of funds enabled
STy to acquire and feature 7 locally produced shows, mostly dramas, in the month of
Ramadan, 1418 (1997). The backlash effect of budgetary considerations in the
programming of locally produced shows usually manifests itself during this month. Due
to the apparent absence of long-term budgetary plans, the Ministry of Information will
commission a number of local producers to prepare and submit programme proposals
at short notice and within a limited time frame. It has become a tradition every year,
during the month of Ramadan (the fasting month), for Saudi television to exhibit a more
locally produced show. This amounts to a high number of shows in a one month period.
When investigating this issue, it was found that the Ministry wished to provide the
opportunity for as many producers as possible to prove themselves. In the last few years,
as more than one producer has indicated, producers have been contacted by STy
 and
asked to prepare a drama series or a situation comedy for the Ramadan month as
quickly as possible and only one or two months prior to scheduled screening. Local
producers find it too difficult to put together a watchable quality show when given such
short notice. However, the reason for this last minute approach is also attributed to the
availability of money allocated by the Ministry of Finance. In 1997, seven local
productions were shown in the month of Ramadan; Tash ma Tash ('Enough or Not?'),
Kalek Mai ('Bear with Me'), Asaraha Raha ('Frankness is a Good Thing'), Khoud a
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Hat ('Give and Take'), Mataeb Dahika ('Comic Endeavours') and Athareeb or
('Obstacles'). ' Of these, only two proved popular: Tash ma Tash, a 20-episode, 30-
minute, nightly comedy and Kalek Mai, a drama series based on real-life situations.
There is a great deal of similarity between all of these shows and they all demonstrate
an inherent weakness created by hasty production methods as producers are rushed into
premature, ill-written and badly planned shows. In Ramadan of 1998, STY featured only
two indigenous productions: Tash ma Tash sequence 4, and another show called Aylat
abo Rwaished ('Abo Rwaished's Family').16
In a rare incident where the Ministry disregarded this pricing policy, the outcome was
one of the most successful indigenous comedy shows in the history of local production.
The show, Tash ma Tash, after special personal intervention by the Minister of
Infonnation himself, was offered double the normal average price: 140,000 Saudi Riyals
per hour, equivalent to £23,000, with some of it payable in advance. This factor alone
may have contributed to its success. It is unclear why such a show was given such
preferential treatment, and producers have expressed to this author their demand for a
level playing field and equal opportunity, not only regarding the price offered but also
in the degree of freedom enjoyed by this show in tackling certain taboo subjects.
Apart from this exception, the Ministry of Information move to encourage local
production has, in effect, backfired: 'It would be much better if we were given enough
time to produce more mature work and have it scheduled in after Ramadan', one
producer contends. He adds: 'There is not a single locally produced show during the rest
of the year' . The idea of cramming in too many local shows and spending 12 million
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Riyals in one month has not, in fact, aided local production. It would be better,
according to some producers, if the Ministry had a plan by which the shows would be
evenly dispersed throughout the year.' 9 This plan would enable the producers to devote
more time and effort to their work and would relieve the pressure of time constraints.
6. Dependency
Although the production companies are independent enterprises, the Ministry of
Information is the government agency which supervises regulates and provides permits
for their operations. Almost all of these companies are dependent on STV as the main
purchaser of their productions, with the exception of the few well-organised, well-
financed ones, such as the ARA Production Company and Asharika Alarabiah, which
have managed to expand the market and have established relationships with some of the
satellite broadcasters. Some producers believe that any television programme initially
produced for STV which must conform to it rules and conditions cannot be marketed
to other broadcasters because of these rules. 2° Dependency on STy has been recognised
by some producers as one of the problems facing local production. As one producer put
it: 'STy
 has its unique editorial climate, requirements and obligations.' He adds: 'To
independent local producers, drama is the most wanted genre, and it is where most of
the clashes with censorship lie. Why not explore some other genres?' He gave as an
example a cookery show he had produced and had managed to promote easily among
many broadcasters in the Arab world.2'
7. Conclusion
This chapter has described how, far from being a lucrative industry, local media
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production in Saudi Arabia is constrained by government practices regarding out of date
and inconsistent pricing policies, limitations on advertisement expenditure and the lack
of economic support for training media personnel, among other factors. Combined with
the political and professional constraints investigated in the previous two chapters, it
becomes apparent why local production companies are unable to develop their potential
and are cornered into producing programmes of poor quality in terms of both production
and content in attempt to satisfy all the criteria of censorship, bureaucracy, STV policy,
and so forth. It is inevitable that the appeal of foreign programme of quality, which is
not subject to the same constraints, increases in this context and facilitates the situation
of dependency on foreign imports.
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CHAPTER X
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. A Summary of the Overall Problem
The Saudi government, since 1970, has embarked on an ambitious plan of development
which affects all aspects of Saudi life. Enormous revenues derived from oil resources
have been utilised to build up Saudi Arabia as modem 20th century nation; its building
and development programme is large and its achievements are abundantly visible in
every corner of the country. The infrastructure: communication systems, roads, airports,
hospitals, schools, and higher education institutions, was targeted for major development
projects and completed in the 1980s.
Thus Saudi Arabia's material progress is obvious, but, unfortunately, it was built in
record time and this presented a number of disadvantages principally relating to
readjustment. Although Saudi Arabia possesses state-of-the-art mass media technology,
it has not been exploited as a tool to explain the government's ambitious plans, nor to
encourage the Saudis to assume important and effective roles in these development
projects. Social awareness, national responsibility, motivation and mobilisation of the
people are the key principles underpinning genuine development - and yet they are the
missing factors in Saudi development. The media do not identify the needs of the
people, nor do they act as feedback mechanisms, and the Saudis have been cast as
mainly passive recipients to all these innovations from the outset. Indeed, the
development plans are on-going and Saudi Arabia is in the process of carrying out its
sixth five-year development plan for the period from 1995 to 2000. Yet, still, the media
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are excluded from the development equation. For a variety of reasons, this failure to
take full advantage of radio and television for development purposes is common to
many developing countries (see Schramm, 1964). Vertical, unidirectional and
authoritarian media messages flow from the top downwards. This is transmission without
communication - a fundamental failing to utilise the potential of the medium.
Saudi viewers have become all too easily persuaded and swayed by an illusory sense of
completeness and perfection projected by a fast-moving consumer television market with
unprecedented channel exploitation. They have also become exposed to waves of
misinformation and antagonistic views. The days of monologue discourse, when messages
were designed only to please their creators are over; the adoption of paternalistic, 'big-
brother' information policies has proven to be futile and inconsistent in today's satellite
age.
1.1. Involvement in Cultural Life
In most developing countries, the media's role in society is misinterpreted. Most of these
countries have assigned their media systems, particularly broadcasting, to entertain the
public. Saudi Arabia is no different: from its inception in society, television has been
envisaged by policy-makers and politicians as a source of innocent diversion. As this
study demonstrates, broadcasting media in Saudi Arabia have devoted a substantial
amount of time to entertainment materials, comprising serials, soap operas and variety
programmes, etc. To the conservative element in Saudi society, these are slick, vapid
types of shows dominating the output with alien problems and alien values which might
be in conflict with the Saudi Muslim culture. Topics often discussed in the few 'home-
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made' programmes on Saudi television are often far removed from current affairs and
government policies. Because of this emphasis on entertainment, broadcasting media
have not been used to an appreciable extent as agents either to broaden the policy
dialogue or to widen the horizons of Saudi citizens.
This failing could be of vital importance to the country in its pursuit of development on
individual, local and national levels. At a time when teachers in schools and preachers
in mosques are urging their pupils and their congregations, respectively, to abide by
Islamic teachings, because in so doing they will achieve success, the nightly television
dramas demonstrate the opposite and contradict such discourse. Of course, entertainment
is a legitimate end in itself in today's stressful world but, in the light of current
performances, it has become the main function of all media at the expense of other
important functions, such as informing, enlightening and educating the public.
The largest quantitative component of broadcasting, entertainment is regarded as neutral
from a political and developmental point of view (Katz and Wedell, 1978). In Saudi
Arabia, it comprises politically 'safe' programmes, mainly because more serious topics
might provoke disciplinary action by the Ministry of Information. However, this is not
conducive to fostering in Saudi viewers a sense of self-knowledge or knowledge of the
immediate environment. Neither are social, political, and economic developments in
their country and around the world made explicit. Unfortunately, development
objectives, as articulated by social thinkers and Saudi planners, have not yet been
mtegrated in media operations.
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1.2. Dependency
This problem will be perpetuated as long as STV is dependent on foreign productions
to fulfil its quota of entertainment. This dependency has been partly engendered by
problems inhibiting the development of a local, indigenous production industry which
include insufficient infrastructure, a shortage of materials and services that keep a
broadcasting system in operation, as well as a lack of incentives for trained technicians,
actors, producers and other essential staff. STV is dependent on 'canned' Anglo-
American programmes, and they would rather acquire these programmes at a lower cost
than build their own local production and distribution system.
This heavy dependence on importation has not only exacerbated existing problems but
also created new ones. As the analysis of the programme content of the imports
illustrates, inconsistencies and even conflicts with Islam and the values and own interests
of Saudi society are apparent. By avoiding relevant and pressing issues, important to
Saudi viewers, and substituting them with 'void' alien shows, and by discussing marginal
and trivial issues, an artificial climate has been created on Saudi television which fails
to appeal to a large segment of the viewing population. What is missing in Saudi
television is the flavour and character of local culture, and programmes that reflect
nation's identity.
1.3. Bureaucracy
In addition, a number of specific problems limit the appeal of STV and inhibit the
development of local production. As described in chapters VIl-IX, bureaucratic processes
constitute a major obstacle. Historically, the government, through the Ministry of
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Information and other governmental organisations such as the Saudi Arabian Culture
and Arts Society, retains full control and supervision of all production and creative
aspects in the cultural sphere. This entails lengthy, centralised, bureaucratic measures in
the decision making process regarding literary production or artistic performances.
However, it is observable that those productions rigorously vetted for suitability and
conformity with local standards (through the censorship rules applied by the Ministry of
Information on imported television) are generally the least watched stations (Bait-Almal,
1993; Al-Oofy, 1995). These decisions are usually based on vague authoritarian criteria
open to a multitude of interpretations and are designed to maintain a close monitoring
system on such activities. Under this centralised government regime there is no room for
initiatives from individuals nor from non-governmental agencies. In the case of local
production companies and independent producers, surveys show that one of the most
frustrating obstacles is the lengthy and unnecessary bureaucratic procedure which is
involved in the making and submission of a production. Proposals for new shows
submitted to the Ministry of Information are circulated and shuffled from one committee
to another for months and even years (see chapter VII). Producers have to wait for long
periods of time for decisions to be made regarding their work while independent
producers are usually left in the dark and unless they have personal connections within
the decision making authority, there is little chance of it arriving at a favourable
conclusion.
1.4. Finance
Financial constraints pose further problems. STy is dependent on government subsidies
but this monetary system, as illustrated in chapter IX, has its lengthy procedural methods
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for funding which do not suit the nature of the broadcasting business. Broadcasting
operations cannot be delayed or suspended in order to wait for such administrative
procedures to take effect over weeks or months. STy advertisement revenue, under this
monetary system is deposited directly to the national income treasury with the Ministry
of Finance and National Economy. STV has no right, according to this system, to make
use of any of this revenue. It is simply treated as a 'much cow' .Finally, the pricing policy
of local independent production is seventeen years old and many producers surveyed in
this study have indicated that the policy is outdated and does not take into account the
rising costs of television production.
1.5. Management and Recruitment
Weaknesses in management and recruitment create further limitations on STV output.
As shown in chapter 1/Ill, STy' s human resources are civil servants who are expected
to return a certain number of hours' work for a fixed monthly salary. As in any other
government organisation, STV personnel abide by the rules and regulations of the
Bureau for Civil Service in recruitment and promotions. A centralised system such as
this does not provide an iota of flexibility for STV to recruit talented people; nor does
it offer encouraging incentives or bonuses for the existing workforce.
1.6. Local Independent Production Companies
Internal defects in local and independent production companies, as revealed by my
survey and first-hand observation, exacerbate the development problem. There is a
strong reticence to produce and offer a wider variety of genre while drama is so highly
priced and sought after; this genre has become their main focus. Nepotism, as mentioned
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in chapter VIII, is also one of the major shortcomings in local production companies.
Finally, the majority of producers and actors are not dedicated or committed to their
work but treat it as a hobby while concentrating more on their own permanent and more
secure jobs.
It is therefore inevitable that if STy and local production fail to attract the Saudi
audience, other broadcasters, such as DBS, will succeed by monopolising on their
weaknesses while the Saudi viewing population will welcome the diversity and often
superior quality of production. Some writers hailed the new Arab satellite system as a
solution to the cultural dependency on Western media products, but an examination of
the current programme content of Arab television leaves us with little hope. The ever-
increasing number of distribution channels offered by satellites has strengthened the
demand for television programmes. A study conducted by the Arab States Broadcasting
Union (ASBU) on the Arabic satellite channels concludes that these channels have no
clear strategy, apart from the aim of making a profit, and that they are heavily
dependent on foreign produced programmes.
2. Recommendations for the Ministry of Information
Policies and regulations for the development of local, indigenous production.
This author believes that there is no reason for not utilising the media as an institution
with considerable importance as a means of expression in actual programming; the
technical apparatus is now in place and the qualified staff could be made available. It
is hoped that the Saudi broadcast media, and television in particular, could be utilised
to sustain and nurture the Saudi endogenous culture. It is essential that those countries
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such as Saudi Arabia whose governments control media operations, give the media, with
its great potential, the attention it deserves and utilise it in a constructive way to solve
problems of national unity and development. Until the impediments and constraints are
removed, however, this possibility is remote, to say the least. Nevertheless, a number of
possible solutions as outlined below, would effect positive changes in the current system.
To make television more appealing to audiences, and to make it an effective
developmental and nation-building tool, Saudi television programmers have to immerse
themselves in their own national heritage and in their own culture to generate appealing
and informative programmes: programmes that retain the distinctive features of Saudi
society using local cultural symbols, stories, and characters. One way to strengthen and
underpin the values of Saudi culture is to produce or facilitate and encourage the
production of home-produced, indigenous entertainment which is in keeping with Islamic
values and the requirements of Saudi society. Such productions will suitably tackle
serious ideas and contribute to the advancement and the modernisation of Saudi social
life. However, if local production is going to develop into a successful industry, the
Ministry of Information needs to take into careful consideration the factors, described
above, that impede or facilitate the flow of television programmes from one country to
another and create dependency in its own.
History teaches us that there will be no adequate and satisfying progress made under
such a system and there is an essential need to unleash the creative power of individuals
and institutions, including the broadcast media, to be able to compete with other
broadcasters. As the Saudi Arabian representative to UNESCO puts it: 'The only way
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to face the transnational broadcasting which contains unfavourable messages is to
'explode" the local creativity and eliminate the chains that cripple free thinking' 2 The
total abolition of the Ministry of Information in some neighbouring countries and the
relative amount of freedom subsequently enjoyed by a number of formerly government
controlled and operated broadcast media in the region should inspire the Saudi
government to relinquish at least some of its control over the media. Meanwhile, critics
and civil liberty advocates should not stick to an 'all or nothing' standpoint but should
act flexibly and responsibly accordingly.
Concerning bureaucratic constraints, if the Ministry of Information radically cut down
on unnecessary routine this would expedite the processing of new proposals by a contact
or liaison office where enquiries regarding these proposals can be directed. Expediency
entails the introduction of a complete, autonomous commercial department, specialised
in fostering and promoting local production and independent from the Ministry of
Information bureaucracy. Such a department, ideally, would be easily accessible to
producers and responsive to the changing climate and vicissitudes of the wider market
of visual production.
hi respect of financial constraints, there is no impediment to the trend of privatisation,
which was successfully adopted by Saudi Arabia in communication and utilities sectors,
encompassing the broadcast media. Such a move would be necessary and consistent with
this global era in which government control and manipulation of information are
deemed futile. It is in the collective interest of the country that the present grip is
loosened without delay. On a more specific note, many believe it is time for a complete
review and revision of the seventeen-year old pricing policy to adequately reflect today's
economics. Finally, a fraction of the advertising revenue could be invested in fmancing
local production operations and used to lubricate the wheel of STV's economy. This is
one of the new trends in the region. In 1995, Qatar announced that it would grant full
administrative and fmancial independence to its broadcasting system. The Jordanian
government has also given total financial and administrative autonomy to its broadcast
media since the beginning of 1998. Under this new system, the media will be able to use
all advertising revenue generated by both radio and television. In the past it had been
deposited in the National Treasury.3
In matters of management and recruitment, ST y should be granted independence and
freedom to make decisions based on its immediate needs and according to its
unparalleled circumstances. Training schemes are noticeable by their absence. Incisive,
hands-on training for artistic and technical personnel is absolutely crucial if STV is to
make its mark on the broadcasting industry. Reform should apply equally to the
fossilised management structure which, given its civil service status, is immune from
close scrutiny and appraisal, and therefore continues to remain unmonitored. The
management team at STy has been there for an over-long period of time; new blood
and fresh impetus is needed for the innovation of novel ideas and modern, up-to-date
practices.
Local independent production companies require radical improvements in organisation
and infrastructure and in their own technological resources to enhance production. These
solutions are contingent on financial resources which could be derived from mergers
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which, in turn, could strengthen and consolidate the position of these companies. Issues
relating to the lack of diversity in genre production could be tackled if local producers
endeavour to produce a wider variety of genres, such as cookery, and nature shows, as
well as programmes suitable for children. Nepotism could be undermined by a system
of advertising based on principles of 'equal opportunities', and impartial auditioning,
interview and selection processes. Finally, if the local production industry is to develop,
there must be adequate funds and grants for production companies and schools to
sustain programmes of artistic development and training. Above all, there should be an
outlet at the end to which the new talent may apply their knowledge and expertise, with
adequate financial support. If there is a consistent and continuing demand for local
production, this will inevitably provide this outlet, as well as the necessary funds to
sustain it. In turn, this will require a greater degree of professionalism and commitment
from those involved in the industry.
By enhancing the performance of the local television and production industries, it is
possible that dependency on foreign television production will decrease. Abdullab Aijasir
(1995) proposes that governments must act in this respect. He contends that there must
be joint venture projects between Arab governments and local private production
companies to be able to compete with their Western counterparts and produce appealing
local television programmes. It is this author's opinion that the undeniable professional
superiority of imported television production has the potential to inspire Saudi television
producers and independent 'private' producers alike to emulate them in style and format
with an authenticity that relates to the indigenous Saudi viewers. The alleged popularity
of American action and comedy shows should not justify their screening. Home-made
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programmes almost always win in the popularity stakes. As one writer puts it, '[...] in
local production the characters are familiar and identifiable, the setting is recognisable,
and the problems are real' (Katz and Wedell, 1978:122).
In analysing the dilemma engendered by the wide adoption and utilisation of DBS in
Saudi Arabia, this author believes that there are signs that the novelty will begin to fade.
Should this be the case, the DBS channels that would still be in a position to attract and
retain viewers are the ones that would respect those viewers' genuine need for
information, insights, and high quality entertainment. Imposing a ban on DBS reception
is unworkable and an unrealistic policy for the 21st Century in the era of globalisation
and the super-highway of information. The negative and helpless position taken by some
Saudi media officials resulting in an unwillingness to compete with DBS channels should
be radically modified. At the same time, the Saudi media industry is incapable of
competing with DBS while restricted by an inflexible media policy. Once STY frees itself
from unnecessary and undue pressure, often self-imposed, there will be enough room for
it to manoeuvre and compete. Competition should be inspirational and a driving force
for reforms on all fronts; administrative, artistic, technical and, of course, intellectual.
But the Saudi media industry has to improve its production by being better resourced
and less bureaucratic in order to achieve this.
3. A Final Word
It is in the nature of the technological mass media to facilitate educational, social, and
economic growth in developing countries. These nations tend to view the mass media
as a vital means of moving toward economic prosperity and political stability. Radio and
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television are often seen as a way to mobilise a country's population to participate in
social change. It is not this author's view that the media are a panacea for all of the ills
of Saudi Arabian society, but surely, when effectively managed and directed, they could
make a difference.
Sly 's image, however, is currently at an all time low. By isolating itself from
mainstream Saudi society, and because of the absence of a well-defined programming
policy and the constant importation of foreign-made television shows, Saudi television
suffers from what could be termed an 'identity crisis'. It simply has no case to advance
and no cause to champion other than maintaining the status quo and occupying its
remaining loyal viewers with cheaply-made, irrelevant television imports.
It is vital that there is a plan to improve its image, but first the Saudi broadcasting
authority has to recognise and admit this image problem. There must be genuine reform
measures, not just placebos, and these must be supported by a political will. Central to
these measures, STy should distance itself as far as possible from the harsh
governmental advocacy tone and put its viewers' interests first. In an interview with the
Secretary for the Higher Council of Mass Communication, Abdulrahman Alabdan, he
revealed to this author that there is a directive from the Chairman of the Council, Prince
Naif bin Abdulaziz, to the broadcast media to lessen their propagandistic overt content
which had become redundant in media discourse. Through the above alternative
policies and programming strategies and not through bans on DBS reception equipment,
albeit not vigorously implemented, local Saudi viewers will be persuaded to keep in
touch with their own national media.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
DBS Services
At present, DBS provides a vast number and variety of channels to the viewing
population of the Arab world. These are described under the categories of Stations,
News and Networks.
1. Stations
Egyptian Satellite Channel (ESC)
Utilising a combination of transponders, ESC provides coverage for the whole of Europe
and North Africa and can be received by dishes from 80cm to 2.40 metres. Since 1996,
ESC has been available through terrestrial broadcasting to viewers in the USA. Parts of
Saudi Arabia in the North and East, Bahrain, Morocco and Kuwait also receive ESC
signals, as do Angola, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia and the UAE. In 1993, a second
ESC channel, Nile TV International, commenced operation, broadcasting in English and
French. Since then, the project has vastly expanded. In April, 1998, Egypt launched its
own satellite, Nilesat 101. The satellite carries 24 television transponders with 72
channels transmitting in digital compression. This venture extended ESC's broadcasting
capacity to include ANN (Arab News Network), Showtime Network, Oman TV, Iraqi,
Libyan, Sudanese and Syrian satellite channels and six Egyptian specialist channels.
Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MIBC)
MIBC aims to complement television services in the Arab nations and to inform viewers
of international events and developments by means of a more Western format and high
calibre production. ' MIBC provides a wide range of programme genre, including family
11
entertainment such as daily features programmes; children's programmes; drama and
music. In addition, it broadcasts documentaries; sports coverage; films; current affairs
and international news.
Dubai Satellite Channel (DSC)
This service is renowned for its acquisition of recent and expensively produced Arab
entertainment fare.
Lebanon Broadcasting Corporation (LBC)
With a strong focus on Lebanese productions of light entertainment, LBC programming
includes popular music shows and drama, features which generally attract conservative
Gulf viewers (Boyd, 1998). However, this type of offering has met with criticism and
accusations of being too progressive in programming content, evident in 1992 when LBC
became the first television station to broadcast Mexican dubbed soaps. It was strongly
reproached for this by many critics. 2 LBC programming also includes innumerable hours
of comedy, children's fare and drama, over 300 hours of sports programming every year,
and various local drama series.
Future TV
Ii 1994, Future TV began to broadcast on satellite as a competitor to LBC and with very
similar programming, consisting of news, variety shows, soaps, serials, and song and
music programmes.
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2. News
Aljazirah Satellite Channel
Aljazirah is considered by many to be a unique broadcasting service and is believed to
have ended the Western news media's monopoly on franchising. 3 Enjoying a reasonable
margin of freedom which allows it to tackle important issues considered taboo by other
broadcasters, what distinguishes Aljazirah's programmes is their openness to diverse
adherence and non-adherence to any political persuasion. All of Aljazirah's programmes
are presented in a slick, professional manner and it is currently considered to be one of
the most popular sources of Arabic news and information, not only in the region itself,
but also among Arab expatriates all over the world.
Arab News Network (ANN)
Although the main programming comprises news and current affairs features, with three
main news bulletins and a brief every half hour, it also features interviews with Arab
writers and artists who reside in Britain and in other European countries, such as in
Kanadeel Fl Addalam ('Candle in the Darkness'), and produces shows which deal with
environmental issues. At present, ANN, along with Aljazirah, are thought to be the main
sources of news and information for Saudi viewers and Arab viewers in general.
3. Networks
Saudi Cable TV System
The initial idea of this country-wide cable system project developed as a solution to the
widespread utilisation of DBS in Saudi Arabia. According to A. Ashamey, one of the
project's executives, the project is totally owned by the Ministry of Information in Saudi
lv
Arabia." The initial service offered 20 channels of which 17 were subject to pre-
censorship to ensure that their content conformed to the 'values' and 'traditions' of Saudi
society.5
Orbit Communication Company (0CC)
Subscribed to by numerous television channels and radio stations, 0CC is arguably the
largest privately owned broadcasting company in the Arab world. Inaugurated in 1994,
with a showing of the classic film The Jungle Book, it now has more than 40 channels
and broadcasts 24 hours a day to 23 countries. What follows is a brief description of the
television channels comprising the first 0CC services.
1. Al Oula
Essentially a film channel, Al Oula selects and presents original Arabic films, as well as
international films which are dubbed into Arabic for the first time.
2. Al Thania
This is a general programming channel specifically targeting a family audience of any
age group throughout the Arab world. It broadcasts entertainment productions from both
the Arab and non-Arab countries, including documentaries, comedies, drama, children's
productions and fashion features.
3. BBC World Service Television Arabic Language Channel
This 24-hour channel initially broadcast domestic and international news, weather,
Arabic current affairs, business news, science and technology programmes and
documentaries. However, two years after commencement it was discontinued and the
agreement with Orbit was terminated in May, 1996, following a disagreement over the
BBC's editorial policy (see Appendix D, BBC News Release).
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4. All News Channel
Another 24-hour television news service, the All News Channel provides the same
service as the BBC World Service Television Arabic Language Channel, as well as
political and financial news and world events. Its main objective is to present a
viewpoint which is different from other news channels.
5. Orbit News Channel
A third 24-hour national and international news channel, Orbit derives its news material
from the original American networks; ABC, CBS and NBC. It also gleans fmancial news
from the Wall Street Journal and the Asian Wall Street Journal. In addition, it features
certain shows from the USA, such as CBS's This Morning and ABC's Good Morning,
America.
6. CNN International
With 550 broadcast affiliates across the globe and focusing mainly on international
developments, CNNI provides a 24-hour service to 210 countries, reaching 140 million
households.
7. The Hollywood Channel
As its name suggests, the Hollywood Channel is dedicated to providing an insight into
Hollywood life by means of interviews and game shows, concerts, award ceremonies,
features on the top stars and health and fitness programmes
8. America Plus
Aimed at providing entertainment for all age groups, this channel broadcasts many of
the most popular American series, such as Seinfeld.
9. Egypt 1
This channel is dedicated to presenting the best of Egyptian entertainment television;
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games shows, mini-series and an array of national productions.
10. Egypt 2
Egypt 2 serves a similar purpose to Egypt 1 but with a greater focus on shows, films and
sports. Again, these are all derived from Egyptian television.
11. Super Movies
In conjunction with Warner Brothers, the Super Movies channel shows original Home
Box Office (HBO) films.
12. Orbit-ESPN Sports Channel
Offering a 24-hour sports coverage service, this channel provides coverage of both
international and national sports events.
13. Music Now
A first in the Arab world, Music Now is a pioneering channel. With Arab speaking
presenters, it features a range of music from all over the world.
14. The Discovery Channel
This service offers 24 hours of nature, culture, wildlife, science and technology
programmes.
15. The Fun Channel
Despite its title, this channel's main objective is to couple entertainment with educational
experience through animation and live action. Its target audience consists of both
children and adults.
16. C-SPAN
For those interested in American congress and politics, this channel offers a unique
service presenting live coverage of the US government in session and detailed daily
analyses of the legislative developments.
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17. Warner Family Channel
This channel offers movies, series and cartoons aimed at entertaining the whole family.
All items are taken from the Warner Brothers television and film library.
18. French Channel
With a substantial number of French-speaking viewers living in North Africa, this
channel aims to offer them entertainment programmes
19. Home Shopping Network
This channel represents the first attempt to introduce home shopping via television in
the Arab world. The target audience is able to watch advertisements and order any
product by telephone.
20. Pay-Per-View
Programmes for the Pay-Per-View channel can be ordered from the Orbit Billing Centre
in Cyprus. This channel represents another first for the broadcasting industry in the Arab
world.
21. New Channels
In April, 1997, Orbit included the Disney Middle East Channel and Orbit Express Shop.
Further to this, in October, 1997, Orbit signed an agreement with World Vision by which
Orbit could receive more than one thousand hours of Western entertainment shows
including Beverly Hills, Melrose Place, Sunset Beach, etc. In other recent developments,
Orbit has made an agreement with Warner Brothers to show the latest Warner Brother
films on Orbit Super Movies channel and to have access to the Time Warner and Turner
film libraries. This deal has enabled Orbit to premier 450 films for its subscribers in
December, 1997.6 In April, 1997, Orbit included among its offerings Sky News, Viva
Cinema, Channel 5 International, NBC, CNBC, and Fox Kids.7
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Showtime
Showtime offers a direct-to-home satellite pay-TV service for the Middle East with
programme offerings controlled and monitored in London. There are 9 customised
channels which make up the Showtime bouquet and which cater for specific age, gender
and genre interest groups as follows:
1. Nickelodeon, which features cartoons and games shows for children. Research
conducted by Middle East Market Research Bureau revealed that this channel was the
leading regional children's television channel. 8
2. TV Land, a channel of fast action, adventure and drama programmes.
3. The Movie Channel, which shows an uninterrupted selection of Hollywood hits and
exciusives, 24 hours a day.
4. VH-1, which provides a mix of classic rock and pop music videos;
5. The Paramount Channel, which broadcasts comedies, dramas, soaps and mini-series
for the whole family;
6. Bloomberg Information TV, a channel which, as its name suggests, broadcasts global
news, sports, Imance and weather services;
7. MTV Europe, which shows Europe's latest rock and pop videos, live concerts and
youth lifestyle shows;
8. Style, a channel exclusively designed for women, featuring drama, fashion, health,
childcare tips, lifestyle discussions, general chat, food and travel programmes;
9. Discovery Channel, as described previously.
These channels being offered to date are 'highly focused' and 'tightly defined' . This
definition means that audiences can be carefully targeted and advertisers are offered
more value.
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Arab Radio and TV (ART)
ART offers seven channels which target all social classes and are dedicated to different
genres. ART IV, the movie channel, transmits 24 hours a day and includes film reviews
arid critiques featuring and involving producers, critics and actors. ART III, the juniors'
channel transmitting 14 hours a day, incorporates educational, cultural and entertainment
programmes in its schedule. A third channel, ART II, dedicated to sports, concentrates
on both Arab and International sporting events and achievements, both recorded and
live. ART V is a music channel featuring Arabic songs. Other channels include Almaarzf
('Knowledge'), which provides an educational service, and Alakifak ('Your Choice').
Finally, there is a variety channel which focuses on Arab cultural activities: festivals,
literary symposiums, entertainment programmes and theatre, and is used as a window
to showcase its other sister channels.
Instead of aiming at financial gain or competing with other sateffite networks it strives
to deliver only suitable entertainment and to lure viewers away from channels which are
deemed inappropriate. 10
x
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APPENDIX B
Mass Communication Policy in Saudi Arabia.
Introduction
The information policy refers to the principles and goals which constitute the
foundations and requirements of information in Saudi Arabia. This policy emanates from
Islam, in doctrine and law, which is the national religion. It aims at establishing belief
in God, raising the intellectual, cultural, and perceptual level in the citizens, and at
dealing with social problems. It seeks to stress the concept of obedience to God, His
Prophet, and the legal guardian. It exhorts Saudi Arabians to respect the law and to
carry it out contently. It includes the broad outlines which govern Saudi information;
thus accomplishing the goals by means of education, guidance, and recreation. This
policy is considered a part of the country's general policy, and is specified in the
following articles:
Article I
Saudi information has its obligation to Islam exclusively. It seeks to keep the tradition
of this nation, and to exclude all that contradicts God's laws which He gave to the
people.
Article II
Saudi mass communication will oppose all destructive elements, atheistic inclinations,
materialistic philosophies, and all attempts to distract the Muslims from their beliefs. It
will further expose their falsehood and dangers to the individuals and societies, and will
xii
stand up to every challenge which does not concur with the general policy of the
country.
Article HI
All information media seek to serve society by consolidating its precious Islamic values;
firmly establishing its honoured Arabic traditions and preserving its gracious inherited
customs; and seek to stand in opposition to everything that threatens its purity and
harmony.
Article IV
All mass communication will seek to serve the existing policy of the Kingdom, protecting
the primary interests of the citizens first, then the Muslims and Arabs in general. This
will be done by the adoption of this policy and its presentation with full documentation,
supported by precedence and facts.
Article V
All mass communication will seek to present the unique and distinctive characteristics
of Saudi Arabia on national and international levels, emphasising its stability and safety,
and progress in various domains, by embracing Islam as the constitution of the
government and the law of life, placing upon her shoulders the responsibility to serve
the sacred Islamic places.
Article VI
All mass communication will seek to strengthen the bond among the citizens by
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informing them of the numerous areas of their country and the significant aspects
pertaining to them, thus demonstrating the complementary nature of these regions.
Article VII
All mass communication will seek to enhance loyalty to the country, bringing to light the
capabilities and potential bestowed upon it, and reminding its citizens of its greatness,
past and present. As the citizen is made aware of his responsibility to his country, he will
be urged to contribute to its progress, advancement and protection.
Article VIII
The Saudi mass communication will give the family its due attention, being the essential
unit in the society, and the first school where children learn and are guided, where their
personalities are developed and enriched.
Article IX
Saudi mass communication affirms the relationship between today's child and
tomorrow's environment. Thus, attention will be given to guidance; educational and
recreational programmes for children. The programmes will be based on educational and
scientific principles and directed by highly specialised personnel.
Article X
Recognising the innate quality which women have, and the duty which God has given
them, mass communication will provide special programmes which will assist women in
performing their innate duty in society.
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Article XI
Saudi mass communication will give special consideration to teenagers, realising the
importance of the period of adolescence. Therefore, special programmes will be
designed to deal with their problems and meet their needs; thus preparing them
adequately in religion and behaviour.
Article XII
The mass communication will seek, through the use of audio-visual facilities, to be
informative in all that pertains to the history of the Kingdom by means of documentaries
and recordings, both within the Kingdom and outside it.
Article XHI
The Saudi mass communication will seek cooperation with educational and social
organisations and research centres to conduct communication studies.
Article XIV
The mass communication will design programmes which will appeal to the highly
educated to keep them informed of all the educational and intellectual studies and
scientific publications.
Article XV
The mass communication will seek to promote and encourage scholarship in all fields
of specialisation. This can be accomplished at a high level of religion, science, awareness,
and dedication, having all conditions favourable.
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Article XVI
Realising its significant role, mass communication will deal directly and effectively to
abolish illiteracy by adopting educational and scientific principles, and by dedicating
educational programmes to meet the needs of every age and mentality.
Article XVII
Mass communication in Saudi Arabia must maintain standard Arabic as the vehicle of
Islam and the reservoir of its education. Consequently, the following points are
emphasised:
1. Authors and writers of programmes will be directed to follow closely the rules of
grammar and syntax, as well as adhere to correct expression and pronunciation.
2. Newscasters, programme directors and club sponsors will be directed to use standard
Arabic to avoid making mistakes in pronunciation, and to conform to the rules of proper
execution.
3. It is essential to be highly selective and avoid all that is derogatory or downgrading
to standard Arabic.
4. There must be an effort to gradually raise the level of the programmes that use
colloquial Arabic, and replace it with simplified standard Arabic.
5. There must be active support for all programmes, plays and series which utilise
standard Arabic to make it desirable to the public.
6. There should be a focus on teaching standard Arabic to non-Arabic speakers in
Islamic countries, utilising the most advanced methods and technology.
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Article XVIII
The Saudi mass media currently support educational and scientific movements in the
following ways:
1. By encouraging researchers, scientists, and intellectuals in every way possible, which
includes the publishing of their scholarly works and giving them opportunities to express
their views.
2. By guiding young talents, encouraging and sponsoring them until they reach the
desired level.
3. By holding scholarly discussions and literary and scientific conferences among the
educated in the Kingdom, as well as with others outside; thus, presenting the educational
and scientific capabilities of the Kingdom.
4. By encouraging specialised periodicals which are published in Saudi Arabia and the
Arab world.
5. By supporting national publishing houses so that they may publish serious Saudi
writings, and by sponsoring book exhibitions, thus demonstrating the rank which Saudi
Arabia has attained in the scientific and educational spheres.
Article XIX
The Saudi information media stress the significance of tradition and the need to revive
it. It performs this role by accomplishing the following:
1. Encouraging the preservation of tradition materially and morally by:
a. Preparing programmes identifying sources of reference and their locations.
b. Publishing materials concerning tradition, with government funding, and making
it available to everyone.
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c. Facilitating the availability of these publications to the parties concerned.
2. Resisting every effort which seeks to destroy tradition or scorn it.
3. Encouraging programmes which draw on books about tradition, especially in the areas
of study, drama series and literary biographies.
4. Exhibition of masterpieces of tradition, introducing the public to their forebears'
efforts and accomplishments in many fields of knowledge and inviting them to bridge
the gap between the past and the present of this nation.
Article XX
The information media will seek to bring all Muslims closer by means of introducing the
Islamic peoples, their countries, potentials and capabilities; and to instigate cooperation
among these countries.
Article XXI
The Saudi information media seeks:
1. Unity and cooperation among all Arabs, avoiding all antagonistic tendencies.
2. Defense of their cases especially those dealing with their destinies, urging them to
support Islam at every opportunity that avails itself.
Article XXII
The Saudi information media affirms the standing invitation to God among Muslims and
others until God inherits the whole earth. Thus the Saudi means of communication
participates in this obligation in all wisdom and advice, seeking to communicate with
intellect while respecting the privacy of others.
xviii
Article XXIII
The Saudi information media, in cooperation with their counterparts in the Islamic world
in general, and the Arab world in particular, will seek to adopt a unified programme
which serves the religious and secular interests of all Muslims and will attempt to
represent their cultural and intellectual unity.
Article XXIV
The Saudi information media affirms its respect of the rights of everyone individually
and collectively. Simultaneously, it seeks to create an atmosphere of harmony, unity, and
cooperation among all, informing everyone of his direct responsibility for the whole
society.
Article XXV
The Saudi information media seeks to be objective in presenting the facts, avoiding
exaggerations, valuing the honour of an individual's word and the need to protect it and
raise it above every suspicion.
Article XXVI
The Saudi information media desires that freedom of expression be guaranteed within
the national goals and values of Islam.
Article XXVH
The Saudi information media advocates respect for the dignity of man; to exercise
freedom in his land; to disapprove of every act of violence towards individuals or
xix
peoples; to fight all expansive intentions; to stand by righteousness, justice, and peace;
and to rise against injustice and racism.
Article XXVIII
The Saudi information media affirms the import of human expert resources capable of
accomplishing the goals of Saudi communication, and entrusts these resources with
training by making necessary adjustments.
Article XXIX
The Saudi information media encourages local production of materials which are in
accordance with its policy.
Article XXX
The information media of Saudi Arabia shall comply with this policy and the execution
of all its rules and regulations.
xx
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APPENDIX C
Programme Cycle, Autumn 1997
Source: Saudi Arabian Television
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APPENDIX I)
Television Programme Prices
H.E. The Deputy, Ministry of Information Affairs
According to what His Excellency, the Ministry Assistant Deputy for Radio and
Television, has said in his letter No.1083, dated 21.8.1401 H. (7.1981), regarding the
revision of television programme prices, the following is approved:
First: Category (A) Available Saudi production
The sum of (30,000) thirty thousand Saudi riyals will be paid for one televised hour if
the following conditions have been met:
1. The work presented is the product of a Saudi company or establishment.
2. The production must be in compliance with the censorship rules and conditions
applied to Saudi television.
3. The Saudi company or establishment will stipulate in a written contract, and
acknowledge therein, that the work in question is actually theirs. The company should
guarantee their ownership of any artistic, literary or financial rights which may be
contested by a third party. A penalty condition must be included in the contract stating
that, in case it is subsequently proven that the work is not the property of this company,
calculations for adjustments may be made, based on current prices for non-Saudi
production, and that, in addition, a fine may be imposed in the amount of 10% of the
original contract value and all transactions with this company will cease for a period not
to exceed one year for the first offence, and to cease indefinitely in the event of any
further infraction of such copyright laws.
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Second: Category (B) Distinguished Saudi production
The sum of (40,000) forty thousand Saudi riyals will be paid for each television hour if
the following conditions are met:
1. The work submitted should be the product of a Saudi company or establishment.
2. The work submitted should be in compliance with the censor's conditions and rules
applied to Saudi television.
3. The company or establishment will stipulate in a written contract, and acknowledge
therein, that the work in question is actually theirs. The company should guarantee their
ownership of any artistic, literary or fmancial rights which may be contested by a third
party. A penalty condition must be included in the contract stating that in case it is
subsequently proven that the work is not the property of this company, calculations for
adjustments may be made, based on current prices for non-Saudi production, and that,
in addition, a fme may be imposed in the amount of 10% of the original contract value
and all transactions with this company will cease for a period not to exceed one year for
the first offence, and to cease indefmitely in the event of any further infraction of such
copyright laws.
4. The consent of any concerned individuals represented in the television production
should be secured in writing, prior to submitting the summary of the story. This will not
lessen the responsibility of the producer to ensure the proper production standards in
all artistic or censoring aspects.
5. The Ministry of Information (for television production) must give its prior consent to
the names of all participants in major roles.
6. The work should be of good quality in general, as far as the components of
production are concerned. However, if the Department concerned with examining and
xxv
controlling production reports that the production is of average standard and can be
accepted, it will be dealt with according to category (A) prices based on average current
prices for Saudi production.
7. The first production copy is to be forwarded to the Ministry of Information, the
Department of Saudi television and the Department will assume the privilege of showing
the materials for a duration of six months subsequent to the submission date of the
work.
Third: Category (C) Private production
The sum of (65,000) sixty five thousand Saudi riyals will be paid for each television hour
if the following conditions are met:
1. The programme must be Saudi in context, and contain the appropriate religious,
moral, social and psychological constructs which will be compatible with Saudi society.
The programme may be historic or Arabic, must exhibit high moral values and, on
certain occasions, the Department of Saudi television may request a company to make
a special production of the above type.
2. Written approval must be obtained from the Department of Saudi television regarding
the context and dialogue of possible television productions. This will not lessen the
responsibility of the producer to ensure the proper production standards in all artistic
or censoring aspects.
3. A number of Saudi actors should participate in the performance, however, the
individuals, their appropriateness for the roles will be reviewed by the Ministry, and
assignments will be subject to its approval.
4. A number of distinguished Arabian actors should participate in the performance,
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especially those who have been recognised significantly as excellent artists and
unequalled in the field; however, the Department of Saudi television must give prior
written approval to the names and the number of Arabian candidates.
5. Production should be made outside the Department of Saudi Television; however, if
the Department provides the studio, equipment and production instruments, 25 % of the
stated price for one television hour will be deducted.
6. The production will become the property of Saudi television; the producer has no
right to market it for others, nor to dispose of it in any way. The Department of Saudi
television shall have the right to dispose of the production in any maimer that it deems
appropriate. The company or establishment will stipulate in a written contract, and
acknowledge therein, that the work in question is actually theirs. The company should
guarantee their ownership of any artistic, literary or fmancial rights which may be
contested by a third party. A penalty condition must be included in the contract stating
that, in case it is subsequently proven that the work is not the property of this company,
calculations for adjustments may be made, based on current prices for non-Saudi
production, and that, in addition, a fine may be inflicted in, the amount of 10% of the
original contract value and all transactions with this company will cease for a period not
to exceed one year for the first offence, and to cease indefinitely in the event of any
further infraction of such copyright laws. A further condition must be inserted in the
contract, stipulating the penalties to be inflicted if the producer disregards the copyright
prerogatives of the Department without having first obtained the written permission of
the Ministry of Information, regardless of whether or not any monetary value was
received, and the calculation of the production value shall be revised in accordance with
the average current prices of Saudi production (A) or the distinguished Saudi production
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prices of category (B), according to individual circumstances. The Department of Saudi
television will charge the producer with the value of the difference in price, and all
transactions with the offending company will be terminated for one year.
Fourth: Category (D) Available non-Saudi production
This is the type of production which may be carried out by a non-Saudi company or
establishment. A maximum sum of (14,500) fourteen thousand, five hundred Saudi riyals
will be paid for each television hour if the supplier is non-Saudi; and the sum of (16,500)
sixteen thousand, five hundred Saudi riyals will be paid if the supplier is Saudi.
Fifth: Category (E) Programmes produced by TV stations which have agreements
with the Department of Saudi television
Programmes which will be produced by foreign TV stations having agreements with the
Department of Saudi television governing their direct marketing without interference
from other production companies or distributors, will be subject to the above two-party
agreements, which will stipulate that the maximum price for each television hour will
not exceed the average production price previously referred to in Category (D), i.e. to
a Saudi supplier, unless the production is a private or joint venture, in which case the
agreement will stipulate its price.
Sixth: Plays
1. If the play is a Saudi production, the price will be (30,000) thirty thousand Saudi riyals
for each television hour provided that the duration of the play does not exceed two and
a half hours.
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2. If the play is a non-Saudi production, the maximum price with be (20,000) twenty
thousand Saudi riyals for one television hour if the supplier is non-Saudi, and (22,000)
twenty-two thousand Saudi riyals if the supplier is Saudi, provided that the duration of
the play does not exceed two and a half hours.
3. The Assistant Deputy of the Ministry of Information will fix the price of those which
are considered distinguished plays and which include the acting talent of famous stars
within the Arabian theatrical profession, after having come to a prior agreement with
the producing company or the company which holds the right of distribution.
Seventh: Cultural programmes in general production
This category includes films and programmes which contain subtitles or commentaries
in Arabic. The maximum television hour price will be (5000) five thousand Saudi riyals.
2. TV discussions and talks which are recorded outside the Department of Saudi
television studios will be given a maximum of (6000) six thousand Saudi riyals per
television hour.
Eighth: Song programmes of general production
Programmes in this category will be treated in the same manner as those programmes
which require other acting skills, with the possible incorporation of an additional
percentage in the price, which will be stipulated by the Assistant Deputy of the Ministry
of Information, in accordance with the importance of the work and the professional
standards of the participants. This percentage should not exceed 25 %. Any further
amount should be submitted to the Minister of Information for review.
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Ninth: Individual songs of available production
The price of each minute will be between 250-500 Saudi riyals. The TV will determine
the price within these limits according to the singers popularity and the excellence of his
work, provided that it abides by the rules of censorship.
Tenth: Children's programmes in general production
1. This category includes educational programmes for children. The price of one
television hour will be (12,000) twelve thousand Saudi riyals, and a percentage of 25%
will be added if it is produced by a Saudi company.
2. The price of children's cartoon programmes, which are either dubbed in Arabic
and/or which provide commentary via ventriloquist dummies will be (8000) eight
thousand Saudi riyals per television hour. If the programme is produced by a Saudi
company, the price per television hour will be increased by 25%.
Eleventh: General Gulf production
In accordance with the recommendations of Gulfvision, and as an encouragement to
Gulf production, the price of one television hour for series and plays produced by Gulf
companies will be determined at (18,000) eighteen thousand Saudi riyals if the supplier
is non-Saudi, and (20,000) twenty thousand Saudi riyals if the supplier is Saudi. The
Assistant Deputy of the Ministry of Information may increase the price of any
distinguished works to a maximum of (22,000) twenty-two thousand Saudi riyals per
television hour if the suppler is non-Saudi, and (24,000) twenty-four thousand Saudi
riyals if the suppler is Saudi. Any further amount should be submitted to the Minister
of Information for review.
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Twelfth: General provisions
I. Without violating the contents of the two previous items (the First and Second
provisions), if a company or an establishment submits a production and claims that they
possess the exclusive right to market it, and it is subsequently discovered by the
Department of Saudi television that it is actually the production of another company,
or that the marketing company has no right to do so, that company's entitlements will
immediately cease and the value given will be recharged to the offending company. No
transactions will be conducted with this company for the period of one year. If this
infraction is repeated, all transactions whatsoever with this company will cease.
2. If the production standard is less than that which is required, and if the Department
of Saudi television believes this can be proven, the price will be reduced to a percentage
which will be determined by the Department and additionally, written consent will be
taken from the establishment or company concerned in acceptance of the reduction
percentage before the materials may be shown on the screen.
3. If the above television material can be made acceptable after some of the contents
have been eliminated, these portions will be deducted from the original quoted price.
Thirteenth
The above instructions will be in effect from the date of their issuance, and they will
replace the previous instructions, issued in the Minister of Information's letter
No.MJW/576, dated 12.4.1401 (1981).
Minister of Information
Mohemed Abdu Yamani
His Excellency, The Assistant Deputy, Radio and Television, regarding necessary action.
(Translated from the Arabic)
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news release
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PRODUCTION OF BI3C ARAI3IC CHANNEL ENDS
BBC Worldwide Television confirmed today (Sunday 21 April 1996) that Orbit
Communications has ceased broadcasting the BIJC's Arabic language news and
information channel (BBC Arabic Television) to Orbit subscribers across the Middle
East and North Africa.
As a result, the BBC has stopped production of the eight hour per day channel at BBC
Television Centre.
Issued by:
BIJC Worldwide Television Press & PR
Veekday Tel:+ 44 181 576 2339
Out of office hours, contact the HBC Corporate Press Office: + 44 181 576 1865
Sunday 21 April 1996
Note to Editors:
BBC Arabic Television was launched on 20 June 994. Initially a two hour per dy channel, it moved to an
eight hour daily schedule of International news, business and facnial programmes presented entirely m the
Arabic language on 23 September 1994 It has been provided under contract by PBC Worldwide Television to
Orbit Communications, a Rome-based compaily owned by the Mawarid Group of Saudi Arabia.
BBC Worldwide Television is a commercial division of BRC Worldwide - the commercial and international
arm of the I3BC.
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APPENDIX F
Pictures and Cartoons
Picture No.1
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A permanent presence for satellite receiving equipment, even at weekend camping
sites outside Riyadh.
Source: Okadh, issue 10813, 21.3.1996.
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Cartoon No.2
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'These satellite channels have spoiled you !
The wife complains to her husband after he has refused a cup of traditional coffee
for a fizzy drink.
Source: Arriyadh, issue 10487, 11.3.1997.
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Cartoon No.3
'We continue our credible news with the tea-leaf reader.'
Source: Asharq Alawsat, issue 7029, 25.2.1998.
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Cartoon No.4
A severe punishment for a young girl who has tried to emulate one of the female
announcers by wearing a short skirt.
Source: Aljazirah, issue 8987, 7.5.1997.
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Cartoon No.5
i.v.
'Don 't worry, with afew connections and recommendations it will be shown on every DBS
channel!'
Words of comfort to a seemingly depressed writer of bad drama.
Source: Asharq Alawsat, issue 6995, 22.1.1998.
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Cartoon No.6
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'As requested by our viewers, we now repeat the histoncal inten'iew with the great leader
on the screen 1
 - "The leader's satellite channel'Y
Source Asharq Alawsat, issue 6957, 15 12 1997
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Cartoon No.7
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Poems of love and courtship inspired by attractive DBS channel presenters
Source Aljazirah, 25 4 1996
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ICartoon No.8
Some Arabic cartoon characters drawn by Arab animators in an attempt to
provide a replacement for established Western counterparts.
Source: A1-Seyassah, issue 2214-2320, 2.3.1998.
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APPENDIX G
Pictures of the latest fashion in printed clothing.
Famous Arab and Western celebrities pictured on T shirts. It has become
fashionable for youngsters to wear these.
Source: Okadli, issue 11478, 19.1.1998.
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A famous Saudi singer's picture on a lady's dress
Source: Okadh, issue 11478, 19.1.1998
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An attempt by youngsters to identify with Western Culture. Media influence was
held responsible for this.
Source: Okadli, issue 11478, 19.1.1998.
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